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3Abstract
Previous theories of design decision-making have discussed how designers use
analogical reasoning to quickly scope the solution space down to one viable solution.
This initial analogy forms the template of a possible action plan that is then modified to
suit the unique properties of that particular problem. This use of analogical reasoning
allows designers to quickly engage with the problem and generate a workable solution.
Our findings indicate that this initial analogy actually persists across all stages of
decision-making, and does not play a role solely during the first stage of scoping. This
analogical persistence leads to poorer design decisions.
This thesis presents a series of studies that adopt a mixed method approach to
investigating the influence of analogies on the decision-making of Interaction
Designers. We employed qualitative methods such as the Critical Decision Method for
Eliciting Knowledge (Klein, 1989), which aided in identifying analogical persistence as
a problem that leads to poorer quality decisions. We also employed quantitative
methods such as the Design Fixation paradigm (Jansson & Smith, 1991) to investigate
how different types of analogies (self-generated & provided Priming Analogies) can
influence the expression of analogical persistence.
Finally in an attempt to mitigate the potential pitfalls of analogical persistence,
this thesis attempts to control it using principles from Design Rationale (Lee & Lai,
1991) and Reflection (Schon, 1983). Rather than seeing a decrease in analogical
persistence, our manipulation actually increased fixation. A follow-up study identified
that designers tend to poorly appraise the weaknesses in the initial analogy, which may
have led to the aforementioned unexpected result. These findings challenge the notion
that greater understanding of the design space will lead to higher quality design
decisions.
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1. Introduction
Decision-making, though an important cognitive component of the act of design, is
often overlooked (Zannier, 2007). Decision-making, regardless of design discipline, is
concerned with the evaluation of the viability of a particular situation in light of the
requirements of the design brief. A cornerstone of the decision-making process (Klein,
1999) is the use of analogical reasoning as way to scope the solution space and to
quickly engage with the design problem. Designers are able to use analogies as a
template for a possible solution by drawing upon similar situations that have worked in
the past. Traditionally, this process of analogical reasoning has been viewed as an initial
framing device, but this thesis discusses how this initial analogy can actually persist
across all stages of decision-making (Klein, 1987a). This initial analogy is used in more
than just the initial stage of idea generation, but is also utilized during the later stages of
decision-making like mental simulation and solution evaluation. While analogies are an
important cognitive component of design decision-making, this analogical persistence
across all stages of decision-making can lead to overall poorer quality design decisions.
1.1. Research Aims
The aim of this research is to investigate how analogical persistence influences
decision-making in Interaction Designers, with a particular focus on mitigating the
inherent issues with analogical persistence. To answer this question, both quantitative
and qualitative methods were employed. Qualitative methods such as Protocol Analysis
(Ericsson & Simon, 1993) and the Critical Decision Method for Elicitation of
Knowledge (Klein, Calderwood, & MacGregor, 1989) were employed as hypothesis
generating techniques, while such quantitative methods as the Design Fixation
paradigm (Jansson & S.M. Smith, 1991) allowed us to observe, manipulate, and
validate the findings from the qualitative approaches. By using a range of different
methodologies, we can gain an accurate idea of how analogical persistence in
Interaction Designers manifests, the factors that influence it, and how to best mitigate
the potential pitfalls while retaining the clear benefits of analogies during design
decision-making.
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The objectives of this thesis are:
 Extend current Naturalistic Decision-Making research into the field of design
decision-making
 Address issues of validity in the Design Fixation paradigm, specifically
generalisability, stimuli, and the confounding variable of familiarity
 Provide insight into how different analogies influence analogical persistence
 Mitigate analogical persistence by using ecologically valid methods, such as
Reflection and Design Rationale
1.2. Chapter Summary
This thesis is composed of a total of ten chapters. Listed below is an overview of each
chapter detailing its aims, goals and contribution towards the defined research question.
1.2.1. Chapter Two
There are many different perspectives on what constitutes design decision-making.
Mechanical Engineers for example see decision-making as a linear evaluation of a set of
possible solutions in which one solution is chosen for its achievement of the most
design requirements with the minimal amount of resources. Researchers such as Klein
& Brezovic (1986) postulate that this view on decision-making is idealistic and simply
unrealistic in a real world setting. In contrast to the engineering view on design, the
work done by Klein (1999) is primarily concerned with achieving an accurate
description of how environmental stressors can impinge on how designers engage in the
decision-making process. Chapter two presents a summary of both sides of this
argument with a focus on which of the current models of decision-making are possibly
the most realistic description of the design decision-making process adopted by
Interaction Designers.
1.2.2. Chapter Three
Chapter three discusses an explorative study looking at the decision-making process of
Interaction Designers in a real world setting. To frame our discussion, we examine how
Interaction Designers make decisions in the context of the Recognition-Primed
Decision-Making model (Klein, 1997). Three variations of this model, which account
for different types of decisions, are examined as descriptors of the decision-making
process exhibited by Interaction Designers. By pairing the Critical Decision Method for
Eliciting Knowledge with screenshots of recently designed interfaces, we were able to
probe the process of, as well as identify important factors that influence, design
decision-making. The chief finding that emerged from our analysis was that the
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analogical reasoning that Interaction Designers engage in at the outset of the decision-
making process to frame the solution space is not simply an initial first stage of the
decision-making process as postulated by Klein (1999), but rather, persists across all of
the decision-making stages. The analogies that designers were employing allowed them
to quickly frame the solution space but designers were also relying on those analogies to
the point where they were no longer a help to the decision-making process.
1.2.3. Chapters Four Through Six
A concern with the results from chapter three was that the analogical persistence
discussed by participants was not an accurate reflection of their decision-making
processes, but simply a function of a post-hoc rationalization. To address this issue, we
used a quantitative approach (i.e. the Design Fixation paradigm (Jansson & S.M. Smith,
1991)) to provide methodological triangulation for the study presented in chapter three.
However, an issue with using the Design Fixation paradigm in this capacity is that there
are various threats to validity that need to be addressed. Chapters four through six each
address a different threat to the validity of the Design Fixation paradigm with an
overarching goal of replicating analogical persistence. Chapter four examines the
generalisability of Design Fixation; chapter five looks at the confounding variables of
stimuli; and chapter six is concerned with the issue of familiarity and how it can impact
the Design Fixation paradigm. By addressing each of these threats to the validity of the
Design Fixation paradigm, we can be confident that the results we are observing are a
true reflection of analogical persistence and not simply a function of a potentially
problematic paradigm.
The biggest threat to the external validity of the Design Fixation paradigm is its
generalisability. Traditionally, replication of Design Fixation outside of a population of
Mechanical Engineers has been problematic (Purcell & Gero, 1991; Purcell, Williams,
Gero, & Colbron, 1993). In chapter four, we discuss how the failure to replicate design
fixation outside of Mechanical Engineers was due to the measures used to gauge the
influence of the initial analogy. By employing a more sensitive measure, we were able
to replicate Design Fixation among Interaction Designers. In addition, by replicating
the findings of previous Design Fixation studies among Interaction Designers, we
quantitatively illustrated how a flawed initial analogy can influence all stages of
decision-making from idea generation to the proposed final solution.
Chapter five continues our discussion of the threats to the validity of the Design
Fixation paradigm by addressing the problem of materials. Traditionally, many of the
Design Fixation studies have used the same, or very similar, materials to the ones used
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in the original Jansson & Smith (1991) study (e.g. Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005; Purcell
et al., 1993). Any new materials that were utilised were limited to the Mechanical
Engineering domain of participants (Perttula & Sipila, 2007; Perttula & Liikkanen,
2006; Purcell & Gero, 1996; Tseng, Moss, Cagan, & Kotovsky, 2008). In this study,
participants were presented with two different design briefs, both newly generated. One
design problem was a newly generated Mechanical Engineering problem, for
comparability to previous studies, and the other was a newly generated Interaction
Design problem. Our results indicated that we were able to replicate our findings from
the Design Fixation studies in the previous chapters using newly generated materials,
thereby checking that the use of different test materials yielded the same results.
Therefore the influence of the initial analogy on decision-making is actually a function
of analogical persistence and not simply a function of the materials used.
Chapter six concludes our discussion regarding the individual threats to the
validity of the Design Fixation paradigm by examining the role of familiarity. We
addressed the issue of materials used in Design Fixation studies and found that a higher
level of fixation was observed in the materials that were traditionally used when
compared to newly generated stimuli. We hypothesised that this result was a function of
participant’s familiarity with the presented stimuli. Participants were shown two
different design problems: one problem that they would be highly familiar with (a
desktop calendar application), and another problem that they would not be familiar with
at all (a communication device between aquatic mammals and marine biologists).
Results indicated that one’s familiarity with the common usage of an artefact actually
has a limited impact on the types of solutions that participants generated. By
demonstrating the limited effect that familiarity had on the types of solutions proposed,
when we explicitly controlled for it, we were able to demonstrate how the influence of
the analogy that we observe in the Design Fixation paradigm is a function of analogical
persistence, rather than a confounding variable inherent to the paradigm.
Chapters four through six each address a different threat to the overall validity of
the Design Fixation paradigm. Chapter four addressed the generalisability, chapter five
attended to the materials, and chapter six was concerned with the confounding variable
of familiarity. Underlying all of these chapters was the goal of replication. To provide
methodological triangulation to the findings presented in chapter three we adopted a
quantitative measure to observe the influence that an initial analogy can have across all
stages of decision-making. Within each chapter we were able to replicate analogical
persistence and illustrate in each case that it was a not a function of some of the issues
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regarding the Design Fixation paradigm.
1.2.4. Chapter Seven
After validating the Design Fixation paradigm in previous chapters, we used it to
quantitatively investigate how analogies can persist across the entire decision-making
process of Interaction Designers. Chapter seven extends the Design Fixation paradigm
beyond its current limitations, by pairing it with a think-aloud which allows us to use it
to observe how different types of analogies influence analogical persistence In chapter
three we found that Interaction Designers draw upon analogies from personal
experiences and use existing artefacts to engage with the design brief (Visser, 2006).
The Design Fixation paradigm in its current incarnation analyses how examples, or
Priming Analogies, can influence the types of solutions proposed by participants. In
chapter seven we look at how Interaction Designers use the provided Priming Analogies
& Self-Generated Analogies in their decision-making process. By examining these
different sources of inspiration, we can see how the usage of these different analogies
overlap or differ and gain some insight into how best to mitigate the potential problems
with analogical persistence.
Since the current Design Fixation paradigm is solely concerned with the provided
Priming Analogies, and we were interested in how Self-Generated Analogies are used,
it was necessary to pair a think-aloud protocol with the existing Design Fixation
paradigm. Participants’ verbalizations revealed that several behaviours, for each of the
two sources of inspiration fostered analogical persistence. Our results demonstrated that
there was a clear disconnect between what designers think and what they do. Self-
Generated Analogies were observed to be prone to selective recall in that participants
only discussed how the best bits of that analogy were remembered and the problematic
elements were forgotten and consequently did not influence their solutions. Priming
Analogies were seen to narrow the solutions space by causing participants to believe
that the provided example was the single best solution to the design brief. Another
important result that was common across both types of analogies was that participants
were aware of how the presence of these analogies could unduly influence the decisions
that they were making; despite this acknowledgment participants had no coping
mechanisms in place to maintain the benefits of the initial analogies but mitigate the
potential pitfalls of analogical persistence.
1.2.5. Chapter Eight
Chapter seven highlights the fact that participants were aware of the limitations of their
chosen analogies but very few, if any, had any coping strategies in place. In the past,
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little work has been able to mitigate the effects illustrated in the Design Fixation
paradigm (e.g. Purcell & Gero, 1996). Chrysikou & Weisberg (2005) were one of the
few researchers to successfully control for Design Fixation. This was accomplished by
providing participants with a pre-generated list of the problematic features contained
within the provided example solution. While successful, this technique has no
applicability outside of a controlled lab setting. In chapter eight we aimed to control
fixation by using an approach based on Chrysikou and Weisberg but in a more
ecologically-appropriate manner. It was hypothesised that by encouraging participants
to reflect on the types of analogies they were employing they would be able to generate
their own list of problematic features which in turn would mitigate Design Fixation. It
was thought that encouraging participants to reflect on the analogies that they employed
in their decision-making would mitigate analogical persistence but actually our study
yielded the inverse effect. Reflection increased the influence of the initial analogy on
decisions that were exhibited in the types of solutions proposed by participants.
Subsequently, a follow-up qualitative analysis of the design rationale templates used by
participants to facilitate reflection on the analogies was conducted. This follow up study
indentified several behaviours that may have fostered the observed increase in
analogical persistence.
1.2.6. Chapter Nine
In chapter nine we examined the validity of the behaviours identified in the qualitative
follow-up presented in chapter eight using methodological triangulation and a think-
aloud protocol. In this study a think-aloud protocol was paired with the experimental
design employed in chapter eight. By examining the verbalisations produced by
participants across the reflection portion of the study and the sketching component, we
were able to examine the cognitive processes that may have contributed to the observed
increase in analogical persistence. This study compares and contrasts the behaviours
identified from participants’ verbalisations against the behaviours identified in the
follow-up examination of the design rationale templates in chapter eight. Employing a
think-aloud protocol reproduced some of the previously identified behaviours, and
provided additional insight into how some of those behaviours may have contributed to
the increased influence of the initial analogy. This chapter closes with a discussion of
the implication that these findings have on the field of Design Rationale.
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1.2.7. Chapter Ten
Chapter ten closes this dissertation with a summary of the contributions towards
knowledge, a discussion of the limitations of this dissertation, and possible research
threads to emerge from this work that may be built upon in the future.
1.3. Summary of Main Findings
Below is a summary of the key findings broken down by the pertinent chapters.
 Identified the persistence of analogies across all stages of design decision-
making (Chapter three)
 Addressed issues of validity in the Design Fixation paradigm, specifically
generalisability (Chapter four), the issue of stimuli (Chapter five), and the
confounding variable of familiarity (Chapter six)
 Extended the Design Fixation paradigm to observe not just Priming Analogies
but Self-Generated Analogies as well (Chapter seven)
 Investigated how different types of analogies, namely Priming Analogies and
Self-Generated Analogies, encourage different behaviours which foster this
analogical persistence (Chapter seven)
 Raised concerns regarding the viability of using common design methodologies,
such as Structured Reflection and Design Rationale, as an ecologically valid
approach to mitigating analogical persistence (Chapter eight)
 Generated a list of behaviours that actually foster analogical persistence caused
by the intersection of Design Rationale and Reflection (Chapters eight & nine)
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2. Moving Past a General Framework of
Design Decision-Making
2.1. Introduction
Design decision-making is an important area of research that, while an integral
component of the cognitive toolset used by designers, has received little attention from
the design cognition community (Zannier, Chiasson, & Maurer, 2007). To date, what
work done in this area, has focused on establishing one unified framework that can be
used to understand design decision-making. The issue with the current emphasis on
establishing one particular framework is that the area of design is composed of many
different sub-disciplines ranging from Mechanical Engineering (Olewnik & Lewis,
2005) to Fashion Design (Eckert & Stacey, 2001). These sub-disciplines, while sharing
many commonalties, do differ significantly in how they approach, frame, and
understand the design problem (Akin, 2001; Lawson, 2006). These individual
differences exhibited by each design discipline, in conjunction with an emphasis on one
single approach to understanding design decision-making, have led to a fractured field
of competing research. While the existing work has led to an understanding of what
types of information are used in these decisions, the factors, both internal and external,
that can influence these decisions are less well understood. This chapter aims to move
past the debate of a universal design decision-making model and focus on one specific
design discipline, specifically Interaction Design, to understand which factors impact
those design decisions. By focusing on the factors that influence the decisions that
Interaction Designers make, we can hope to support behaviours that led to higher
quality design decisions and suppress problematic behaviours that lead to faulty
decision-making.
2.2. Why Decision-Making is Integral to our Understanding of Design
Cognition
Interaction Designers employ a wide variety of skills when they engage in the design
process such as: decision-making (Highsmith, 2004), mental simulation (Guindon,
1990), mental modelling (Adelson & Soloway, 1985), problem structuring (Guindon,
1990), idea generation (Perttula, 2006) and creativity (Finke, 1996). While all of these
cognitive skills are important the amount of attention that is devoted to each is not
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equal. Paradoxically, whilst decision-making has been identified as an important area of
design cognition, in comparison to other areas like problem solving, research in this
area has been lacking (Zannier et al., 2007).
A contributing factor to the neglect of design decision-making is that
traditionally design has been seen as primarily a problem-solving activity (Bonnardel,
2000). This focus on problem solving is due to Simon in his (1996) work was one of the
first to highlight the importance of understanding design cognition. Simon discusses
that the act of design as a problem-solving activity, with a particular emphasis on
viewing design cognition as the continual structuring and reframing of the problem to
transform it from an ill-defined and difficult problem to a structured problem with a
clear solution path. The issue with this perspective is that the design process is
composed of so much more than solely structuring an ill-defined problem (Zannier et
al., 2007). Problem structuring is but one component of the skills that designers employ.
Viewing the design process as a problem-solving activity has influenced most of the
work to date on design cognition, which consequently has led to other important areas
of design cognition to be neglected (Bonnardel, 2000). As a reaction to the heavy
influence of Simon’s work some researchers have over-compensated and have
characterised the design process primarily as a decision-making activity (Hazelrigg,
1998), which is also a highly problematic position to adopt as the act of design is
composed of more than one cognitive component. Recent work (Bonnardel, 2000;
Zannier, 2007) has highlighted that neither approach is entirely correct and that we need
to adopt a more holistic approach in which several different cognitive skills are
employed with decision-making being an important component.
Tang et al. (2008), highlight another important aspect that speaks to the
importance of understanding design decision-making: the pervasiveness of design
decisions. Each element of the design artefact is in some way influenced by a decision
made by a designer or a design team. For example, a designer can be faced with such
high-level decisions like which interaction modality to use (Wii vs. PS3), or a more
finite decision like the spacing between elements of the interface. To quantitatively
highlight the importance of design decisions on the final artefact, Tang et al. (2008)
discuss the direct connection between the types of decisions being made and the quality
of the artefact produced. In their study, the higher the quality of the design decision, the
higher overall quality of their proposed design solutions were, and conversely
Interaction Designers who engaged in a faulty decision-making process produced
markedly poorer design solutions.
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While an important component of the design process, design decision-making
has received little attention from the broader design cognition community. Considering
the pervasiveness of decision-making on the design process, coupled with a call from
researchers highlighting the importance of decision-making, a greater emphasis on this
area of design decision-making is needed.
2.3. Duelling Perspectives of Design Decision-Making
To date much of the work in the area of design decision-making has primarily focused
on modelling the decision-making process. By focusing on the establishment of a
framework that describes in detail how designers make their decisions, researchers have
created a splintered field of research with different design disciplines viewing design
decision-making differently. Akin (2001) and Lawson (2006) both highlight how
different design disciplines approach and frame design problems using different
strategies and heuristics.
The field of decision-making can broadly be broken down into two main
perspectives: Rationalistic Decision-Making (RDM) and Naturalistic Decision-Making
(NDM) (K. M. Piegorsch et al., 2006). The Rationalistic approach to design decision-
making is exemplified by the field of Mechanical Engineering which views design
decision-making as a tool to achieve the ‘best’ single solution (Hazelrigg, 1998;
Olewnik & Lewis, 2005; Suh, 1995). Other design disciplines, such as Architecture and
Agile System Developers, view decision-making as a descriptive tool to aid in
structuring ill-defined design problems (Klein & Brezovic, 1986; A. Tang, 2007;
Zannier & Maurer, 2005). These two inherently different perspectives on what design
decision-making is, and is not, has led to a broken view of the applicability of each
model to the field of design. This emphasis on the different theoretical underpinnings of
design decision-making has taken attention away from other useful areas of design
decision-making research, such as examining the factors that may influence the types of
decisions that designers may make. To move past the establishment of one definitive
model and begin to understand what different factors can contribute both positively and
negatively to the design decision-making process, we have focused on one discipline,
Interaction Design. As the myriad of design disciplines view design decision-making
differently it is worth setting a context by discussing the two different decision-making




The Rationalistic Decision-Making (RDM) paradigm takes a logical, or analytic,
approach to decision-making by assuming that a set of alternative solutions can be
generated and that the decision-maker can, within reason, judge the success of each
outcome. This approach emphasises that each solution can be measured using clear and
discernible criteria, and the “best” option to choose from the generated set is the one
that maximises utility and minimises cost. While this perspective has been shown to
adequately describe decision-making in certain contexts, applying this perspective to
the design process is problematic. Before a discussion of the issues surrounding
Rationalistic Decision-Making and design it is important to first define the meaning of
the term.
Three key features define the RDM paradigm: decision alternatives, utility
function, and probabilities (Orasanu & Connolly, 1995; Siddall, 1972; Simon, 1955).
The first defining characteristic of the RDM approach is that for each decision there
must be a set of possible alternatives to choose the optimal solution from. This solution
set must be composed of alternatives that are known to the individual, as well as the
probability of each particular outcome occurring. The second characteristic of RDM
deals with choosing which option from that solution set is the best possible course of
action. To choose which one particular course of action is the most appropriate, one
must judge the success of that option in relation to the other alternatives. To judge the
most suitable course of action, each possible option must be evaluated in relation to
how much energy must go into making that particular option work and how successful
that outcome will be. The ‘optimal’ solution will be the one course of action that has the
highest level of success for the minimal amount of effort. This score, the amount of
effort versus the success, is known as the utility. The third defining characteristic of the
Rationalistic approach to decision-making is the probability of a particular solution
occurring. For example, one particular solution may have a very high utility (i.e. it
achieves the most of the requirements for the minimal amount of input), but the chance
of it occurring may be extremely low. In conjunction with the utility value the
probability scores determine which alternative from the solution set is the best choice.
Simon (1996) criticises the RDM paradigm by pointing out that this perspective
is impractical in the context of design. The idea of a finite number of solutions to a
given design problem that can be linearly evaluated and an optimal design solution
selected is unrealistic. Design problems have been described as ‘wicked problems’
(Buchanan, 1992), meaning that there are an infinite number of satisfactory solutions to
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any particular design problem (Rittel & Webber, 1973). This approach to viewing
design decision-making is impractical in that designers do not have the cognitive
resources to linearly evaluate a potentially endless number of solutions to find the
optimal design. To reduce the number of possible solutions down to a manageable
number of alternatives designers must employ cognitive short-cuts which the
Rationalistic Decision-Making paradigm cannot account for.
While the RDM perspective on design decision-making has its faults, this theory
is not without its supporters. The discipline of Mechanical Engineering has long
supported the view that there are a finite number of options, to a particular design
problem, and that an optimal design can be attained (e.g. Olewnik & Lewis, 2005). This
focus on the documentation of all possible iterations and alternatives, while
cumbersome, has been entrenched in the discipline as an essential part of the design
process. Some engineers have even gone as far as to characterise design as purely a
decision-making exercise (Hazelrigg, 1998). Two ‘tried and true’ decision-making
methodologies, which exemplify this approach to design decision-making, are
Axiomatic Design (Suh, 1995) and the House of Quality method (Hauser & Clausing,
1996). Proponents of these methodologies list the benefits as threefold. The first is to
promote logical evaluation of all possible solutions to the design problem at hand. The
second benefit is to promote the use of quantifiable facts and figures to support those
decisions. Lastly, the third benefit is to remove the designer from any outside bias or
influence on the types of solutions that will be produced. Recent work by Olewnik &
Lewis (2005) describes how these industry standard methodologies are deeply flawed
and do not even conform to the three key benefits of adopting a RDM approach. By
simulating the relative weights that are assigned to each individual design element
Olewnik & Lewis (2005) were able to illustrate a range of flaws: from designers
imposing their own preferences on weightings to designers providing a false sense of
reliability by providing arbitrary weights on unquantifiable elements of the design
problem. The myriad of issues raised by Olewnik & Lewis (2005) are more than just
specific issues with those particular formal methods, they also highlight some of the
fundamental issues with adopting the rationalist approach to understanding design
decision-making.
2.3.2. Naturalistic Decision-Making
In contrast, the Naturalistic paradigm emphasises the importance of situational
pressures and how people deal with complex cognitive functions in realistic settings
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(2005). Naturalistic Decision-Making (NDM) suggests that, due to the pressures and
limitations of our environment, engaging in a linear evaluation of the available options
is not realistic; rather, individuals use cognitive shortcuts to quickly reach a viable
decision (Orasanu & Connolly, 1995).
The NDM perspective arose as a reaction to the disconnect between the
laboratory based results of the RDM perspective and the difficulty that those models
had in terms of explaining some of the real-world decision-making processes that were
employed. Klein, Calderwood, and Clinton-Cirocco, (1988) first discussed this
disconnect in the examination of how firefighters, when in-situ, engaged in the
decision-making process. Rather than engaging in a linear evaluation of all possible
options for an optimal solution firefighters actually used cues derived from their
environment to elicit a pre-formulated action plan based on analogical reasoning.
Firefighters would use cues from the situation at hand to select a similar situation from
the past that ha been successful. The similar situation, generated through analogical
reasoning, provided a template for when actions in the past were appropriate for this
type of situation. This action-plan template would then be modified based on any
characteristics unique to their particular situation. This approach to decision-making
was a vastly different approach to understanding decision-making in-situ than had been
previously proposed by the RDM school of thought. Several models have been
produced which aim to encapsulate the decision-making process that people participate
in in-situ (see table 2.1 for a synopsis of the major models in this field). While each
model differs, in terms of its focus and theoretical assumptions there are several
characteristics common to all NDM models which are: diversity of form, situation






Lipshitz (1988) Postulates that while people may use different strategies to
reach decision all of those strategies are underpinned by the
same six attributes: framing (how the problem is defined),
uncertainty (the noise that interferes with the selection of a
course of action), logic (The rationale for the chosen course
of action), handicaps (the constraints affecting the decision-
making process), and therapies (techniques that can be used
to address issues in the previous five attributes)
Decision Cycles Connoly
(1989)
While most models emphasise the selection of one alternative
Connoly would argue that one alternative is never truly
selected and there is a continual cycle between situation





Emphasis that an alternative is chosen when it is at least as
attractive as the alternatives on all of the important






Originated as a model explaining the decision-making
process of jurors. Decision-making under this model focuses
on creating a narrative, from the situational evidence, that
makes sense to the decision-maker. An alternative is then
selected by how well that alternative matches the internal
narrative.
Image Theory Beach &
Mitchell
(1987)
Postulates that a decision is reached when one alternative
from the solution set best matches three images: Value (the
principles of the decision-maker), Trajectory (the goals that
the decision-maker wishes to accomplish), and Strategic (how
the decision will be actualised).
Participatory
Decision Making
Kaner (2007) Is defined by its emphasis on inclusion of all stakeholders,
full understanding by all participants and shared
responsibility for all decisions made by the group.
Participatory decision making is characterised by three
phases: divergence (stakeholders are separated on the issue at
hand), groaning (stakeholders vocalise the issues that gave
rise to the need for a decision), and convergence (the group
comes together as a single unit to form a decision).
Recognition Primed
Decision Making
Klein (1997) People reach decisions using a combination of situational
assessment, generating an action plan through analogical
reasoning, and mental simulation
Requisite Decision
Model
Phillips (1984) This approach to decision-making emphasises coming to a
decision by constructing and modelling the shared
understanding of the problem space. A decision is reached




Noble (1986) Emphasises the collection and interpretation of information
from various sources (the environment, the context, and the







Hammond's model examines how the information from
various sources (the environment, the context, and the
experience of the decision-maker) is collated to reach a
decision. This model differs from other NDM models in that
it discusses a continuum between RDM and NDM in terms of
the strategies that are used to reach a decision.
Table 2-1 Popular models of Naturalistic Decision-Making.
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The first defining characteristic of all Naturalistic Decision-Making models is
diversity of form. From Table 2.1 we can see that there is a wide diversity of ways that
decision-makers come to a particular decision. For example the Recognition Primed
Decision-Making model uses recognition and analogical reasoning, while the
Explanation based model of decision-making focuses on reaching a decision through
the construction of a narrative. This diversity underscores the futility of trying to
encapsulate how decisions are reached through a single concept such as maximising
utility like in the RDM perspective. The second characteristic common to all NDM
models is situation assessment. All NDM models have some element of constructing a
mental model of the problem space through environmental cues. The third characteristic
of NDM models is mental imagery. While the basis of the RDM perspective was
choosing the solution based on quantifiable cognitive processes, such as the utility
value, NDM models use cognitive processes that involve creating mental
representations of the situation. The fourth defining characteristic of NDM models is
context dependence. As described earlier the fundamental basis of the NDM approach
to understanding how decisions are formulated in the real world is by understanding the
context of the situation. The fifth characteristic of the NDM perspective is dynamic
processes. A basic assumption of Naturalistic Decision-Making is that the decision-
making approach is not composed of discrete stages which are completed in a linear
fashion to arrive at a successful course of action. Naturalistic Decision-Making
emphasises the dynamic nature of how people make decisions in-situ. It is worth noting
though that while some models subscribe whole-heartedly to this constant iterative
approach to decision-making, such as the Decision Cycle model (Lawson, 2006), other
such as the Recognition Primed Decision-Making model do adhere to some level of
linear progression through the various stages of decision-making.
Based on the issues inherent to a RDM approach to design decision-making, as
well as the strengths of the NDM approach, it seems that NDM is a better theoretical
perspective through which to examine design decision-making. While the strengths
inherent to NDM are promising, its suitability for describing the decision-making
process of Interaction Designers is still unclear.
2.3.3. Recognition-Primed Decision-Making
Of the various models discussed within Table 2-1, academics regard the Recognition-
Primed Decision-Making (RPD) model as the most prototypical representative of the
field of Naturalistic Decision-Making (Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001). Due to
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RPD’s prominence within the field of NDM, we have chosen to use this model to frame
our discussion of the decision-making process employed by Interaction Designers
within chapter three. What follows is a brief discussion regarding the origins of the
RPD model, its evolution, as well as some of the fundamental issues that surround this
model.
The central tenet of Recognition-Primed Decision Making model is to provide a
description of how people can use their experience to arrive at decisions without having
to engage in an arduous mental search for the optimal solution (Klein et al., 1988).
Klein, Calderwood, and Clinton-Cirocco (1988) describe people as leveraging their
experience to reach decisions by using a combination of situational assessment,
generating an action plan through analogical reasoning, and mental simulation. This
model stands in stark contrast to the Rationalist Paradigm which emphasises the
generation of multiple options for selection of an optimal solution.
Figure 2-1 The original Recognition-Primed Decision Making model (Klein, 1988)
When developing the RPD model Klein at al. found that when experienced
decision-makers were faced with a situation in which a quick and decisive course of
action was necessary the first thing they did was to assess the decision point they were
faced with and, on the basis of the outcome of this assessment, select a ‘best course of
action’. This series of actions in the RPD model is characterised by three distinct
phases: situation recognition, serial action option evaluation, and mental simulation
(McLennan & Omodei, 1996).
The initial stage of the RPD model, situation recognition, involves the decision-
maker classifying the situation at hand as either unique or common based on previous
knowledge. A common event is characterised as a successful match between the present
situation and a familiar analogy or prototype in memory. Based on this initial matching
stage, a series of goals that will satisfy the decision point are identified and potentially
achievable goals are set.
The second stage of RPD, the serial option evaluation stage, involves compiling
a potential plan of action to address the goals that are required of the situation. If there
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is more than one potential plan of action then each plan is evaluated, one after the other,
until a satisfactory one is decided upon. This plan of action does not necessarily
produce the most optimal solution, but rather yields the first proposed solution to satisfy
the goals of the decision point.
In the final stage, mental simulation, the decision-maker mentally walks through
the proposed action plan to evaluate the potential outcomes and the potential problems.
Based on this analysis the proposed action plan will be executed if no problems are
identified, or modified to address any identified issues.
These three stages formed the basis of the original model (as depicted in figure
2-1). While these three stages were an accurate description of the decision-making of
the interviewed fire-fighters it became apparent that when this model was applied to
other fields it fell somewhat short in its descriptive power. From this shortcoming the
RPD model was further refined to three distinct variations (Klein, 1999). Each of three
variations represent the three most common types of situations that one could face: A
familiar situation which has an accompanying familiar set of actions, a situation in
which the decision-point is unclear and ill-defined but yet once it has been refined has a
clear course of action, and a situation which we recognise as familiar but has an ever-
changing course of required actions.
Figure 2-2 The three variations of the Recognition Primed Decision-making Model
(Klein, 1999)
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The focus of the first variation is the situation in which a ‘simple match’ is made
between the familiar situation and a familiar course of action. This match is based on
identifying the situation as either typical, which has a clear solution, or as familiar, in
which they have encountered a similar situation in the past. Since the situation is
identified as typical/familiar, the decision-maker will recognise a course of action which
has successfully accomplished this task in the past. This identified course of action is
reached by understanding the priorities of the situation, the information that needs to be
taken into account, the expected outcome, and the typical actions which have solved the
situation in the past. The proposed solution, under the first variation, is a single and
familiar analogy coupled with a clear and familiar set of actions to make the initial
decision.
Not all problems that people encounter are typical or familiar. The second
variation entails assessing a situation where no typical scenario exists. Since either no
familiar analogy is known, or various analogies are identified, a greater attention to the
diagnosis stage of the model is required. When no typical case is evident, more
information must be gathered to refine the range of possible analogies down to a
manageable level of one or two. This evidence-gathering stage is further complicated by
the fact that the individual may have misinterpreted the problem and chosen an ill-
suited match from which to build a potential solution. It is possible that the decision-
maker will not realise this until a point is reached at which it is clear that the proposed
solution to this problem will not, in fact, be a viable answer.
While the second variation of the RPD model deals with an ambiguous problem
coupled with a simple solution, the third solution focuses on the other end of the
decision process: a simple analogy coupled with an ever-changing set of solution-
focused actions. Under these conditions the individual must engage in a continual
process of mental simulation in order to continually adjust the proposed solution as
difficulties in the proposed solution arise. Mental simulation allows the decision-maker
to cope with this ever changing action plan in an efficient and economical fashion.
To date any use of the RPD model in the area of design decision-making has
been the original unitary model (Klein, 1987). While the newer variations have been
applied and validated across several different fields of research (Klein, 1999), they
have not been examined in the context of their descriptive power of the decision-
making of Interaction Designers.
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2.4. Differences in Design Cognition Based on Subject Discipline
As discussed earlier, different design disciplines have different perspectives on what
design decision-making is composed of. The field of Mechanical Engineering viewed
design decision-making as a logical assessment of all available options to find the
optimal solution. This view was characterised by the Rationalistic perspective on
decision-making. On the other hand, design disciplines such as System Design and
Ergonomics view design decision-making as understanding how complex
environmental factors, specifically time pressure, can impact the decisions that they
make (Klein, 1993). These two fundamentally different perspectives have coloured our
views on what design decision-making is and is not. While each model of design
decision-making is an accurate reflection of its representing design disciplines it is
problematic to generalise these principles across design disciplines.
Both Akin (2001) and Lawson (2006) discuss how difficult it is to generalise,
which cognitive processes are involved in design, across design disciplines. Akin
(2001) highlights the fundamental differences between the cognitive processes that
Architects and Engineers employ. Architects were characterised by behaviours such as
using an analogy as a basis for discourse as well as use a greater variety of
representations than their engineering counterparts do. Lawson (2006) echoes these
fundamental differences by discussing the overlapping and disparate cognitive skills
that uniquely identify each design discipline.
2.5. Rationalistic vs. Naturalistic Decision-Making among Interaction
Designers
Yates et al. (2001) highlight an important issue in regards to these two differing
perspectives on design decision-making: context. Each of the two perspectives of
decision-making discussed earlier highlight how people make decisions in the particular
context that surrounds them at that time. In some cases a rationalist view on decision-
making is a better indicator of what actually occurs while in other cases Naturalistic
Decision-Making may be a more accurate reflection. This then begs the question if both
views have been applied to understanding design decision-making which of the two is a
more accurate depiction of the process that Interaction Designers engage with?
Considering the issues with the rationalistic perspective as well as the
applicability of Naturalistic Decision-Making to the related fields of system design
(Miller & Woods, 1997; Mitchell, Morris, Ockerman, & Potter, 1997) it would seem
that the Naturalistic Decision-Making perspective may be a more appropriate match to
understanding the decision-making process of Interaction Designers. Both Klein (Klein,
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1999) and Orasanu & Connolly (1995) have compiled several factors which define a
decision-making situation which is best described by NDM: namely a situation which is
characterised by time pressure, high-stakes, ill-defined goals, dynamic environments
and input from multiple team members. Both groups of researchers state that, while not
every situation will be defined by all of these characteristics, an NDM-appropriate
decision making situation will conform to the majority of them. In a similar vein,
design, while not defined by all of those characteristics, does conform to the vast
majority of the NDM identifiers. Characteristics of time-pressure and high-stakes have
been discussed by Lawson (2006), while the ambiguous nature of design goals has been
discussed by Buchanan (1992).
Klein was one of the first researchers to apply the NDM framework to
understanding design decision-making. While Klein’s work has provided the basis for
much of the NDM work on design decision-making (Miller & Woods, 1997; C. M.
Mitchell et al., 1997) it is not without its issues, specifically, the issue of validity.
Klein first examined design decision-making in the context of Naturalistic
Decision-Making, in a study he conducted with Brezovic (1986), which examined the
design strategies that were employed by system designers. Fifty system designers were
interviewed using a combination of semi-structured interviews as well as the Critical
Decision Method of Knowledge Elicitation. What emerged from this data were that
designers used an informal decision-making process which relied heavily on their
personal background. This personal decision-making utilised several techniques, or
information sources, such as matching the problem to an analogue, drawing on personal
experience, as well as using informal mock-ups and experiments. Klein described the
decision-making process that designers employed as one in which the designer, when
faced with a decision, will search for an analogy that best matches the problem at hand.
The appropriateness of this starting analogy is next tested using mental simulation and
then modified to better suit the original decision point. Designers were primarily
concerned, not with evaluating all the options at hand and selecting the optimal one; but
rather, taking a starting analogy and modifying it to suit the design goal.
While evidence was found in Klein & Brezovic (1986) to support the
inappropriateness of a rationalist perspective on decision-making, no framework to
model or analyse these results from a Naturalistic Decision-Making perspective was
proposed. The data that were identified in this study was important in that it highlighted
important NDM characteristics, such as the use of analogies to narrow down the
problem space, and the usefulness of mental simulation in the decision making process.
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The issue though is that while this study was explorative in nature the findings were
taken as validation of the Recognition-Primed Decision-Making model as a framework
to understand design cognition (Klein, 1987a).
The assertion of the unqualified usefulness of the Recognition Primed Decision-
Making framework as a model to understand design decision-making has, despite these
issues, remained unchallenged and unexamined, with researchers tending to simply
build on this assertion (Kaempf, Klein, & Thordsen, 1991; C. M. Mitchell et al., 1997).
Some of the more recent work in the area (e.g. Zannier & Maurer, 2005) has started to
widen the theoretical base from that used by previous work. While the application of
the NDM perspective to the sister area of system design is not without its issues, it does
provide evidence to indicate that this theoretical perspective, over the rationalistic
approach to decision-making, may be a more appropriate lens through which to
examine decision-making among Interaction Designers.
2.6. Design Decision-Making: Conclusion
Recently researchers have begun to acknowledge decision-making as an important
component of the cognitive tool set employed by designers. While this increased body
of work is welcome it has led to a field of research, which has become divided and
stagnant. This academic stand off is partly related to the difficulties of generalising
across design disciplines. Researchers such as Lawson & Akin (Akin, 2001; Lawson,
2006) have discussed how different design disciplines employ different strategies and
heuristics when they engage with the design process. These inherent differences
between design disciplines have led to two competing views on design decision-
making; the Rationalist decision-making perspective, as embodied by the Mechanical
Engineering Discipline, and the Naturalistic Decision-Making perspective as discussed
in the context of System Design. Each perspective championing its own model as an
accurate reflection of how designers in general engage with the decision-making
process. While modelling the decision-making process of designers is an important
component of decision-making research this debate has led to other areas of decision-
making being ignored. To broaden our approach to design decision-making research we
need to move past focusing on the establishment of a universal framework and embrace
the notion of context. Each decision-making model, be it rationalistic or naturalistic,
may be an accurate reflection of each particular design discipline. By focusing on one
particular design discipline, in this case Interaction Design, we can move past the
framework and begin to examine others area of interest within the field of design
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decision-making such as how different factors, both internal and external, can
fundamentally influence how designers come to the decisions that they do.
2.7. Design Fixation
In chapter three we present an explorative study that discusses the influence that an
initial analogy can have across all stages of the decision-making process. As discussed
under the review of the decision-making literature, an analogy is used as an initial step
in the scoping of the solution space and nothing more. Chapter three highlights the
issues regarding this assumption. To address the issue of construct validity, through the
process of methodological triangulation (Morse, 1991), we have employed a
quantitative approach to examining the influence of analogies on the decision-making
process by using the Design Fixation paradigm (Jansson & Smith, 1991). Chapters four
through nine employ the Design Fixation paradigm as a way to observe and manipulate
the influence that the initial analogy can have on a designer’s decision-making.
The Design Fixation paradigm was originally proposed by Jansson & Smith
(1991). Jansson & Smith illustrated how the mere presence of an example can
fundamentally change the design process by causing designers to incorporate
inappropriate elements of the example into their own designs. Jansson & Smith devised
a paradigm that allowed them to quantitatively assess the degree to which the design
process can be influenced by the inclusion of an example. The basic methodology of the
Design Fixation paradigm, as outlined by Jansson & Smith, is as follows. At the outset
of the study participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups. The first group
was given a design brief and asked to sketch out as many ideas as possible, within the
allotted time frame, in response to that design brief. The second group was given the
same design brief but in addition were given an example of a possible solution to that
design problem. The included example was fundamentally flawed in several important
ways: the example either directly contradicted requirements stated in the design brief, or
contained solutions which were illogical considering the purpose of the design brief.
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Brief: Design a car-mounted bicycle rack. Your proposed solution must satisfy the
following issues: 1) easy mounting of at least three bicycles; 2) easy mounting of the
rack; 3) the proposed bicycle rack cannot harm the bike or the car; 4) the rack must be
versatile for all makes of both bikes and cars.
Proposed solutions need not be detailed or complete. A simple sketch complete with
annotations is all that is required. You have twenty-five minutes to complete this
exercise. You are not limited to one solution. You may propose as many solutions as
you would like.
Example: Below is an example of a present day bike rack. The bicycle is set in the rails
and the vinyl coated hook is attached to the seat tube of the bike, and then the hook is
tightened down by hand with a wing nut. One should note the difficulty in mounting the
middle bikes on the rack.
Figure 2-3 The design brief and the accompanying flawed example from Jansson &
Smith (1991)
To assess the influence that the flawed pictorial example had on the types of
solutions generated the produced sketches were analysed to see how many of the flaws
that were placed by the experimenters were present in the proposed solutions.
Participants who were primed by the included example produced solutions far more
similar to that initial example when compared to the control group which received
solely the brief. The only study to drastically change the basic experimental paradigm
was Chrysikou and Weisberg (2005).
Chrysikou and Weisberg (2005) retained the same basic methodology but the
real difference between this work and all of the previous studies was how the sketches
were analysed. Previous Design Fixation studies measured the influence of the flawed
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priming example by the presence or absence of the flaws placed in the example solution
by the experimenters. The more flaws included in the design the higher the level of
fixation. In comparison, under the scoring procedure used by Chrysikou and Weisberg
(2005), each design was scored along three separate dimensions of fixation: 1) A
measure of similarity, which was composed of direct physical similarities, reproductive
similarities, and analogical similarities; 2) reproduction of intentional flaws; and 3)
reproduction of unintentional flaws (which were identified retrospectively). A direct
physical similarity occurred when the design generated was a direct copy of the
pictorial example provided. Reproductive similarities were characterised by specific
elements of the pictorial example being incorporated into the final design. Analogical
similarities occurred when the same principles as the pictorial example were used
without copying the physical characteristics of the example. Intentional flaws are
characterised by incorporating specific flaws from the pictorial example that were
placed there by the experimenter, which previous to this work was the sole measure of
fixation in the Design Fixation paradigm. Unintentional flaws are characterised by the
incorporation of flaws in the provided examples that were not specifically placed by the
experimenter.
While Design Fixation measures the influence of an initial example on the types
of solutions generated can we actually use this paradigm to evaluate the persistence of
analogies across the decision-making process? The concern is that by using the Design
Fixation paradigm we are not observing the influence of analogies, but rather, the
influence of pictorial examples on the decision-making process.
2.8. Design Fixation and Analogical Persistence
As discussed earlier, analogies are used in the design process to aid in quickly
identifying a viable solution from a large pool of adequate resolutions (Bonnardel,
1999; Klein, 1997). To aid in narrowing the pool of viable solutions designers must
structure the design space. This structuring of the design space is achieved through
analogical reasoning, in which designers draw upon previous experiences to look for
solutions that have worked in similar situations. These analogies can take many forms;
from anecdotal experiences (Bonnardel, 1999) to examples of previous work (Eckert,
Stacey, & Earl, 2005; Herring, Chang, Krantzler, & Bailey, 2009). While the modality
may differ the purpose is still the same: to quickly structure the design space to one or
two workable proposals based on work that has been done in the past. Eckert et al.
(2005) discuss how designers use examples of previous work as a way to access the
inherent knowledge surrounding that design problem. Previous examples of other work
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were used to prime knowledge pertinent to that particular design problem. Eckert
discusses how the use of previous examples and design knowledge are inherently
intertwined where one cannot exist without the other.
Purcell & Gero (1991) were able to illustrate the influence of previous examples
without the inclusion of physical examples. Rather than provide a graphical solution to
the design brief, they provided a verbal description of a possible flawed solution. What
was found was that these verbal descriptions were just as influential in producing
Design Fixation. This illustrates that there is more to the Design Fixation phenomenon
than the influence of graphical examples. While Purcell & Gero (1991) describe the
effect that these verbal solutions have on the overall design process, they do not discuss
the possible mechanisms that may cause the exhibited multi-modal fixation.
Analogies can take many different forms, from memories of past experiences to
physical examples. The only difference between the different modalities is the source of
the analogical reasoning. By presenting participants with a faulty primed example we
are priming them with an analogy versus asking them to generate their own. This
distinction between these two analogical sources is discussed in more depth in chapter
seven of this thesis. By using a primed analogy, i.e. a flawed pictorial example, we can
quantitatively assess the influence of the initial analogy on the entire design decision-
making process.
2.9. Design Fixation: Conclusion
The Design Fixation paradigm allows us examine and manipulate the influence that an
initial analogy can have over all stages of the decision-making employed by Interaction
Designers. Chapters four through nine of this dissertation employ the Design Fixation
paradigm, or variations of, to validate and manipulate analogical persistence. This
quantitative approach provides an appropriate compliment to the qualitative methods
used to understand the decision-making process of Interaction Designers (chapter 3,





The study reported in this chapter is an exploratory study focusing on how Interaction
Designers engage in decision-making. As briefly discussed in the previous chapter, little
work has been done at the intersection of decision-making and Interaction Design. The
three main bodies of research that have engaged with this particular area of research (N.
Hammond, Jørgensen, MacLean, Barnard, & Long, 1983; Klein & Brezovic, 1986;
Zannier, 2007) have not been without their issues. Each of these bodies of work was
limited in relation to the conclusions that we could draw in regards to how Interaction
Designers make decisions. The aim of this study was to build upon the limited work
that had been done in this field, and to provide a slightly more detailed, while
theoretically grounded exploration of how Interaction Designers engage in the decision-
making process.
To date research that has examined the decision-making process of usability
experts has been limited. Hammond et al. (1983) provided the foundation of decision-
making among usability practitioners with an explorative study looking at the process
by which these designers reached their decisions. Five designers, who had all worked
on the development of the same system, were interviewed about the types of decisions
that they made as well as how they reached those particular decisions. While the exact
analysis method that was used was unclear, it did seem to contain elements of an open-
coding strategy, like the strategy found in a grounded theory approach to data analysis
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998). From the analysis, the authors propose a descriptive model of
the decision-making process exhibited across the five designers; however, this study
does not engage with the wider decision-making literature in any meaningful fashion.
Due to its theoretical isolation Hammond et al. (1983) study lacks the common
nomenclature used across different models of decision-making that would allow
researchers to draw comparisons between this work and different strands of decision-
making research. For example, a large portion of the study discusses different ways in
which the designers consider the user in their decision-making. While the authors never
use the term, they are referring to a process of mental simulation that designers use to
test the usability of their proposed artifact. While this work was important in that it set
the stage and context for research in this area, it is limited in its theoretical application.
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The next study to investigate the intersection of usability practitioners and
decision-making was Klein and Brezovic (1986). Adopting a similar methodological
and theoretical, approach to Hammond et al. (1983), Klein and Brezovic (1986)
interviewed several usability practitioners about how they engage with the decision-
making process with a focus on a descriptive account of this process. What set Klein &
Brezovic (1986) apart was that, although no direct connections were made between this
work and the wider field of decision-making research, there was some engagement with
some of the psychological processes that may be involved. For example, one of the key
findings of their work was how the interviewed designers relied heavily on analogical
reasoning in their decision-making. In an ironic twist, despite its theoretical isolation,
this early work would later inform the Recognition-Primed Decision Making model
(Klein et al., 1988).
After Klien and Brezovic (1986), the examination of how usability practitioners
made decisions was largely ignored. Work in other fields of decision-making continued
to mature, but the refinements and implications that were being discovered in other
areas were rarely applied back to the field of design decision-making. Zannier (2007)
began to bring some of the theoretical developments from other domains of decision-
making, and examine how those models worked in the context of design decision-
making. This work was an important development in our understanding of design
decision-making as it began to bring together disparate threads from differing fields of
decision-making research and examined how these threads applied, or possibly were
irrelevant to the area of design decision-making. While Zannier (2007) was a large step
forward in the area of decision-making and HCI, it was not without its faults. Zannier
(2007) presented a series of qualitative studies which aimed at identifying the processes
used in decision-making. While each study used a different methodology to probe at the
decision-making process, such as interviews in one study and the completion of
templates in another, this methodological triangulation was confounded by the ever-
changing conditions that the participants were being examined under. In one study the
decision-making process of lone designers was being examined, while in another, which
was claimed to provide methodological triangulation, decision-making was being
examined at an organisational level. While each of these conditions does provide
valuable information about how design decision-making can change depending on the
level of engagement, these studies are too different to provide any type of comparability
let alone validation.
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Research at the intersection of decision-making and the area of Interaction Design
has been rare. Early work by Klein & Brezovic (1986) and Hammond et al. (1983) were
instrumental in providing a basis for this field of research. Though both of the
aforementioned studies lack theoretical underpinnings, they do have some applicability
outside of these isolated studies. By not tieing the results from Klein & Brezovic (1986)
in to larger models of decision-making it is difficult to identify components that are
common to all Interaction Designers rather than just those particular instances.
However, Zannier (2007) has begun to integrate the decision-making of Interaction
Designers with recent models of decision-making. The issue though with Zannier
(2007) this work was that the scope of the research was too wide and the validity of
those findings came at a cost.
The goal of this thesis is to adopt a more moderate position that takes into account
all of these studies. Our examination of the decision-making processes employed by
Interaction Designers had to be grounded in the wider decision-making literature, yet
remain focused enough in our investigation so as to provide a clear picture as to the
exact processes that were being used by participants. To provide a theoretical grounding
for our study, which will allow us to make comparisons between our findings and
existing research in the area, we chose to structure our study around the Recognition-
Primed Decision-Making (RPD) model, specifically the three variations (Kaempf et al.,
1991; Klein, 1997; C. M. Mitchell et al., 1997) as discussed in the previous chapter. To
date any use of the RPD model in the area of design decision-making has been the
original RPD model (Klein, 1987a). While these newer variations have been applied
and validated across several different fields of research (Klein, 1999), these variations
have not been examined in the context of the decision-making of Interaction Designers.
The aim of this study was to use these variations to frame our examination of the
decision-making process that Interaction Designers use.
3.2. Method
3.2.1. Participants
To ensure the greatest level of generalisability from this study of interaction designers,
two sub-populations were examined: academic (n=3) and professional (n=3). The
academic population was defined as designers whose experience in interface design was
primarily from the context of academic work while the professional population was





1 PhD Student: Develops
news web-sites for small
businesses
Academic 5
2 Research Fellow: Develops
digital libraries prototypes
Academic 5
3 PhD Student: Develops Bio-
medical software
Academic 2










Table 3-1 Demographic of Participants
Table 3-1 presents a series of short profiles of the individuals that participated in
this study. Participants were recruited through departmental communication channels
using snowball sampling with the exception of participant 6 who was recruited through
personal connections. All participants recruited through the departmental channel either
worked for, or had been affiliated with, the University College London Interaction
Centre at one point.
3.2.2. Design
To probe the decision making process employed by Interaction Designers, an adaptation
of the Critical Decision Method for Eliciting Knowledge (CDM) was employed (Klein
et al., 1989). Traditionally CDM commences with the subject being asked to recollect
an important decision that they recently had to engage in. Once a premise for the
conversation has been established, the interviewer then asks a series of probing
questions based on the information provided by the participant. To greater reflect the
graphic nature of Interaction Design, the CDM methodology was modified for this
study. As opposed to commencing with the recollection of a recent decision, each
participant was instructed to bring with them a screenshot of an interface they had
recently worked on. Each interview commenced with the participant being asked to
describe the design decisions that were involved in the provided screenshot, as well as
the rationale behind each of those decisions. The screenshot was used in order to
provide focus, direction, and greater control of the interviewing process, as well as to
act as a referent to the topic of discussion. In keeping with CDM, a series of probing
questions were used throughout the interview. These questions were further
40
supplemented with several pre-written questions depending on which topics had already
naturally arisen thorough the course of the interview. Table 3-2 presents the probing
questions used in the interview, as well as examples of how those questions were used
in the interview. In accordance with a data-driven approach to analysing the data, these




What was the biggest decision you had to make when
putting together this interface?
Analogies How did you come up with the initial idea for your
design?
Constraints What factors were taken into consideration when
planning the design of your website?
Experience How much do you think your experience designing web
pages played a factor in your design process?
Environment What external influences, if any, played an important
part in the decision-making process?
Problem Solving When you start to think about breaking down the overall
design goal into something more tangible, how did you
go about that?
User Did you, at any point, imagine yourself in the role of the
user?
Time Pressure How much did deadlines and other forms of time
pressure impact your design?
Table 3-2 Example of Interview Questions.
3.2.3. Procedure
In order to explore the design decision-making process of Interaction designers, a series
of semi-structured interviews were employed. These interviews ranged from 35 to 50
minutes with an average duration of 40 minutes. The interviews were then analysed
using a Theoretical Thematic Analysis coding strategy (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The
results of this analysis were then contrasted against the RPD Model (Klein, 1999) to
ascertain the appropriateness of the RPD model in explaining the process underlying
Interaction Designers’ design decisions. Five of the interviews were recorded and
transcribed. Due to technical difficulties, the only record of the sixth interview were the




There are several approaches to analysing qualitative data. One can adopt a data-
driven approach, in which a rich-description of what occurred is obtained and themes
emerge from the data. Alternatively, one can also adopt a theoretical perspective, which
investigates in detail one particular aspect of the data which is identified by the research
question. As a specific research question was being investigated, in this case the relation
between the RPD variations and design decision-making, a Theoretical Thematic
Analysis (TTA) was conducted. A TTA is a multi-stage coding process which looks for
themes in a data set in the context of a particular research question (Braun & Clarke,
2006).
The first stage of the qualitative analysis was to gather data to examine how
Interaction Designers make design decisions. These recorded interviews were then
transcribed verbatim. To obtain a realistic reflection of the manner in which the
conversation took place many idiosyncrasies of the interviewees were written into the
transcripts, such as pauses, “urm”s & “ah”s. As the data were being transcribed, any
ideas or insights that emerged were noted. These notes were used in the later stage of
semantic analysis.
The preliminary phase of the analysis used an open-coding strategy. At this
stage codes are generated by identifying significant sentences or quotations and
associating a label which aimed to encapsulate a relevant theme or idea (Braun &
Clarke, 2006). Each code that was generated could appear multiple times throughout the
interview under various quotations and sentences that reflect that particular theme, but
the code may also have been used in conjunction with other codes to more accurately
describe the data. This deconstruction was then repeated in an iterative fashion until the
entire interview was coded.
There are several levels of granularity that can be used to break down the
transcript into discrete codes. At one extreme, a word-by-word analysis can be
conducted to establish a set of codes while, at the other extreme, a paragraph-by-
paragraph analysis can be utilised. The concern with adopting a word-by-word approach
is that an unwieldy number of codes may be generated and the meaning behind the data
lost. A paragraph-by-paragraph approach was not adopted, since the codes that would
result from this level of analysis would be so few and high-level as to reveal little
meaning. In the context of this study, the most appropriate approach was a sentence-by-
sentence level of analysis. Braun & Clarke (2006) recommended this approach to open
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coding as a line-by-line analysis is less likely to result in the researcher ‘seeing’ what
they want in the data.
Once the surface level meanings had been encapsulated in the code list, the analysis
then progressed to examine the data for latent themes, i.e. the underlying ideas, by
examining the relationships between the codes generated at the semantic level of the
analysis. The goal of this secondary analysis was to establish and examine relationships
between the codes identified in the preliminary stage of the analysis in order to obtain
an initial understanding of the themes that emerge from the data. By creating
relationships between individual codes, these relationships began to cluster together to
form broader themes. The aim of this clustering is to give shape to the data by
organising the codes under broader theoretical concepts. From the axial coding stage of
the analysis many micro-level codes started to cluster into cohesive themes. These inter-
related micro-level codes formed several meso-level codes which encapsulated common
themes that ran throughout the common micro-codes. If these higher level abstracted
codes started to relate to each other, then the process was continued in an iterative
fashion until a singular macro-code was available to encapsulate all of the related
themes. From these relationships, and broader macro-categories, a model of design
decision making emerged.
3.3. Results & Discussion
From this analysis three themes were identified that encapsulated the decision-making
of Interaction Designers. The thematic map in Figure 3-1 summarises the clustering of
individual codes into the broader latent themes that will be further discussed. What
follows is a detailed discussion of the relationships between the identified themes and
the RPD variations. To illustrate the relationship between the identified themes and the
data, a summary of Participant 2's decision-making process is used as a consistent
example as he/she was the most articulate in terms of verbalising their thoughts.
What emerged from the Theoretical Thematic Analysis were three stages that
encapsulated how the participating Interaction Designers reached their design decisions:
using an initial analogy as the starting point, modifying the initial analogy based on
various constraints, and evaluating the proposed design through mental simulation.
These three stages support the Recognition Primed Decision-Making model of design
decicion-making, as discussed by Klein (1999). Analogy use and mental simulation
appear as important stages in the DDM process and also play key roles in the RPD
model. Discrepancies between the data and the traditional view of RPD also emerged,
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with the persistence of the initial analogy across all stages of the DDM process being
the largest difference.
Figure 3-1 A thematic map illustrating the clustering of semantic codes to identify
latent themes
3.3.1. Analogical Persistence in the Decision-Making Process
The initial stage in the Recognition Primed Decision-Making model is to quickly
narrow down the possible solution space by identifying a single analogy or prototype
that most closely matches the observed situation. This initial analogy is used to provide
a framework from which to narrow the solution space to a more manageable level. This
is an important characteristic of not only the RPD model, but many Naturalistic
Decision-Making models (Lipshitz, 1995). This stage was uniformly identified as the
commencement point for all design decisions that were discussed. All participants
discussed how the design they created was based, either intentionally or unintentionally,
on an analogous within domain example. All participants mentioned this concept when
engaging in the decision-making process with no participants citing the concept of their
design coming from an original/inspirational source. To better illustrate the usage of an
initial example to scale down the problem space, a summarised account of participant
two’s decision-making process is presented below.
Example 1 - Digital Library Search Interface - Stage 1
Participant 2 was faced with designing a new search function for a digital
library. The primary design goal for this project was to reduce the
complexity of searching an elaborate academic catalogue. From the
beginning of the decision-making process the interface used by Google
seemed to be the solution to emulate, in that it produced potentially
complicated results but yet retained a simple and non-threatening
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interface. As a way to build on this simplicity and retain some of the
power of complex searching of the original digital library, the initial
search would take place on the simple Google-like search bar but
refinements would be suggested based on the syntax of the search terms
as a way to obtain a simple query but maintain the leverage of an
advanced search.
When Participant 2 was faced with a complex situation that was fraught with ill-
defined goals and time-pressures, he/she streamlined the problem space by identifying
an analogy that matched the requirements of the situation, in this case the Google search
interface.
“Ah yeah, I also think I was trying to copy Google as well. Trying to be evocative of a
plain, long plain box and one single button” - Participant 2
This initial example let the designer begin the decision-making process without
having to engage in a rational linear evaluation strategy. While this Google example
was not the optimal option at the time, it was deemed satisfactory in terms of the design
requirements. This initial Google example functioned as a way that allowed the decision
maker to quickly attain a starting point from which to engage with the decision-making
process. The use of examples were more than just starting points in the decision-making
process. These examples persisted throughout the entire design process, with
characteristics of the initial analogy being apparent in the final design solutions:
“There are a few bits and pieces that have been kind of borrowed from systems ... this
IVR thing – the reason why I thought of the visual thing was because I had found some
instructions for something that had it mapped out in a kind of hierarchical way and so
that gave me inspiration for visualising it that way” - Participant 4
From the above quotation we can see that the example of an old Interactive
Voice Recognition (IVR) manual provided the starting point for the decision, but was
characterised throughout the design process as well. This persistence of a key base
concept seems to have strongly influenced the final outcome of the design decision-
making process. In conjunction with this persistence of the original design analogy, at
no point in the interviews did any of the designers discuss comparing several design
examples to find the most appropriate. No evidence for a linear assessment to obtain an
optimal solution was exhibited. This finding of a lack of alternative generation among
designers has been reflected in the work of Ball et al. (1998), where it was found that
engineers generated very few, if any, alternative solutions. This persistence of an initial
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idea overriding the evaluation of plausible alternatives is also echoed in Darke’s idea of
a Primary Generator (1979). Darke (1979) states that a Primary Generator is the
situation in which a designer commences the design process with a simple idea, and
latches onto this idea for the remainder of the design process, at the cost of evaluating
alternative solutions to the problem. It is worth noting that in the latter stages of design
decision-making the persistence of the Google analogy became a hindrance to the
overall decision-making process. The example below illustrates the problems of the
Google analogy in the latter stages of the decision-making process.
When Participant 2 engaged in a mental simulation of his/her proposed solution
he/she found that the simplicity of the Google interface was not feasible to replicate
under the conditions of his/her design problem. The amount of information that needed
to be conveyed in the digital library search was inherently too complex for the Google-
like interface. Rather than begin the DDM process anew and select a more appropriate
analogy, Participant 2 struggled with adapting the Google analogy to suit the needs of
the digital library problem. In the end a revision of the design was proposed with
modifiable drop down boxes to supply the added complexity needed for the query.
The above example illustrates that the influence of the initial analogy was felt
throughout the entire design decision-making process rather than as an initial starting
point. Participant 2 was reluctant to discard this initial example and its inherent flaws
for a new and more appropriate analogy, which would have potentially saved
Participant 2 much time and wasted effort. The analysis of the interviews indicates that
interaction designers rely heavily on the use of analogies as a way to commence the
DDM process. In all the discussions with the interaction designers, it seemed that the
resulting end decision was a modified variant of this original analogy.
3.3.2. Constraints and the Changing Action Plan
After the initial analogy has been identified in the first stage, the second stage is the
modification of this analogy to not only better suit the initial design goal but, as well, to
accommodate various ‘constraints’. The term ‘constraints’ in this context refers to any
influence which fundamentally changes the initial course of the decision. The impact of
constraints on the decision-making process of designers has been discussed by previous
researchers. Hammond et al. (1983) identified constraints as one of the major influences
on the formation of a design decision. Even outside the domain of DDM, the
importance of constraints on the design process has been widely discussed with all
parties agreeing on the powerful impact that different constraints have on shaping the
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design process (Lawson, 2006). The issue, though, is that, while the importance of
constraints has been identified by the design research community the impact of
constraints on RPD is far from clear.
To illustrate the impact that constraints can have in the DDM process, a
continuation of the previous example is provided. While the first stage of Participant 2’s
DDM process was to choose the Google search interface analogy as a way to streamline
the viable solution space, this second example illustrates how various constraints
influenced the development of the digital library interface.
Example 2 - Digital Library Search Interface - Stage 2
After the initial Google-like analogy had been selected, Participant 2 was
then confronted by the immediate practicalities of trying to execute this
Google-like interface. The most immediate problem with executing this
design analogy was working within the constraints of the programming
language specific to the digital library. The ranking of the results that
Google returns was not possible to accomplish based on the existing
structure of the programme. Programming in that particular language was
also affected by various time crunches, such as upcoming deadlines as well
as certain family situations. There were other issues that led to several
major modifications, such as the task itself, which was too complex to
handle ambiguous entries into the search box. In the end, Participant 2
determined that to avoid the complexity of the search results and ambiguity
of the search queries, a partially filled search bar would guide the user and
narrow the potential ambiguous terms that the user might enter.
From the passage above we can see that the initial idea of a Google-like search interface
was not able to meet the demands of the various constraints imposed on the design
process. The constraints of the existing system, in conjunction with time constraints and
the fallibility of the user, led to a modification of the initial analogy. From these we can
see that the limitations that influenced the DDM process ranged from technical
constraints to, environmental constraints, to user based constraints. These represent just
some of the constraints that emerged from the data.
“So we were really constrained by what we could do as in how drastic we could be with
the redesign because it's not like you've got these nice little plugs you can just plug new
bits into” - Participant 4
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The first, or second variations, of RPD is supported by the data, since the common
element between the two is that a simple course of action, which when executed, will
achieve the original goal. In contrast, the third variation of the RPD mode emphasises
the evaluation of an ever-changing decision process, as does our data. The discussed
constraints emphasised the difficulty of generating a design solution as the flux created
by these constraints led to an ever-changing environment.
3.3.3. Mental Simulation
The third stage identified was the evaluation of the proposed design using the act of
mental simulation. After the initial analogy has been selected and modified based on
different types of constraints, the designer evaluates the proposed solution by walking
themselves through the use of the proposed solution and examining how well that
solution addresses the design goal that was set out at the onset of the process.
Example 3 - Digital Library Search Interface - Stage 3
Once a solution was proposed Participant 2 engaged in evaluating the
feasibility of the solution. As discussed in Example 2, Participant 2 created
a possible solution by having a partially filled in search bar. As Participant
2 imagined himself/herself in the role of the user he/she realised that, if the
user was going to have to move around or even retype some of the
predefined search terms to customise their query, this solution was not
feasible or realistic. As this evaluation returned a negative match between
the solution and the design goal this led to a revision of the proposed
design. In the end the final design was a combination of the initial Google-
like search bar in conjunction with a series of drop-down boxes that aimed
to refine the search after the initial query had been run. This solution
proved to be a modification of the original Google analogy to accomplish
the design goal, while controlling for all of the influencing constraints.
The majority of statements within the design evaluation theme reflected the act of
mental simulation, with the designer imagining him/herself as the user and participating
in a mental walkthrough of how the user could, or could not, accomplish their goals,
given the current course of action in the decision process. In the latter portion of the
analysis a linkage between the codes 'design evaluation', 'thinks as user', and 'user task
completion' became evident. Throughout the narrative of the interviews these three
codes were constantly being mentioned in the context of the evaluation of their
proposed solutions. This linkage further illustrates the process that Interaction
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Designers used to evaluate their proposed solutions by conducting a process of mental
simulation in which they placed themselves in the role of the user. This linkage among
the codes further reaffirms the presence and evaluative use of mental simulation as an
important component in a cyclical process of adopting a starting analogy, refining that
analogy based on constraints, and evaluating the potential success of the proposed
solution. This iterative approach strongly echoes the Recognition Primed Decision-
Making framework, in which the act of mental simulation is used to evaluate a potential
course of action and based on that mental simulation either a refinement of the course of
action may occur or a completely new cycle maybe proposed.
The notion of mental simulation as a way to refine the ambiguous course of
action is a defining characteristic of the third RPD variation. As discussed earlier the
previous two models place an emphasis on being able to identify a clear and concise
course of action that will successfully achieve the initial decision point.
3.3.4. Decision-Making in Designers and the Three variations of RPD
The three stages of design decision-making that have been identified thus far, while not
a perfect match, do have much in common with Klein’s Recognition Primed Decision-
Making model (1999); namely, the reliance on the use of analogies to narrow down the
problem space and the use of mental simulation as a technique to ascertain the success
of the proposed solution. With the exception of the influence of constraints in moulding
the decision making process, the stages that emerged in this analysis confirm the
appropriateness of using the RPD model to describe Design Decision Making. An issue
that needs to be addressed outside of the validity of the RPD model in the context of
design, is the issue of DDM and the developments of RPD that have occurred since
Klein’s original work on DDM (Klein, 1987a; Klein & Brezovic, 1986). At the outset of
the RPD model (Klein et al., 1988) it was a single unified model to facilitate the
understanding of Naturalistic Decision-Making, as opposed to the current context in
which the RPD model is composed of three distinct variations. As discussed earlier in
this chapter, these three variations aim to describe in detail the different type of
situations decision makers would have to face in real world settings. While the stages of
DDM discussed thus far confirm the general appropriateness of the RPD model, what
do the results of this study indicate about the specific relevance of each of the three
RPD variations?
The first stage that was discussed was the role of analogies in design decision-
making. One of the points made was that designers used a single analogy to narrow
down the problem space, with no alternative analogies being considered as appropriate
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starting points. In all of the interviews, the use of alternative analogies was never
discussed nor mentioned. A simple match between the situation at hand and the one
single analogy was mentioned in all interviews. Based on this use of a single design
analogy, we can discard the second variation of the Recognition Primed Decision-
Making model. The focus of the second variation is that the decision maker is faced
with an ambiguous situation in which there are multiple matching analogies. This use of
a single design analogy lends support for both the first and third variation of the RPD
model. What differentiates the first and third variations of RPD is how the decision is
reached. If a typical response is available, then the first model is most applicable but, if
the course of action must be modified, then the third of the variations is a better fit.
The first Recognition Primed Decision-Making variation is not supported by the
data, since the first model revolves around the concept that there is a typical situation,
as well as a simple course of action, to complete the goal. Therefore, the first model is
unable to account for the ever-changing decision-path exhibited in our data. The third
variation of the RPD model, on the other hand, places as much emphasis on evaluation
of an ever-changing decision process as our data does. The focus of the third variation is
on a simple solution coupled with an ill-defined and ever-changing decision path. In the
RPD model this is accounted for by the use of evaluative mental simulations of the
proposed solution and reformulation of the decision-path to a more suitable course of
action. This evaluation of the present state of the decision using mental simulations, as
mentioned before, was a strong theme to emerge from the data, with multiple references
to evaluating the state of the design by placing oneself as the user and creating a mental
simulation of how well this proposed solution would satisfy the original design goal.
The themes that have emerged from our data driven analysis provide evidence
that the third variation of the Recognition Primed Decision-Making model, in which a
simple analogical solution is proposed and is subjected to an ever-changing solution
(constraints), and an evaluative mental simulation on the ill-defined course of actions
(design evaluation) is the most representative of the design-decision making process
used by interaction designers.
3.3.5. Limitations
The main issue with our finding of the persistence of the initial analogy is one of
post-hoc rationalisation. The discussion of a single analogy through the design decision-
making process may simply be a function of only remembering the one analogy that
participants ended up using throughout the design decision-making process, with other
analogies being used and discarded along the way. To address this issue the study
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presented in chapter 4 takes a quantitative approach, by using the Design Fixation
paradigm (Jansson & S.M. Smith, 1991) to validate the persistence of the initial analogy
across all stages of the design decision-making process. By using a quantitative
approach to our follow-up study we can then provide theoretical triangulation to bolster
the validity of the results from this study.
3.4. Conclusion
By examining the relation between the Recognition Primed Decision-Making model
and design decision-making the impact of analogies emerged as an important element to
the decision-making process of Interaction Designers. This over-reliance on an initial
analogy, while echoed across all participants interviewed, could not be accounted for by
the current RPD models. Several themes emerged from the Theoretical Thematic
Analysis that reinforced the RPD model with the persistence of the initial analogy
across all phases of the decision-making process being the largest divergence between
our results and the model (Klein, 1997). As briefly described in the above limitations
section an alternative explanation to the finding of analogical persistence is one where
multiple analogies are considered but only one is taken to the completion of the
decision-making, and that is the only analogy that is remembered. This alternative
hypothesis is another plausible explanation to the results highlighted in this chapter. To
address this alternative hypothesis and replicate our findings, we decided to employ
methodological triangulation by using the Design Fixation paradigm (Jansson & S.M.
Smith, 1991). The Design Fixation paradigm provides a quantitative approach to
measuring and understanding how influential an initial idea or analogy can be on the
entire design process. As discussed in chapter two, the Design Fixation paradigm allows
us to prime participants with a flawed initial analogy. As this initial analogy contains
carefully manipulated errors we can examine the solutions proposed by participants for
the presence or absence of those errors. The greater the number of errors present in the
proposed solution, the greater the influence of that initial Priming Analogy. By using
this quantitative measure we can gauge the level of influence that one analogy can have
over the entire decision-making process; from analogical selection to mental simulation.
If our initial hypothesis as to the influence of analogical persistence were to hold we
would expect the initial Priming Analogy to heavily influence the final solution(s) as
solely one analogy is used across all stages of decision-making. In the context of the
alternative hypothesis, that multiple analogies are considered and used but just not
remembered, we would expect there to be little influence of the initial flawed Priming
Analogy as multiple analogies will be considered and employed in formulating a viable
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action plan that satisfies the requirements of the design problem. The study presented in
the following chapter addresses the plausibility of this alternative explanation to the
results presented in this chapter using the quantitative approach of the Design Fixation
paradigm.
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4.Validation of Analogical Persistence in
Design Decision-Making
4.1. Introduction
The previous chapter discussed how analogies negatively and positively influence the
entire design decision-making process. The main issue with the results discussed in the
previous chapter is one of validity; specifically internal validity. From what we have
observed, it is difficult to ascertain how much our findings are truly representative of
analogical persistence or are merely a function of the methodology employed. While
measures were taken to be as stringent as possible in our qualitative analysis, there are
still alternative explanations that overshadow our findings. A plausible explanation for
the persistence of the initial analogy is simply a matter of the fallibility of post-hoc
rationalization. It is possible that the participants interviewed only remembered the one
analogy, from a multitude of analogies used, that was taken to completion in the
decision-making process. To address concerns like this, we need to establish
methodological triangulation, i.e. use several different methodologies to complement,
and validate, the findings of analogical persistence. The aim of this study was to adopt a
quantitative perspective on the examination of analogical persistence on design
decision-making to address the issue of internal validity raised in the previous chapter.
We have chosen to employ the Design Fixation (DF) paradigm (Jansson & S.M.
Smith, 1991) to observe and manipulate the possible influence of an initial analogy on
the entire design decision-making process. By comparing the types of solutions
generated from a design brief against the same design brief with a flawed pictorial
example, we can observe how and under what conditions the priming analogy (the
flawed example) are the most influential on the decision-making process of interaction
designers. The primary focus of this study is to use a different methodological
perspective to observe the issue of analogical persistence within the design decision-
making process of Interaction Designers. While the Design Fixation paradigm does
allow us to leverage a quantitative perspective on the issue of analogical persistence, it
is not without its own validity problems. The Design Fixation paradigm has several
threats to its external validity that need to be addressed before one can be confident in
its use to provide sound methodological triangulation. Before we discuss the specific
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validity issues of the Design Fixation paradigm it is worth defining the term external
validity. External validity is concerned with how representative the findings, of a
particular study, are of the true phenomenon, or the amount which these findings
generalise past the specifics of the experimental paradigm. In the case of the Design
Fixation paradigm there are several threats to validity that need to be addressed. Design
Fixation has been replicated numerous times using Mechanical Engineers but attempts
to produce similar results among differing design populations has been problematic.
This study directly examines this issue of generalisability.
4.1.1. Issues with Design Fixation
While Design Fixation has been identified and replicated numerous times among
Mechanical Engineers, the application to other design domains has been neither
successful nor conclusive. Purcell and colleagues (Purcell & Gero, 1991, 1996; Purcell
et al., 1993) extended the original work of Jansson & Smith (1991) by examining the
impact of Design Fixation across several different design populations (Industrial
Designers & Architects). Purcell and his colleagues found that while DF was replicated
among Mechanical Engineers, fixation among Industrial and Interior Designers, was
only marginal. A potential explanation for these conflicting findings is that DF occurs
when there is match between the domain of expertise of the designer and the domain of
the problem presented, so DF may be less robust when there is a mismatch between
these two variables. Failure to replicate in previous studies was due to non-engineering
designers being given engineering based problems; by giving designers domain-relevant
problems, DF should be exhibited. By addressing these issues of generalisability we
hope to test whether Interaction Designers are just as susceptible to DF, ultimately in
order to provide quantitative evidence of the persistence of analogies across all phases
of the design decision-making process.
4.2. Method
4.2.1. Participants
Thirty-two Interaction Design students participated in this experiment. Participants were
recruited from two postgraduate programs in the Greater London area. Sixteen students
were recruited from the MSc in Human-Computer Interaction with Ergonomics from
University College London and sixteen participants were recruited from the MSc in
Interaction Design from Middlesex University. All participants had on average 8 months
of experience as Interaction Designers.
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4.2.2. Materials
Four different design problems were used: two differing domain problems focusing on
Mechanical Engineering principles (the bike rack problem and the spill-proof coffee cup
problem from the original Jansson & Smith (1991) as illustrated in Appendix A) and
two within-domain problems focusing on Interaction Design principles (a digital music
player problem and a medicine dispenser problem designed specifically for this study as
detailed in Appendix A). Each problem was comprised of a short description of the
design problem, and a list of criteria that each solution must conform to. As familiarity
has been raised a possible issue in regards to the expression of Design Fixation (Purcell
et al., 1993), the design problems were accompanied by a brief questionnaire to
ascertain the familiarity of the participant with the devices in each design problem.
Familiarity was scored on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (‘Have never used the device’)
to 5 (‘Frequently use the device’).
4.2.3. Experimental Procedure & Design
The experiment employed a 2 x 2 mixed design, with the between subject manipulation
being the Presentation (Brief Only vs. Brief & Flawed Example) and Problem
Discipline (Mechanical Engineering and Interaction Design) manipulated within-
subjects.
Participants were run in two separate groups broken down by university.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the Brief Only condition or the Brief &
Flawed Example condition. The Brief Only group (n=16) were given just the design
brief, while the Brief & Flawed Example group (n=16) were given the same design
problems but with an inherently flawed pictorial example solution that violated at least
two of the constraints identified in the design brief.
Each participant was presented with a booklet containing two different design
problems: one Mechanical Engineering problem and one Interaction Design problem.
These presentations were counterbalanced for presentation order as well as all
combinations of the problem domain. Participants were instructed to: construct as many
solutions as possible in the allotted time for each design problem, write comments with
every design, and number each individual design. Participants were allotted 25 minutes
for each design problem.
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Problem 1 Problem 2
Music Player Bike Rack
Music Player Coffee Cup
Medicine Dispenser Bike Rack
Medicine Dispenser Coffee Cup
Table 4-1 Order of Problem Presentation
4.2.4. Analysis
To quantify the generated designs, the scoring procedure used in Chrysikou & Weisberg
(2005) was used. This scoring procedure provides greater detail in terms of the
characteristics of fixation than the scoring procedure used by Jansson and Smith (1991),
which solely looked at the presence or absence of certain flaws that were placed in the
Fixation condition by the experimenter. In Chryiskou & Weisberg (2005), each design
was scored along three separate dimensions of fixation: 1) A measure of similarity,
which is composed of: direct physical similarities, reproductive similarities, and
analogical similarities; 2) reproduction of intentional flaws, and 3) reproduction of
unintentional flaws. A direct physical similarity occurred when the design generated
was a direct copy of the pictorial example provided. Reproductive similarities were
characterised by specific elements of the pictorial example being incorporated into the
final design. Analogical similarities occurred when the same principles as the pictorial
example were used without copying the physical characteristics of the example.
Intentional flaws are characterised by incorporating specific flaws from the pictorial
example that were placed there by the experimenter. Unintentional flaws are
characterised by the incorporation of flaws in the provided examples that were not
specifically placed by the experimenter. Table 4-2 contains an example of the specific
scoring criteria used in the analysis (the full scoring criteria is contained in Appendix
A). On each generated design a percentage score was created for a specific fixation
measure by dividing the design score on that measure by the maximum possible score
for the measure, then these were averaged over all the generated designs to produce a
single summary score for that fixation measure. This process was repeated for each of
the fixation measures producing summary scores with potential limits of 0 (complete
absence of fixation) to 1 (maximum fixation).
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Measure Definition Score
Direct Physical Similarity Same shapes, patterns, controls, layout and
features as an example
0-1
Reproductive Similarity 1) use of album, 2) vertical volume bar, 3)
use of excessive controls, 4) use of arrows
for linear navigation, 5)use of cover flow,
6) placement of add/remove buttons
0-6
Analogical Similarity 1) Alternative ways to display playing
music , 2) alternative ways to navigate
music collection
0-2




Unintentional Flaws 1) not able to search, 2) no display for
current track
0-2
Table 4-2 An example of the scoring criteria used for the music player problem
4.3. Results
To investigate whether the solutions generated under the Brief & Flawed example
condition were markedly more similar to the provided examples than the solutions
generated under the Brief only condition, a mixed series Multivariate Analyses of
Variance (MANOVA) was used to analyse the four dependent variables (Reproduced
Similarities, Analogical Similarities, Intentional Flaws and Unintentional Flaws). As in
the earlier studies that used these five fixation measures, all participants scored zero on
the Direct Physical Similarities (Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005). Consequently, since this
result was constant across all groups, the Direct Physical Similarities measure was
removed from the analysis.
4.3.1. Design Fixation in Interaction Designers
Figure 4.1 clearly illustrates that the designs generated under the Brief & Flawed
Example condition were significantly more similar to the provided examples
(Reproduced Similarities (RS) M = 0.413, SD = 0.183; Analogical Similarities (AS) M
= 0.432, SD = 0.268; Intentional Flaws (IF) M = 0.403, SD = 0.214; Unintentional
Flaws (UF) M = 0.332, SD = 0.277) when compared to the brief only condition (RS M =
0.144, SD = 0.189; AS M = 0.185, SD = 0.150; IF M = 0.276, SD = 0.190; UF M =
0.085, SD = 0.110). This behaviour was exhibited across all three measures of fixation
(RS F(1,30) = 16.88, p < .01; AS F(1,30) = 10.29, p < .01; UF F(1,30) = 10.91, p <
.01).
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Figure 4-1 Levels of fixation between the presentation conditions for each fixation
measure. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
The notion of two types of flaws as discussed by Chrysikou and Weisberg (2005) is an
arbitrary distinction if the perspective of the participant is considered. The distinction
between Intentional and Unintentional flaws is simply an artefact of the experimenter
but from the point of the view participants, they are unaware of which flaws were
placed by the experimenter and which are flaws that were inherent to the example. By
combining the two measures of fixation into a unified measure examining the flawed
elements of the example, regardless of the source, we can gain a more accurate picture
of how participants fixate. While the distinction between Intentional and Unintentional
flaws is arbitrary both of these measures of fixation were kept in the previous analysis
so as to allow for comparability back to previous Design Fixation studies. Previous to
the work of Chrysikou & Weisberg (2005), all Design Fixation studies calculate fixation
scores by the presence of flawed characteristics from the original example in the
proposed solutions. In this study this is exemplified by the Intentional Flaws measure of
fixation.
When fixation is examined with the unified measure of Reproduced Flaws, the
results remain consistent with the results discussed in the proceeding paragraphs. The
Reproduced Flaws measure of fixation demonstrated that there was a significant
difference between the two presentation conditions F(1,30) = 10.24, p < 0.01 with the
Brief + Flawed Example condition exhibiting higher levels of fixation (M = 0.367, SD =
0.198) as compared to the Brief Only condition (M = 0.181 ,SD = 0.124).
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4.3.2. Design Fixation and the Effect of Differing Problem Disciplines
While the main effect of Presentation (whether the participants were given a flawed
Priming Analogy or not) was generally robust across measures, the same cannot be said
about the main effect of Problem Discipline. There was a main effect of Problem
Discipline, F(4,27) = 3.558, p < .05, but as illustrated by Figure 4.2, the observed effect
can be attributed to the Reproduced Flaws measure of fixation. Participants
incorporated significantly more of the Reproduced Flaws of the original examples into
their solutions to the Mechanical Engineering problems (M = 0.355, SD = 0.248) than
they did in the Interaction Design problem solutions (M = 0.193, SD = 0.233), F (1,30)
= 9.07, p < .01. No significant differences were observed between any of the other
measures of fixation.
The main effect of exposure to a flawed graphical example; therefore, produces a
fairly robust impact on a range of fixation measures. However, the main effect of
problem discipline results in a fixation effect that was restricted to the Reproduced
Flaws fixation measure.
Figure 4-2 Differing levels of fixation within each fixation measure across problem
disciplines. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
4.3.3. The Effect of Exposure Within Each Problem Discipline
While there was no significant interaction observed between Problem Discipline and
Presentation (F(3,28) = 0.957, p > .05), Figure 4-3 does illustrate that there were several
notable differences between the Brief and Flawed Example condition and the Brief
Only condition. To investigate these differences a series of independent sample t-tests
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were conducted within each problem discipline in order to examine the discipline-
specific differences between the experimental groups on each fixation measure.
Figure 4-3 Levels of fixation in each fixation measure separated by experimental
condition and problem discipline. RS = Reproductive Similarities, AS = Analogical
Similarities, RF = Reproduced Flaws. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
Figure 4.3 illustrates differing patterns of fixation between the two problem disciplines.
When participants were working on a problem from their own design discipline they
tended to fixate across all measures of fixation (Reproductive Similarities t(30) = 3.36,
p < .01; Analogical Similarities t(30) = 3.77, p < .01; Reproduced Flaws t(30) = 2.34, p
< .05). In comparison, when participants were working on a design problem with which
they were not familiar, they focused on the physical characteristics of the provided
example namely the Reproductive Similarities (t(30) = 3.09, p < .01) and Reproduced
Flaws (t (30) = 2.348, p < .05). Figure 4.3 illustrates quite clearly that the inclusion of a
within domain problem causes fixation across all measures of fixation, while the
presence of an example in a domain that they are not familiar with increases fixation on
only the physical properties (RS & RF) of that flawed graphical example.
In summation, we can see that by showing a participant a graphic example, the
designs they create will be markedly closer to the initial example. When examining the
differences between the experimental conditions, we see that the introduction of a
pictorial example increases levels of Reproductive Similarity and incorporation of
Reproduced Flaws from that example, independent of problem discipline. Outside of
this common thread, which spans the two design domains, we found that analogical
similarities were limited to within-domain problems.
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4.4. Discussion
The primary focus of this study was to address issues of external validity, within the
Design Fixation paradigm, by replicating Design Fixation in a non-Engineering
population, namely Interaction Designers. By replicating Design Fixation among
Interaction Designers we are able to in turn validate the analogical persistence identified
in the previous study. Examining how the domain of the problem as well as the domain
of expertise of the participant allowed us to address one threat to the external validity of
the Design Fixation as well as provide theoretical triangulation to the previous study.
As previously mentioned, replication of Design Fixation outside of the
Mechanical Engineering discipline has been problematic (Purcell & Gero, 1996; Purcell
et al., 1993). When the discipline of the designer was controlled for, DF was observed
to be present among different design disciplines but was only marginally significant.
Purcell et al. (1993) hypothesized that the marginally significant results of their study
were due to a mismatch between the discipline of the designer and the discipline of the
problem, e.g. fixation among Interaction Designers would be significantly higher when
working on an Interaction Design problem than when working on an engineering
problem (which they have no expertise in).
Results from this study indicate that Design Fixation is present in Interaction
Designers. Purcell et al. (1993) hypothesised that a match between the problem domain
and the domain of expertise would yield fixation; however, the results from this study
do not support this hypothesis. The results from this study suggest that DF was in fact
present among the solutions generated in Purcell et al, (1993) Therefore, the marginal
significance obtained by Purcell et al., (1993) was most likely not a result of a mismatch
between problem discipline and domain of expertise, but a function of the outcome
measure used.
The increased levels of fixation that were observed in this study may be attributed
to the usage of a more sensitive outcome measure. In both Purcell & Gero (1991) and
Purcell et al. (1993), the measure of fixation employed were lists of the particular flaws
placed in each example by the experimenters. Fixation was then coded based on the
appearance of these particular characteristics. Under the more sensitive measure created
by Chrysikou and Weisberg (2005), these characteristics would only be accounted for
by the Intentional Flaws measure of fixation. If only the Intentional Flaws measure of
fixation had been utilized in this study, we would have drawn the same conclusion as
Purcell et al. (1993), as illustrated in Figure 4.1. By widening the scope of fixation
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measures to include such characteristics as analogical similarities and reproductive
similarities, we can see that DF is in fact fairly robust across design disciplines.
When we took a more focused approach to analysing the individual measures of
fixation we began to see evidence for Purcell’s hypothesis. A significant difference in
fixation was recorded between the types of designs generated across all measures of
fixation when Interaction Designers were faced with a problem domain they were
familiar with (as illustrated by Figure 4.2). When engaging in the design decision-
making process with a problem domain familiar to them, participants focused on
superficial elements of the flawed examples (i.e. Reproductive Similarities and
Reproduced Flaws).
The validity of analogical persistence was confirmed by employing the Design
Fixation paradigm to quantitatively assess whether or not these initial results were an
artefact of a post-hoc rationalisation of the design decision-making process. Results
indicated that when Interaction Designers were given a flawed example at the outset of
the decision-making process that the solutions generated where markedly closer to the
experimental analogies when compared to the control group.
This persistence of an initial idea overriding the evaluation of plausible
alternatives is echoed in Darke’s idea of a Primary Generator (1979). Much like the
persistence of the initial analogy the Primary Generator is best described as an idea that
a designer begins the design process with, then latches onto for the remainder of the
design process, at the cost of evaluating alternative solutions to the problem. This
phenomenon is well documented in the area of design research, but its presence is taken
as simply inevitable with little work being done on understanding its effects in a more
holistic manner to the design process. Other areas outside design research have
commented on similar phenomena such as Gestalt psychology and the differing types of
fixation (e.g. Functional Fixedness Duncker, 1945, Mental Ruts (S. M. Smith, 1995)),
as well as the Anchoring Effect in the decision-making literature (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). The Gestalt idea of fixation discusses how the problem solving
process can become disrupted by differing elements (such as recency, repetitions,
familiarity) which prevent the individual from successfully completing the problem and
‘fixating’ on particular characteristics of the problem in question. For example, Duncker
(1945) described the phenomenon of Functional Fixedness in which the traditional use
of an artefact prevented the participant from imagining other, more innovative, ways to
use these objects to solve the problem at hand. Participants were given a matchbox,
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containing one match, a candle and a thumbtack and were instructed to light the candle
and attach it to the wall. Participants were unable to solve the problem as they were
fixated on the traditional use of a matchbox and were not able to imagine the box as a
candle holder that could be attached to the wall with the thumbtack. The Anchoring
Effect is similar in that it documents the disruption of a normal cognitive system, in this
case decision-making, by the inclusion of an initial example. Tversky and Kahneman
(1974) discussed the inclusion of an example before a participant engages in the
decision-making process will provide an answer that is markedly closer to the given
example than if they hadn’t been given an example solution. This ‘anchoring’ to the
initial example, as well as the related phenomenon of the primary generator, and
fixation build a picture in which the presence of an initial idea, analogy, or example can
profoundly influence the outcome of the process in question. These phenomena further
underline the relevance of the findings from the first study from a theoretical standpoint.
The results of this study demonstrate how the inclusion of a flawed example can
lead to a faulty framework in which certain suppressed elements of the analogy were
carried through to the conclusion of the decision-making process. The flawed graphical
example created a framework in which certain elements of the design problem were
highlighted and other elements were suppressed. The presence of these faulty elements
in the final solutions were indicative of this faulty framework. This persistent and faulty
framework created by a faulty analogy demonstrates the over-reliance on a single
analogy rather than a series of analogies which would support the issue of the results
from the first study being a function of post-hoc rationalization.
4.5. Conclusion
The primary aim of this study was to replicate analogical persistence using a
quantitative method. By replicating Design Fixation in Interaction Designers we have
addressed both the issue of internal validity from the previous study as well as the threat
to external validity of the Design Fixation paradigm. By adopting a more sensitive
measure than the one used in previous studies (Jansson & S.M. Smith, 1991; Marsh,
Landau, & Hicks, 1996; Perttula & Sipila, 2007; Perttula & Liikkanen, 2005, 2006;
Purcell & Gero, 1991, 1996; Purcell et al., 1993; Tseng et al., 2008) we were able to
replicate Design Fixation in a non-engineering population. This replication provides
methodological triangulation to the previous study by demonstrating how a Priming
Analogy can influence the entire design decision-making process from the initial stages
of idea generation through to the final stage of offering a solution to the design problem.
By illustrating quantitatively how an initial analogy can persist across all stages of the
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decision-making process we are more confident in the representativeness of the findings
from the previous qualitative study.
At the outset of this chapter we discussed an alternative explanation to the
results from the previous study, which posed a threat to the construct validity of
analogical persistence. By using the Design Fixation paradigm we can see how a
singular analogy, at the outset of the design process, can impact the entire design
decision-making process. By providing methodological triangulation we also addressed
this threat to the construct validity of analogical persistence. While we have addressed
the issue of internal construct there are still other threats to the both the internal and
external validity of the Design Fixation paradigm. The next two chapters each deal with
a possible threat to the validity of the Design Fixation paradigm.
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5.Design Fixation and Internal Validity –
The Stimuli
5.1. Introduction
While the Design Fixation paradigm allows us to examine and manipulate the influence
of analogies, it is not without its issues. The previous chapter raised the issue of external
validity, specifically the generalisability of Design Fixation across different design
domains. This chapter continues with our examination of validity by examining the
threats to internal validity by addressing the issue of the materials. To date many of the
Design Fixation studies have used similar stimuli to those created by Jansson & Smith
(1991). While consistent stimuli increases sensitivity and comparability across studies,
it also raises a concern to the internal validity of the Design Fixation phenomenon. To
use the Design Fixation paradigm with any confidence to provide methodological
triangulation, we need to address this threat to internal validity by replicating the
previous study with new stimuli.
5.1.1. Replication of Design Fixation and the Materials used
Since the first Design Fixation study (Jansson & Smith, 1991), work that has aimed to
replicate these findings has primarily relied on the original stimuli. While there are clear
benefits to using the same materials as Jansson & Smith (1991), particularly allowing
for direct comparison across different studies, this consistent use of the same problem
set does raise the concern that the results exhibited in the previous chapter were not a
function of the experimental manipulations of the DF paradigm but rather were a
function of the problems used.
Researchers such as Purcell & Gero (1991) have used the same, as well as
similar, stimuli to the ones created by Jansson & Smith in their investigations of the
Design Fixation phenomenon. While their use of Jansson & Smith’s stimuli were
appropriate, considering the goals of the study, it does bring in to question the validity
of their reported findings. For example, Purcell & Gero (1991) were investigating the
generalisability of Design Fixation across several different design disciplines, in
particular Architecture, Industrial Design, and Mechanical Engineers. Purcell & Gero
(1991) used the same structure, and stimuli, as the original DF study. Fixation was
reproduced in the engineering population but the replication of fixation failed to exhibit
among the non-engineering populations. While this failure to replicate was addressed in
the previous chapter the constant use of the Jansson & Smith (1991) stimuli in that
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study as well as the previous chapter does threaten the internal validity of the Design
Fixation paradigm. This issue of materials is not just related to the work done by Purcell
& Gero (1991) but has been observed in several other studies which have investigated
different aspects of Design Fixation (e.g. Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005; Purcell et al.,
1993).
Recently several studies have begun to use different problems to elicit Design
Fixation (Perttula & Liikkanen, 2006; Purcell & Gero, 1996; Purcell et al., 1993) and
have had success in recreating the results of Jansson & Smith (1991), but with one
crucial caveat: the design discipline of the tested population. All studies to date that
have employed different design problems, to elicit fixation, have been solely in the
context of Mechanical Engineering students. As discussed in the previous chapter the
Design Fixation paradigm does manifest differently within different design disciplines.
So while the replication of DF using different stimuli is promising the confounding
variable of design discipline needs to be addressed.
To quantitatively investigate the influence of analogies on the decision-making
process of Interaction Designers, we need to be confident that the results that we are
observing in the Design Fixation paradigm are attributable to our experimental
manipulations and are not a function of fundamental flaws with the paradigm itself. To
address issues of internal validity, specifically the problem of stimuli, we replicated the
design of the study discussed in the previous chapter with the use of entirely new
stimuli to separate the observed phenomenon from flaws within the paradigm.
5.2. Method
5.2.1. Participants
Twenty-two Interaction Design students from the MSc in Human Computer Interactions
with Ergonomics from University College London participated in this experiment.
Participants had on average 8 months of experience as Interaction Designers.
5.2.2. Design
As the focus of this study was to examine the confounding issue of the materials used in
the previous study, a similar experimental design to the previous chapter was employed.
A 2 x 2 mixed design was used with Presentation condition (Brief Only vs. Brief &
Flawed Example) being the between-subjects variable, and the Problem Domain
(Interaction Design vs. Mechanical Engineering) being the within- subjects variable.
The Brief Only and the Brief & Flawed Example conditions were the same
format as the study in the previous chapter. The difference between the two presentation
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conditions is the amount of information that is provided with each problem. The
Problem Domain condition manipulates the design characteristics that the participants
would be familiar with. The Interaction Design condition is a within-domain problem,
i.e. a successful solution would be based upon leveraging design principles that the
participants would have an understanding of. The second problem domain condition is
the Mechanical Engineering problem, which is based on a design area in which the
participants would not have an understanding of the design principles necessary to
generate a successful solution to the design brief.
5.2.3. Materials
Participants, at the outset of the study, were given a booklet containing two design
problems. One design problem was a within-domain problem that participants would be
familiar with (Interaction Design) with the other problem being a design problem from
a differing domain (Mechanical Engineering). Each design problem contained a brief
outlining the overall goals of the problem as well as the criteria necessary for a
successful solution. Unlike the study in the previous chapter, this study used completely
new design problems to address the issue of stimuli on the internal validity of the
Design Fixation paradigm. New design problems were generated so as to avoid any
overlap with subject areas that were already covered in Jansson & Smith (1991) to
avoid any potential confounding variables. The Brief Only condition contained a verbal
description of the design problem while the Brief & Flawed Example condition
contained the same verbal description with the addition of an inherently flawed graphic
example. The flawed pictorial examples contained at least two flaws that violated
several of the design constraints identified in the verbal description of the design
problem The new design problems are included in Appendix B.
5.2.4. Experimental Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two presentation conditions.
Participants were instructed that they would be presented with two different design
problems, one being an Interaction Design problem and the other being a Mechanical
Engineering problem. Prior to commencement participants were instructed that they had
25 minutes for each design problem and during that time they should generate as many
solutions as possible in response to each design brief. In addition they were instructed to
annotate each design, as they felt necessary and to number each individual design. Each




As in the previous study the same scoring procedure created by Chrysikou & Weisberg
(2005) was employed. Each design that participants generated was analysed along two
dimensions of fixation: 1) Similarity, which is operationlised by the three measures of
Direct Physical Similarity (DP), Reproductive Similarities (RS), and Analogical
Similarities (AS) and 2) Reproduction of Flaws from the presented example which was
originally composed of Intentional (IF) and Unintentional Flaws (UF).
As discussed in the preceding chapter, these four measures of fixation are
different ways in which fixation can be exhibited. Direct Physical similarity is a binary
measure to account for when the design generated is a direct copy of the provided
example. Reproduced Similarities accounts for specific features of the provided
pictorial example being present in the generated designs. Analogical Similarities are
similar to Reproduced Similarities in that a feature of the provided example is
inappropriately incorporated into the final design but rather than focus on the physical
aspects of the feature the fixation is on the principles behind that feature. Intentional
Flaws are characterised by incorporating specific flaws from the pictorial example that
were placed there by the experimenter. Unintentional Flaws, on the other hand, are the
incorporation of flaws from the example, which were not initially identified by the
experimenter.
In this study Unintentional Flaws and Intentional Flaws have been combined from
two separate measures into one unified measure of fixation, referred to as Reproduced
Flaws (RF). In previous studies, such as Chrysikou & Weisberg (2005), UF and IF were
studied in isolation of each other. The division of flaws between intentional and
unintentional was an artefact of the experimenter and not truly reflective of the
phenomena being studied. As the participant is not aware of what flaws have been
specifically included to measure fixation (IF) and which flaws were fixated upon per
chance (UF), to the participant a flaw is simply a flaw. Figure 5.1 below illustrates the
various measures of fixation and how they relate.
Figure 5-1 Fixation and its component phenomena
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Each design generated was given a percentage score, on the four above measures of
fixation, which indicated the level of fixation exhibited in the design. Below is an
example of the scoring criteria employed in this analysis, the complete set of scoring
criteria is contained in Appendix B. A score of zero was indicative of a complete
absence of fixation and a score of 1 was maximum fixation. The score for each measure
was obtained by dividing the design score for each individual measure by the maximum
total that could be obtained for that measure.
Direct Physical
Similarities
Same shapes, patterns, controls, layout, and features as example
Reproductive
Similarities
1) Cube like rotation 2) Simple grid system 3) Drop down menu for multiple
calendars 4) Two drawings for calendar navigation
Analogical
Similarities
1) use of 3D view 2) Floating calendar sections 3) Non-linear navigation between
months
Reproduced Flaws 1) Static weeks will not work 2) Ambiguous navigations between months 3) No
current display for month/year
Table 5-1 Scoring criteria for the calendar problem presented
5.3. Results
To investigate the experimental manipulations of our two independent variables
(Presentation and Problem Domain) a similar type of analysis, as used in the previous
study, was conducted. As we have one within-subject independent variable, one
between-subject independent variable, and four dependent variables, a mixed-design
Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was conducted. A MANOVA was
employed to provide an understanding of each of the main effects of each independent
variable as well as minimize our risk of over-testing our four dependent variables
(Direct Physical, Reproduced Similarities, Analogical Similarities, and Reproduced
Flaws). Of the four measures of fixation discussed in the above Methods section three
were analysed as per previous studies (e.g. chapter four and Chrysikou & Weisberg,
2005). The Direct Physical measure of fixation, which takes into account the situation
in which participants copy the provided pictorial example, was removed from the
analysis. None of the participants proposed any simple facsimiles in their final design
solutions: each design generated was a novel solution.
5.3.1. Presentation
The Design Fixation paradigm employed in this study postulates that designers who are
shown a flawed example will produce designs that are more similar to the given
example when compared to control participants in the Brief Only condition who had not
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been exposed to the example at all. As is evident from Figure 5-2, we can see that this
hypothesis holds with a replication of the findings from the previous study (main effect
of Presentation F(3,18) = 3.413, p < .05). Participants who were given the flawed
example in conjunction with the design brief had higher levels of fixation (RS M =
0.222, SD = 0.204; AS M = 0.372, SD = 0.342; RF M = 0.345, SD = 0.267) when
compared to the Brief Only condition (RS M = 0.043, SD = 0.072; AS M = 0.058, SD =
0.077; RF M = 0.100, SD = 0.088). These higher levels of fixation are indicative of
participants who were exposed to the flawed pictorial examples incorporating more
elements of that example into their design than the control condition.
Significant differences between the Brief & Flawed Example condition and the
Brief Only condition were observed over all three dependent variables (RS F(1,20) =
7.525, p < 0.05; AS F(1,20) = 8.793, p < 0.01; RF F(1,20) = 8.315, p < 0.01).
Figure 5-2 Levels of fixation between presentation conditions across all measures of
fixation. RS = Reproduced Similarities, AS = Analogical Similarities, RF = Reproduced
Flaws. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
5.3.2. Problem Domain
In the previous study it was observed that the domain of the problem that participants
were given did have some influence on the types of solutions that were generated. In the
previous study it was shown that types of problems that participants were given only
impacted the number of specific problematic characteristics of the flawed example
being incorporated into the final solutions, as indicated by the significant effect of
Problem Discipline on the Reproduced Flaws measure of fixation. In the previous study,
using the potentially problematic stimuli, the domain of the problem had no impact on
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the other two measures of fixation (Reproduced Similarities and Analogical
Similarities).
The introduction of new stimuli did offer slightly different results than the ones
observed in the previous study. Figure 5.3 illustrates that there was no effect of Problem
Domain on any of the measures of fixation (F(3,18) = 1.00, p >.05) . The previous
study showed that more specific problematic characteristics from the flawed example
were present in the final solutions when dealing with a problem from a domain that they
were not familiar with (i.e. Mechanical Engineering); however, this finding was not
replicated when new stimuli were presented. When new stimuli were used the mean
level of fixation observed on the ME problems dropped from 0.355 (chapter four) to
0.176 which is more inline with the levels of fixation observed in the Interaction Design
condition across both studies (chapter four M = 0.193, chapter five M = 0.256). While
the replication of two measures of fixation does indicate a certain level of internal
validity for those measures of fixation we can observe the impact that differing stimuli
can have an expression of how many flaws from the priming example are incorporated
into the final solutions.
Figure 5-3 Levels of fixation for each problem discipline across all three measures of
fixation. RS = Reproduced Similarities, AS = Analogical Similarities, RF = Reproduced
Flaws. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
5.3.3. Fixation Patterns
In the previous study differing patterns of fixation were noted when comparing the
various measures of fixation across the two differing problem domains. What was noted
in the previous study was that when participants engaged with a within domain problem
(i.e. an Interaction Design problem) they were far more likely to be influenced by the
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flawed Priming Analogy, as illustrated by the significant differences between
Presentation conditions across all measures of fixation. When participants engaged with
a problem domain they were not familiar with they tended to fixate on the physical
aspects of the flawed example i.e. the Reproduced Similarities and Reproduced Flaws
measures of fixation. Considering the issue of stimuli on the internal validity of the
Design Fixation paradigm it does beg the question: are the fixation patterns reflective of
the differences between engaging with a problem participants are familiar with or not,
or is it a function of the stimuli used?
Figure 5-4 Levels of fixation for each measure of fixation across both problem
disciplines. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
Problem Domain
Measure of
Fixation t df p
Interaction Design RS 3.342 20 0.003
AS 3.533 20 0.002
RF 3.509 20 0.002
Mechanical Engineering RS 1.425 20 0.169
AS 2.179 20 0.041
RF 1.169 20 0.256
Table 5-2 Follow up independent sample t-tests for each component of figure 5.4
Figure 5.4 illustrates the level of fixation for all three fixation measures across
both problem disciplines. What emerged was that the fixation patterns were not
replicated. While the within-domain levels of fixation were consistent in both studies,
the differing domain levels of fixation were not significant. From Table 5-2 we can see
that there was a significant difference between the two Presentation conditions on the
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Analogical Similarities measure in the Engineering problems (t = 2.179, p < 0.05).
When we correct for the possibility of over-testing using a Bonferroni correction by
using a corrected alpha of 0. 008 (α = 0.05 / 6) this difference is no longer significant. 
From this analysis we can conclude that the patterns exhibited were not a function of
within versus differing problem domains, but rather were a function of the problems
presented to the participants.
5.4. Discussion
In the previous study it was demonstrated that by extending our conceptual
measurement of fixation from a predefined list of counter-intuitive features to a more
holistic approach to measuring fixation, we could in fact replicate Design Fixation in a
non-engineering population. By replicating the Design Fixation among a non-
engineering population of designers we were able to address a main threat to the
external validity of this paradigm: the representativeness. The aim of this particular
study was to address another important threat to internal validity: stimuli. While many
Design Fixation studies have used the same stimuli so as to allow for comparison across
multiple studies it has overshadowed some of the results as a possible confounding
variable (e.g. Purcell & Gero, 1991). To address the confounding issue of stimuli we
replicated the previous study with an entirely new problem set. The introduction of new
stimuli produced consistent results on some of the experimental manipulations, such as
Presentation, and produced mixed results on other manipulations such as Problem
Domain.
5.4.1. Presentation
The replication of the results, with newly generated stimuli, exhibited in the previous
chapter attests to the robustness of the Design Fixation paradigm. Under both studies it
was observed that by priming people with a flawed analogy at the outset of the design
problem that participants will rely on that analogy to the point of producing solutions
that are markedly closer to the provided example in comparison to the participants who
were given only the design brief. Previous to the study in chapter four, studies that
attempted to reproduce Design Fixation in a non-engineering population were met with
mixed results. With the replication of fixation in both chapter four and this study we can
see that using a more sensitive measure can reveal Design Fixation among Interaction
Designers. By producing the same results in both studies, using completely different
stimuli, we can feel more confident that the issue of does not influence the internal
validity of the Design Fixation paradigm.
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5.4.2. Problem Domain
While the effect of Presentation (Brief Only versus Brief & Flawed Example) replicated
despite the use of different stimuli, the same cannot be said for the effect of the Problem
domain manipulation (within-domain versus differing-domain problems). In the
previous study it was observed that the types of problems that participants were given
had no effect on the influence of the Priming Analogy on two of the three measures of
fixation. The only measure of fixation to show any effect of Problem Domain was the
Reproduced Flaws measure. Results from the previous study showed that when
participants were engaging with a problem that they were not familiar with (i.e. the
Engineering based problems) they were more likely to incorporate problematic
characteristics of the priming example into their final solutions. This result makes sense
as one would expect a participant who is familiar with the domain of the problem to
have an easier time identifying problematic elements of the flawed example and remove
those from the proposed solution.
In this study, we did not replicate the difference in the influence of the priming
example between the Interaction Design problem and the Mechanical Engineering
problem. All three measure of fixation (Reproduced Similarities, Analogical
Similarities, and Reproduced Flaws) showed no difference in terms of how much the
Priming Analogies influenced the design decision-making process. When we
specifically compared how the Reproduced Flaws measure of fixation expressed itself
across the two different stimuli sets (Jansson & Smith (1991) problems and the new
problems used in this study) we can see that the level of fixation from the previous
study drops to a consistent level exhibited by the Interaction Design problems used in
both studies. The higher levels of fixation exhibited using the older stimuli do provide
evidence to indicate that the types of examples used by previous Design Fixation
studies (e.g. Jansson & Smith, 1991; Purcell & Gero, 1991; Purcell et al., 1993) fosters
higher levels of fixation. The observed higher levels of fixation indicate that using the
types of stimuli proposed by Jansson & Smith (1991) to produce Design Fixation may
be a relevant issue.
5.4.3. Fixation Patterns
In the previous study, it was hypothesized that the differences in the expressions of
fixation between the two problem domains was a potentially descriptive pattern. It was
hypothesised that these fixation patterns could describe whether a participant was
dealing with a within-domain problem or a problem from a differing domain, depending
on the relative values of the different fixation measures. The results in chapter four
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illustrated that when participants were engaged with a within-domain problem, when
provided with a flawed priming example, they were far more likely to produce solutions
that were markedly closer to that initial flawed example in comparison to the solutions
generated by participants who were only given the design brief. This was true across all
of the fixation measures. Chapter four also discussed the fact that when participants
were engaging with a design problem from a domain they were not familiar with, they
also tended to fixate not on the analogical elements of the priming example but also on
the physical aspects of that initial provided Priming Analogy.
However, results from this study did not support our hypothesis that these fixation
patterns were descriptive of the participant’s level of familiarity with a given design
problem. While the behaviour exhibited by the within-domain problems remained
consistent, the levels of fixation observed among the engineering problems were not
replicated. In this study there was no difference between the types of solutions
generated between the participants who received the flawed example, and the group of
participants only given the brief. The results of this fixation pattern analysis underscores
that there are possible issues with the original stimuli.
While Design Fixation was replicated, regardless of the stimuli used, the fact that
the expression of fixation across the two different design domains does raise some
questions. A possible explanation of the differing results between studies may be due to
the participant’s level of familiarity with these examples. Previous studies have
highlighted how familiarity may impact Design Fixation. Purcell & Gero (1996)
discussed how attempting to control for the familiarity of the stimuli may interfere with
fixation. The next chapter examines why using unfamiliar stimuli causes Design
Fixation to manifest differently.
5.5. Conclusion
The primary goal of this study was to address a threat to the internal validity of the
Design Fixation paradigm: the stimuli used. While the effect of Presentation was
replicated, the influence of Problem Domain was not, implying that the expression of
fixation across design domains may be affected by the stimuli. Despite the issues
regarding the problem domain, the fact that we were able to consistently measure
fixation when Interaction Designers engaged with Interaction Design problems
highlighted the robustness of the Design Fixation paradigm when a more sensitive
measure is used. By addressing these threats to internal validity, generalisability and
stimuli, we can be more confident in the internal validity of the Design Fixation
paradigm itself. While the previous two chapters have dealt with the issue of
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generalisability and the issue of materials we still have not dealt with all of the potential
threats to validity. Earlier we discussed how the confounding variable of familiarity
may account for the observed increase in analogical persistence. The next chapter
addresses the last threat to validity: the confounding variable of familiarity.
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6.Design Fixation and Internal Validity –
the Issue of Familiarity
6.1. Introduction
In the previous two chapters we have discussed several threats to the validity of the
Design Fixation paradigm. This study continues this exploration of possible threats to
the internal validity of the Design Fixation paradigm by examining the influence of
familiarity on how analogies influence the types of decisions Interaction Designers
make when producing design solutions. In the previous chapter, it was noted that the
stimuli created by Jansson & Smith (1991) actually produced higher levels of fixation
when compared to newly generated stimuli. While the influence of the flawed examples
was consistent across both studies when participants were engaging with a within-
domain problem, fixation did not persist when participants were working with problems
in an unfamiliar design domain. Consequently, it was hypothesised that our failure to
replicate fixation with the newly generated stimuli may be a function of the
participant’s level of familiarity.
6.1.1. Familiarity and Design Fixation
The first study to replicate the findings of the original Design Fixation study identified
familiarity as having an important effect on the levels of fixation exhibited by the
participants (Purcell & Gero, 1991). When Purcell and Gero (1991) attempted to
replicate Jansson & Smith (1991) with different design disciplines fixation was only
replicated in the original engineering population and fixation in the non-engineering
population was hypothesized to be a function of familiarity. Familiarity was
operationalised as one’s knowledge of the device as a function of extended exposure or
use.
The role of familiarity plays an important part in Naturalistic Decision-Making.
In the first stage of decision-making, as described by Klein and Calderwood (1991), the
decision-making process begins by using analogical reasoning to find a previous
example that is similar enough to the decision to be made that it can be used as a
template to create a proposed action plan. The analogy that is chosen by the decision-
maker as the decision template is a situation that the decision-maker is highly familiar
with (Klein, 1987b). Ward et al. (2002) discuss how, in open-ended design tasks, a
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familiar situation or artefact forms the basis for which all of the participant’s proposed
solutions are derived. However, this notion of a familiar example forming the basis of
all generated solutions is not a new idea to the domain of design research (e.g. Eckert &
Stacey, 2001; Eckert et al., 2005; Jansson, Condoor, & Brock, 1993).
In the context of the Design Fixation paradigm the flawed pictorial example acts
as a Priming Analogy that participants use to construct their proposed action plan,
which produces solutions that are visibly influenced by the flawed example. The
intersection of familiarity and Design Fixation is a matter of expression. If we are to
look at how the Design Fixation paradigm functions in the context of Priming
Analogies we would expect that participants would be more heavily influenced by the
flawed pictorial example when it is an artefact that they are unfamiliar with since there
would be no competing analogies for the singular decision template. Alternatively,
when participants are engaged with a problem in which the artefact in question is highly
familiar, we would expect less interference from the Priming Analogy since there would
be competition between the provided Priming Analogy and a Self-Generated Analogy.
To investigate the impact that familiarity has on the Design Fixation paradigm,
using the Prucell and Gero (1991) definition, we should explicitly control for
familiarity. By explicitly controlling for familiarity as an independent variable we can




Twenty-two Interaction Design students from the MSc in Human-Computer Interaction
with Ergonomics from the University College London participated in this study.
Participants had on average 8 months of experience as Interaction Designers.
6.2.2. Design
Like the two previous Design Fixation studies presented in this thesis a 2 x 2 mixed
design was used. The between-subjects variable was Presentation (Brief Only vs. Brief
& Flawed Example) and the within-subjects variable was Familiarity (High vs. Low).
As per the previous studies, the Presentation condition manipulates how much
information the participant is provided with at the outset of the study. In the Brief Only
condition, participants received a design brief which outlined the overall goals of the
problem as well as the requirements necessary for a successful solution. In the Brief &
Flawed Example condition, participants received the same design brief, but in addition
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were given a flawed pictorial example of a possible solution to that particular problem.
This flawed example acted as a Priming Analogy for the design decision-making
process. Within the provided example there are several problematic characteristics
implanted by the experimenter. These problematic features were either in direct
contradiction to the accompanying design brief, or were in themselves counter-intuitive.
As briefly discussed earlier, Familiarity is defined as ones understanding of the
functionality device through prolonged frequent exposure.
6.2.3. Materials
As the level of familiarity was explicitly controlled for in this study a pilot study was
conducted to ensure that the problems presented were truly reflective of their relative
familiarity conditions. Six problems were used: the Interaction Design problem from the
previous study and five newly generated problems. Three problems were generated to
be low in familiarity and three were generated to be high in familiarity. Appendix C
contains the six design problems used in the pilot study. A group of 5 post-graduate
students, from the University College London Interaction Centre, were asked to rate
their familiarity with each of the six problems on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5
where 1 was indicative of 'Have never used the device' and 5 was representative of
'Frequently use the device'. From the six design problems generated two were selected
which were the highest and lowest rated. The highest rated design problem (the calendar
problem) was categorised as the high familiarity problem and the lowest rated (the
marine mammal communicator problem) was used as the representative of the low
familiarity condition.
In the main study, each participant was given a booklet containing two design
problems; one for each level of familiarity. To eliminate any type of order effect all
possible combinations were presented across all participants. At the end of each booklet
a questionnaire was given which asked participants to report how familiar they were
with the two design problems contained in the booklet. For each of the two problems
participants were asked to rate their familiarity using the same Likert scale that was
used in the pilot study. This self-rating of familiarity was used to corroborate the
familiarity classification of the pre-study.
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Figure 6-1 The high familiarity design brief with accompanying flawed example.
Figure 6-2 The low familiarity design brief and accompanying flawed example.
6.2.4. Experimental Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of either the Brief Only condition or the
Brief & Flawed Example condition. Participants were instructed at the outset of the
study that they would have 25 minutes for each design problem, and were asked to
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generate as many solutions as possible in response to the design briefs. In addition
participants were asked to annotate each proposed solution as they felt necessary to
communicate their design ideas, as well as number each proposed solution. Each
participant was paid six pounds for their participation.
6.2.5. Analysis
The analysis, originally proposed by Chrysikou & Weisberg (2005) that was used in the
previous chapters was also employed to measure the influence of the flawed priming
example. Each solution that was generated in response to each design brief was coded
along four different measures of fixation: Direct Physical Similarity (DP), Reproductive
Similarity (RS), Analogical Similarity (AS), and Reproduced Flaws (RF).
As explained previously, each fixation measure accounts for different ways in
which the flawed priming example can influence the produced solutions. Direct
Physical Similarity is a binary measure, which accounts for whether or not the
participant copied the proposed solution for his or her own solutions. Reproductive
Similarities measures how many of the physical elements of the flawed solution were
incorporated into their final solutions. For example, a Reproductive Similarity would be
if the proposed solution used the same angle of presentation as the example or if they
used the same physical objects in their sketches. The Analogical Similarities measure of
fixation accounts for the inappropriate incorporation of characteristics from the flawed
example, that while not physically similar, are influenced by the underlying ideas
present in the Priming Analogy. An example of an analogical similarity would be
incorporating a suction cup into a final design when the provided example used a
magnet. While the magnet and suction cup differ physically they both use the same
underlying principles and function within the design problem. The last measure of
fixation is Reproduced Flaws. RF accounts for the inclusion of specific problematic
elements from the flawed example that were either placed by the experimenter or were
counter-intuitive characteristics of the design that were inadvertently discovered by the
participant.
Each generated solution was given a percentage score on each of the above
measures of fixation. Each score indicated the level of fixation. A score of 1 was
indicative of maximum fixation and a score of zero indicated no fixation was present.
The scoring criteria used in this study are contained within Appendix D.
6.3. Results
As with the previous studies a mixed-measures MANOVA was used to analyse the
main effects of the experimental manipulations (Presentation and Familiarity), any
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possible interactions between the two independent variables, as well as take into
account possible over-testing with several dependent variables. As per previous studies
the Direct Physical Similarity measure of fixation was removed from the analysis. None
of the 22 students who participated in this study copied any of the provided flawed
solutions. While several of the solutions exhibited high levels of fixation each solution
was novel, to some degree.
6.3.1. Presentation
The reliability of the Design Fixation paradigm continues as we again replicated the
main effect of Presentation, F(3,18) = 28.596, p < .01. Figure 6-3 illustrates the
significant differences between Presentation conditions across all three measures of
Fixation. (Reproductive Similarities, F(1,20) = 14.32 , p < 0.01; Analogical
Similarities, F(1,20) = 17.502, p < 0.01; Reproduced Flaws, F(1,20) = 89.008, p < 0.01)
As discussed in previous chapters, the exposure to the flawed Priming Analogy caused
participants to produce solutions that were markedly closer to the problematic solution
(RS, M = 0.296, SD = 0.107; AS, M = 0.410, SD = 0.196; RF, M = 0.623, SD = 0.156)
when compared to the participants who were only given the design brief and left to
generate their own analogies based upon experience (RS, M = 0.070, SD = 0.053; AS,
M = 0.125, SD = 0.078; RF, M = 0.066, SD = 0.046).
Figure 6-3 Presentation conditions across the different measures of fixation. RS =
Reproductive Similarities, AS = Analogical Similarities, RF = Reproduced Flaws. Error
bars indicate standard error of the mean.
As we are investigating the influence of familiarity on the Design Fixation paradigm it
is worth noting how the Presentation effect differed between the two different
familiarity conditions. Of the three measures of fixation only Reproduced Flaws
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displayed a significant interaction between Presentation and the level of familiarity
(F(1,20) = 5.995, p < 0.05).
Figure 6-4 Interaction between familiarity and presentation. Error bars indicate
standard error of the mean.
From Figure 6-4 we can see that Familiarity had no effect in the Brief Only condition
(High Familiarity, M = 0.087, SD = 0.113; Low Familiarity, M = 0.046, SD = 0.151).
This result is not surprising as the Design Fixation paradigm itself is constructed in such
a way to measure the influence of the provided example. If no example was provided,
as was the case in the Brief Only condition, then our coding scheme would register little
fixation since we have no way of measuring the influence of participants’ own Self-
Generated Analogies. The Presentation and Familiarity interaction, occurs in the Brief
& Flawed Example condition. Participants showed higher levels of fixation, i.e.
produce solutions that were more influenced by the initial Priming Analogy, when they
engaged with a problem that they were unfamiliar with (Low Familiarity, M = 0.796,
SD = 0.270) compared to the solutions produced from the problem in which the
participants were highly familiar with the type of design problem (High Familiarity, M
= 0.451, SD = 0.325).
6.3.2. Familiarity
No main effect of familiarity was observed, F(3,18) = 1.207, p > .05. From the results
of the previous study, we hypothesised that familiarity might have accounted for higher
levels of fixation. To investigate this hypothesis, a series of focused post-hoc tests were
used to investigate to see if any of the measures of fixation were significantly different
from each other despite the lack of an overall main effect. Based on the results from the
previous study, we would expect the inclusion of flawed example to have a greater
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impact on a participant’s level of fixation when engaging with a design problem in
which they have little knowledge of the artefact from the design brief. From Figure 6-5
we can see that the only measure of fixation to show any significant difference between
the familiarity conditions was Reproduced Flaws. The same pattern discussed in
relation to the Presentation X Familiarity interaction was exhibited. Participants were
far more likely to incorporate specific characteristics of the flawed example into their
proposed solutions when engaging with a design problem when they had little
knowledge of the artefact in question (M = 0.420, SD = 0.439) when compared to the
solutions generated from the design problem that participants would be highly familiar
with (M = 0.269, SD = 0.301).
Figure 6-5 Levels of fixation for each level of familiarity across all three measures of
fixation. RS = Reproductive Similarities, AS = Analogical Similarities, RF =
Reproduced Flaws. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
6.4. Discussion
The primary goal of this study was to investigate how a participant’s level of familiarity
with an artefact can dictate how influential a Priming Analogy is in the decision-making
process. It was hypothesised that priming examples that were highly familiar would
have less impact on the types of solutions generated by participants due to competition
from participant’s own highly familiar Self-Generated Analogies. On the other hand,
design problems that participants had little knowledge of would be more likely to be
influenced by the provided primed analogy since participants would be less likely to
have their own Self-Generated Analogy that would compete to form the decision
template.
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Of the three measures of fixation analysed Reproduced Flaws was the sole metric
that displayed results consistent with our hypothesis. A higher number of the flawed
characteristics from the original example were exhibited in the Low Familiarity
condition when compared to the types of solutions produced in the High Familiarity
condition. In contrast, the other two measures of fixation (Reproduced Similarities and
Analogical Similarities) showed the same level of fixation across both measures of
familiarity, i.e. that familiarity made no difference on how many analogical or physical
characteristics of the flawed pictorial example were incorporated into the final
solutions. These results, in conjunction with the results from the main effect of
Presentation, demonstrate that while the presence of an example does increase
participant’s level of fixation among Reproduced Flaws this effect does not generalise
to whether participants fixate on physical or analogical elements of the primed example.
As Reproduced Flaws was the only measure of fixation to display behaviour
consistent with our hypothesis why did we not observe the same results on the other two
measures of fixation? Our results indicate participants fixated on problems regardless of
the familiarity with the problem. Based on our results, we could hypothesise that the
provided Priming Analogy has a stronger influence than the self-generated one in
relation to the Reproduced Similarities and Analogical Similarities measures of fixation.
Familiarity with the design problem only dictates how much the Self-Generated
Analogy is over-ridden when it comes to the specific problematic characteristics of the
flawed example.
6.5. Conclusion
The goal of this study was to examine a potential confounding influence on the Design
Fixation paradigm: the level of familiarity of the design problems. Researchers such as
Purcell and Gero (1991) have discussed the problem with familiarity and the expression
of Design Fixation. From our results in this study we can see that the familiarity of the
design problem does impact the Reproduced Flaws measure of fixation. As discussed in
chapter three, the traditional measure of Design Fixation was the presence or absence of
specific flawed characteristics of the provided example among the final proposed
solutions, as measured by the Reproduced Flaws measure of fixation. By again taking
this narrow view of Design Fixation we can see the confounding nature of familiarity on
the final solutions, as discussed by Purcell and Gero (1991). By manipulating levels of
familiarity and examining them in the context of a more sensitive measure of fixation
(Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005), we began to understand in which conditions differing
levels of familiarity with the design problem became an issue.
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By replicating Design Fixation across each of the three previous studies (chapters
4 – 6) we can see the robustness of the phenomenon of analogical persistence. The key
difference between the two approaches, though, is the types of analogies being
examined. In the first study (chapter three) we examined the influence of Self-
Generated Analogies. The Design Fixation paradigm on the other hand, lets us
manipulate and observe the conditions where analogies are most influential, but the
paradigm is constrained by the fact that we are only examining provided Priming
Analogies. To bring these, quantitative and qualitative approaches together, we need to
expand the Design Fixation paradigm beyond its current format. The next chapter
discusses the limitations of the Design Fixation paradigm as it currently stands, and how
we can adapt it to use different types of analogies, not just provided Priming Analogies.
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7. Design Fixation and Self-Generated
Analogies
7.1. Introduction
In its current format the Design Fixation (DF) paradigm lets us measure the level of
influence of a Priming Analogy by examining the presence and absence of particular
problematic characteristics from the flawed example in the produced solutions. While
the Design Fixation paradigm lets us observe how influential a Priming Analogy can be,
it does not let us observe directly how a participant’s Self-Generated Analogies
influence decision-making. The aim of this study is to investigate how Self-Generated
Analogies express themselves under the Design Fixation paradigm. By pairing a think-
aloud protocol with the Design Fixation paradigm we investigated how Self-Generated
Analogies compared to the Priming Analogies were used in the Design Fixation
paradigm.
7.1.1. Limitations of the Design Fixation paradigm
From the study presented in chapter 3 we know that Self-Generated Analogies can be
just as influential on the design decision-making process, as the provided primed
analogies used over the last three chapters. Currently, the Design Fixation paradigm
considers the 'Brief Only' condition to be a control condition, i.e. that fixation does not
occur in the absence of a flawed pictorial example. To a certain degree this is true, in
that when no flawed example is given to participants (in the Brief Only condition) there
are no observable flawed characteristics that can be incorporated into their proposed
solutions. From chapter 3 we know that Self-Generated Analogies can have a similar
effect on the provided Priming Analogies, since participants incorporated problematic
elements of their own self-generated examples into their final solutions.
The main flaw with the Design Fixation (DF) paradigm, in its current state, is
that it is difficult to elicit specific information of how fixation may occur with these
Self-Generated Analogies. There is no experimental control over the 'Brief Only'
condition; and consequently, there is no ability to conduct any type of quantitative
analysis to examine how fixation manifests. To quantitatively analyse the design
solutions generated, using the DF paradigm, there needs to be the ability to compare the
produced designs to a predetermined flawed example in order to ascertain which faulty
features the designer has fixated upon. While a quantitative analysis of the ‘Brief Only’
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condition in this study is impossible, a qualitative analysis of the design solutions could
provide some additional information as to how Self-Generated Analogies fit into the
Design Fixation paradigm.
To understand how analogies influence the decision-making process we need to
investigate how these Self-Generated Analogies are used and what causes them to
persist throughout the entire decision-making process. By pairing a think-aloud
requirement with the Design Fixation paradigm we can qualitatively examine how
similar, or dissimilar, Self-Generated Analogies are used as compared to Provided
Priming Analogies (e.g. the flawed pictorial examples given to participants). The goal
of this study was to understand the specific strategies that Interaction Designers utilize
when using different types of analogies (Self-Generated Analogies vs. provided
Priming Analogies) and how those strategies help or hinder analogical persistence.
7.1.2. Design Fixation and Different Types of Analogies
As discussed in chapter two, when individuals are faced with a decision they use analogical
reasoning to recall similar situations that they have encountered in the past. This Self-
Generated Analogy forms a template from which the decision-maker can formulate a
possible successful solution to the problem (Klein, 1999). In the case of Interaction
Designers faced with a novel design problem, they use analogical reasoning to look for
similar design problems they have encountered in the past for a possible viable solution
(Klein & Brezovic, 1986, Chapter 3). Bereciatura et al. (2008) highlights another source
of inspiration that designers draw upon outside of their own personal experiences:
examples of similar work. Techniques such as mood boards and product libraries
(Buxton, 2007) allow designers to draw upon a range of artefacts for inspiration that
they may not have been aware of. These examples, from an analogical perspective, can
be seen as Provided Priming Analogies (PPA) in that they prime an analogy within the
designer that can then be used, like Self-Generated Analogies, to frame and understand
the problem space. While at first glance the Design Fixation paradigm may seem
artificial it does build upon this idea that is commonly used in the field of design.
Designers can use artefacts outside of their own personal experience to initiate
decision-making much like participants who have been provided with an example
solution to initiate the decision-making process.
While we can observe the end-product of analogical persistence in Design
Fixation, we have very little understanding of the behaviours that foster this behaviour.
By pairing a think-aloud protocol with the Design Fixation paradigm, we investigated
how different analogies are used in decision-making, and if these analogies help or
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hinder analogical persistence. Ericsson and Simon (1980) hypothesised that
encouraging participants to verbalize their thoughts continually, i.e. think-aloud, while
they are engaged with the task, provides insight into the cognitive processes that are
involved in the current task. Chrysikou and Weisberg (2005) were the first to conduct a
think-aloud protocol paired with the DF paradigm. While the results were helpful in
understanding how the provided examples were being used, the aforementioned
analysis focused exclusively on analysing the usage of the provided examples.
Chrysikou and Weisberg (2005) provided no data to indicate how Self-Generated
Analogies were used by designers.
7.2. Method
As discussed earlier, the Design Fixation paradigm only lets us examine the influence
that the provided primed-analogies have on the final sketches. To overcome this
limitation, a think-aloud protocol was included (Ericsson & Simon, 1998) with the
traditional DF paradigm (Jansson & Smith, 1991). This allowed us to understand not
only the strategies used in the primed-analogy condition but also how Self-Generated
Analogies factor into analogical persistence.
7.2.1. Participants
Twelve participants from a mixture of backgrounds took part in this study. Five
participants were from an academic background, all with a specialization in Human-
Computer Interaction, and averaged 1.5 years of experience with HCI practices. The
seven other participants were from an industry background with an average of 3.5 years
of employment as Interaction Designers. Participants were run individually in a small
lab to avoid distractions and to facilitate the focusing on the task at hand. The average
length of each session was 45 minutes.
7.2.2. Design
A traditional Design Fixation paradigm was employed in this study to investigate the
influence of different types of analogies. More specifically the amount of information
presented was manipulated between-subjects with the addition of a think-aloud
requirement. The main experimental manipulation, as per the Design Fixation studies
presented earlier in this thesis, was the amount of information that was presented to the
participants. In the Brief Only condition, participants were provided with a design brief
outlining the overall goals and constraints of the problem. During fixation, or the Brief
& Flawed Example condition, participants were provided with the same design brief
with a pictorial example of a possible solution to that design problem. The provided
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example contained several problematic elements that ran either in direct contradiction
to the requirements laid out in the design brief or were counterintuitive methods of
addressing those requirements. These two Presentation conditions allowed us to
observe the influence of different types of analogies on the decision-making process of
Interaction Designers. Since the Brief Only condition contained only the design brief,
participants were generating their own analogies to structure and frame the design
space. In the Brief & Flawed Example condition, participants were provided with a
flawed example. The impact of this provided primed analogy can then be directly
observed.
To allow us to observe the influence of the Provided Primed Analogy and to
investigate how the use of Self-Generated Analogies compares to using Priming
Analogies used in the DF paradigm, all participants were encouraged to verbalise their
thoughts throughout the duration of the study. Asking participants to verbalise their
thoughts enabled us to understand the cognitive processes involved in the use of not
only the primed analogy, but also, the Self-Generated Analogy (Ericsson & Simon,
1998).
7.2.3. Materials
To reduce the chance that our findings would be the result of one particular design
problem participants were given two different Interaction Design problems (see
Appendix D). The first problem asked participants to propose a device that marine
mammals could use to communicate with marine biologists. The second presented
problem asked participants to redesign a calendar program with a heavy emphasis on
3D animations. Both design problems contained a design brief outlining the goal and
the constraints of each particular design problem. In keeping with the Design Fixation
paradigm, one of the two problems, in addition to the brief, contained an inherently
flawed example of a potential solution. The example contained several flaws placed
by the experimenter, which directly contradict the brief. Problem presentation was
randomized and counterbalanced to ensure that the order of presentation did not
unduly influence the results. With the addition of a think-aloud to the Design Fixation
paradigm each participant’s verbalisations were recorded for analysis using an MP3
recorder.
7.2.4. Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two Presentation conditions.
Participants were given 25 minutes to sketch as many solutions as possible for each
design problem and to number each individual sketch produced. As discussed above,
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all participants were asked to verbalise their thought processes as they generated
solutions to the given design problems. To avoid some of the issues discussed by
Ericsson and Simon (1998) (i.e. capturing a participant’s meta-cognitive processes
rather than their current thought processes), in regards to verbalising one’s thoughts
participants were instructed that they were not explaining their thoughts to the
experimenter but were asked to verbalise their own internal thoughts to the best of their
ability. These verbalisations were recorded with supplementary notes generated
throughout the study. Participants were paid six pounds for their participation.
7.2.5. Analysis
The verbalisations generated from the think-alouds were transcribed verbatim. To
obtain a realistic representation of the participant’s verbalisations pauses as well as
idiosyncrasies such as “urm”s & “ah”s were noted. The transcriptions from each
participant were analysed according to the tenets of Protocol Analysis (Gilhooly &
Green, 1996). The transcripts generated by the first three participants were used to
generate a coding scheme. The creation of the initial coding list was driven by our
desire to understand the different behaviours surrounding the use of different analogies
on the Design Fixation paradigm. The creation of the codes was done in an iterative
fashion to describe in the greatest detail possible the verbalisations generated by the
participants. From this initial coding scheme the remaining transcripts were
segmented and coded as described by Green & Gilhooly (1996). As a precaution a
fellow academic was asked to code two randomly selected transcripts using the
coding list provided. The codes generated from this analysis were compared to the
codes generated from the previous analysis for a sense of how similar or
dissimilar the coding of the selected transcripts was. An inter-rater reliability of
87% was achieved meeting the threshold requirement of 85% necessary for a valid
coding scheme (Green & Gilhooly, 1996).
7.3. Results & Discussion
From the protocol analysis we were able to observe how participants used different
types of analogies to aid in their decision-making process. While there was some
commonality between how the two differing analogies were used, namely to frame the
solution space, they did differ in a number of important ways. Detailed below are
several behaviours that were observed in the participants, which highlight the different
uses of the two analogies.
91
7.3.1. Self-Generated Analogies
In most instances, when faced with a design problem, Interaction Designers use
analogical reasoning to generate a potential action path that has worked in the past
based on the cues provided by the design brief (Klein, 1999; Klein & Brezovic, 1986).
We observed from the recorded verbalisations that Self-Generated Analogies were used
in two unique ways within the Design Fixation paradigm. Of the two identified
behaviours ‘using SGA as a counterexample’ was aimed at understanding the problem
space while the ‘Selective Recall’ behaviour was observed to actively contribute to
analogical persistence.
7.3.1.1. Selective Recall
Participants interviewed indicated that they viewed their Self-Generated Analogies as
superior in comparison to examples provided by others. This was due to the
perception that the key benefit of Self-Generated Analogies was that only the extreme
characteristics of the analogy were recalled. These SGAs were seen as superior to the
provided primed analogies in that the positive aspects of the analogy would be
incorporated into the proposed solution while the influence of the negative
characteristics could be forgotten over time and hence removed from any type of
influence.
[I‘m] trying not to go to it [the provided example] straight away … I might copy it. I’m
trying to think back to things I‘d already seen [self- generated analogy]… the things I
remember are the things that were the most positive parts about it or the most negative
parts about it. Obviously I don’t have a photographic memory of my outlook
calendar or anything like that but I think the things that stand out for me are really
good or really bad. And I’m trying to think of the really good ones and try and get
those across in this [sketch].... (Participant 6)
However, experimental evidence indicates that, while designers think that they are
consciously ignoring negative elements of an analogy, these negative characteristics
still influence the decision-making process (S. M. Smith, Ward, & Schumacher, 1993;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
7.3.1.2. Using Self-Generated Analogies as a Counter Example
The other usage of the Self-Generated Analogy was to act as a counterpoint, which
enabled the participants in the Brief & Flawed Example condition, to explore the
possible fallibilities of the provided example. At several points throughout the study
many participants discussed the influence that the provided Priming Analogy was having
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on their ability to create novel solutions that addressed the needs and goals of the design
brief.
okay I’m trying to work [out] what this is [the brief] and this [the provided
example] is restricting me at the moment (Participant 8)
Since the provided example was an external artefact, the participant could use the
remembered characteristics of their SGA as a method of testing the suitability of the
provided primed analogy in matching those particular characteristics.
How do Zoo-Keepers communicate with dolphins? … There could be something
hanging here … it would look natural so it doesn’t look digital like that [the provided
example]… but it looks like something out of their own environment. T hen you
c a n kind of teach them how to communicate w i t h that. There could be
something like they get a treat [if they do it correctly]. Otherwise I think it would be
really hard to communicate with the animals if they don’t get a treat. I’m thinking
instead of this [the example] where you see digits and all that maybe you would see
something like all rocks and things that are familiar to the animals. (Participant 5)
Participant 5 describes several helpful features in their Self-Generated Analogy of a
zoo enclosure, such as the faux-natural settings as well as the Pavlovian condition that
zoo-keepers employ, to act as a counterpoint to highlight important features that are
absent from the Provided Primed Analogy. In addition to those helpful characteristics
being absent from the provided Priming Analogy they also highlight an important issue
with the flawed example namely one of acceptance. By increasing the similarity of the
communication device to be more in line with things dolphins would find in their
natural surroundings the higher the likelihood that the marine mammals would accept
and consequently use the communication device.
While the Self-Generated Analogy was a counterpoint to elucidate some of the
problematic characteristics of the provided flawed example, the inverse behaviour was
not observed. Participants did not use the characteristics of the flawed Priming Analogy
to probe the possible issues with their Self-Generated Analogy. In the light of the
selective recall behaviour, participants’ use of the flawed example to highlight potential
problems in their Self-Generated Analogies would seem like a valuable coping
strategy. This behaviour would actually be more beneficial, as compared to the counter-
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example behaviour described above, because there is no physical artefact in the SGA
to help identify the negative or positive characteristics. Using the provided example
as a counterpoint it would make it easier to form critical evaluation of a solution’s
strengths. Despite the use of this behaviour to evaluate the Priming Analogy,
participants did not scrutinise their Self-Generated Analogies to the same degree.
The use of comparing individual characteristics of one artefact to that of another
is by no means novel; in that this cross-comparison between the artefact and the
analogy is a hallmark of analogical reasoning (Hesse, 1963). Hesse (1963) describes
analogical reasoning as a series of small hypothesis testing exercises where each
characteristic of the generated analogy is tested against the situation at hand to
determine which aspects of the generated analogy are helpful in that particular
situation, and which are not applicable or problematic. When participants were given a
Priming Analogy the majority of them used characteristics of their Self-Generated
Analogy to test the appropriateness of the characteristics of the Priming Analogy.
However, this behaviour though does not generalise a flawed priming example; when
provided with a flawed priming example a participant did not use this analogy as a
counterpoint to evaluate the appropriateness of their Self-Generated Analogy. A
Priming Analogy seems to override any of the participant’s Self-Generated Analogies
to form the template from which an action path is created. The fact that a flawed
example still overrides a more effective Self-Generated Analogy was discussed in the
previous chapter. What remains unclear is why the provided Priming Analogy is able to
trump Self-Generated Analogies, especially when participants discussed the superiority
of their own analogies when this display this ‘selective recall’ behaviour.
7.3.2. Provided Primed Analogies
As discussed earlier, Interaction Designers use Self-Generated Analogies to scope and
understand the problem space. In addition to generating their own analogies to engage
in the design decision-making process they also use examples of previous work that
have been done in similar areas to inspire their designs (Bereciartua et al., 2008;
Herring et al., 2009). These previous examples serve the same function that Self-
Generated Analogies do, namely to structure the solution space by providing a template
from which a viable action plan can be generated. In our earlier discussion regarding
Self-Generated Analogies, participants discussed the benefits of using their own
analogies (as evidenced by the selective recall behaviour), but despite this perceived
strength the presence of a flawed Priming Analogy seemed to always form the basis of
the proposed action-plan. Below are several observed behaviours that provide some
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context to this over-riding behaviour.
7.3.2.1. Primed Analogies as the 'best' solution
In the presence of the primed analogy, participants produced sketches that were clearly
based on the flawed pictorial example as opposed to any of their own self-generated
analogies. This can be explained by the fact that participants discussed the included
flawed pictorial example as the optimal solution to that particular design problem.
The primed-analogy is seen as the 'best' solution, so this establishes the dangerous
notion that a successful solution must either evolve from, or emulate, this analogy.
…well they’ve already taken the good keyboard idea maybe I could come up with
some type of marine mouse…. I think they already have a better idea [referring to
the example]. I would have designed that.. [upon reflection] Later on I thought I
based my .. I guess my designs were variations of that example really. So I looked at
that and thought ‘the looks like a good solution’ anything else wouldn’t be as good
(Participant 7)
… I like the idea of displaying the information this way (referring to the enclosed
example of a digital calendar) … this struck me as the best way to do it …. I
tried my best to stay away… although I don’t think it helped much… (Participant
2)
This perception of a 'best' solution demarcates the solution space by providing a
framework of what is and is not part of the design brief. By viewing the provided
example as the ‘optimal’ solution, participants were influenced to create designs that
were based on that solution. This assumption fundamentally coloured the individual
characteristics of the flawed Priming Analogy, which caused participants to skip the
evaluation process, as described in the counterpoint behaviour, participants assumed
that the characteristics of the experimenter’s flawed analogy were in fact the best way
to address the criteria set out in the design brief. In the context of the marine mammal
communication system, it was observed that all of the solutions generated under the
Brief & Flawed Example condition were devices to be used primarily by the marine
mammal. In contrast, participants given the same design problem in the Brief Only
condition primarily produced solutions that would be used by the marine biologists to
communicate (see Figure 7-1 and 7-2).
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Figure 7-1 Sketches produced by participants who were not exposed to the flawed
example in the marine mammal communication system problem.
Figure 7-2 Sketches produced by participants who were exposed to the flawed
priming example in the marine mammal communication system problem.
The perception that the flawed example was the ‘best’ solution to the design brief does
provide evidence as to why the provided Priming Analogy is so influential across all
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stages of the decision-making process. Perttula and Liikkanen (2006) discussed two
theories that may potentially underpin the fixation observed in the Design Fixation
paradigm: Unconscious Conformity and Memory Blocking. In Unconscious
Conformity, designers unconsciously incorporate high-level elements of previous
examples into their design solutions. The opposing explanation of Design Fixation is
Memory Blocking, which states that exposure to possible solutions pre-emptively
exhausts the pool of possible solutions before the design process even commences. To
assess which theory was a more accurate representation of the cognitive processes
involved in Design Fixation, Perttula and Liikkanen (2006) coupled a think-aloud
approach with an analysis of several behavioural methods, such as the number of
solutions produced and the categories of the solutions. The study drew attention to the
lack of theoretical work in this area and delineated these two possible explanations
regarding the underlying mechanics of the phenomenon but Perttula and Liikkanen
(2006) was inconclusive as to which theory was more suitable to describing how
Design Fixation occurs. The identified behaviour from our study provides evidence
that the Memory Blocking approach may be the most apt description of Design
Fixation, since the pool of solutions was exhausted due to the fact that the provided
solution was perceived to be the best solution. Based on this, one could hypothesise
that since the provided solution is perceived as optimal the exploration of the solution
space is pre-emptively terminated, which leaves the participant with a limited list of
possible solutions to the design brief.
7.3.3. Evaluation of Produced Sketches and the Influence of the Priming Analogy
The perception that the provided primed-analogy was the optimal solution to the
design brief was carried over to the last stage of decision-making; when generated
sketches are supposed to provide the best solution to the design brief. Figure 7-3
contains a sketch chosen by Participant 3 as the best solution to the marine mammal
communication device design problem, of the three they had generated. That sketch
was chosen despite evidence to indicate the inappropriateness of using a keyboard
approach (dolphins primarily communicate through sound not through touch). This
disconnect between what participants perceived as the best solution and the actual
appropriateness of their own preferred solution highlights the problems with reflecting
on our own meta cognition (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).
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Figure 7-3 Original example and the preferred generated solution by Participant 3
This identified behaviour does have some consequence for the viability of the
commonly discussed design process of generating several designs then choosing the
best one as a way to overcome some of the problems of fixation which in turn avoids
deeply flawed design solutions (Tohidi, Buxton, Baecker, & Sellen, 2006). Figure 7-3
illustrates how the persistence of an initial analogy can influence even the final stage of
the decision-making process. This behaviour is worrying, because participants may
believe they are being objective in their selection criteria when they are actually still
unduly influenced by the primed analogy.
7.4. Conclusion
The goal of this study was to look past solely the Provided Priming Analogies
traditionally used in the Design Fixation paradigm, and to look at how different types
of analogies may foster analogical persistence. In its current state the Design Fixation
paradigm only provides information as to how influential a provided example can be
on the decision-making process of Interaction Designers. From the results in chapter
three we know that the analogies that participants generate themselves, not just
provided Priming Analogies, can persist across all phases of the design decision-
making process and cause problematic solutions. By pairing a think-aloud technique
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with the Design Fixation paradigm we investigated how these Self-Generated
Analogies are used in the Design Fixation paradigm, and consequently how Self-
Generated Analogies function in relation to when the Priming Analogies are provided.
From the verbal reports produced by the participants we were able to identify several
behaviours that were unique to the different types of analogies being used. It was
observed, much like in the previous chapter, that the provided Priming Analogies
seemed to over-ride the use of a Self-Generated Analogy in forming a decision
template. This behaviour seemed to be in part due to the belief exhibited by most
participants that the provided analogy was perceived as the best solution to the design
brief. The most concerning finding was that of the best generated solution, from all of
the alternatives created by that participant, was the one most like the provided primed
analogy. This finding does bring into question the value of different techniques which
encourage designers to rationally evaluate all of their produced solutions and choose
the best one.
Design theorists have discussed several ways in which to overcome the mental
block that can occur in design, be it from an analogy or another source of inspiration
(e.g. Buxton, 2008; Cross, 1994). Cross (1994) discusses several commonly used
techniques that designers employ to enlarge their solution space and overcome issues
of fixation such as: Transformation, Random Input, Why?Why?Why?, and Counter-
Planning (pp 53-54). The Counter-Planning behaviour, i.e. pitting an idea (the thesis)
against its counterpart (the antithesis) to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the
idea, observed in this study displayed how while helpful that behaviour is only used in
specific instances, i.e. in the critique of the provided artefact. The counter-planning
technique was absent from critiquing Self-Generated Analogies, which considering
some of participants’ assumptions regarding Self-Generated Analogies, would actually
be more helpful in the overall quality of the design decisions proposed by participants.
Also our finding that the Priming Analogy was viewed as the optimal solution brings
into question the viability of techniques like the Why?Why?Why? technique. In the
Why?Why?Why? technique, designers are encouraged to ask themselves a series of
why questions until a dead-end is achieved in their rationalisation. As illustrated in
Figure 7-3 the assumption that the Priming Analogy is the optimal solution carries
over into the participant’s evaluations of which generated solutions are the most
effective at addressing the design brief. The solution that was most similar to the
Priming Analogy was chosen as the most effective solution. Participants who
exhibited this behaviour were aware of the similarities between their solution and the
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provided example but this was seen as a key strength to its success. There was a clear
disconnect between the perceived strengths of their own generated solutions and the
actual strengths and weaknesses. This highlights a fundamental problem with these
types of design techniques; namely how poor we are as cognitive beings at
metacognition (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). All of the techniques discussed by Cross
(1994) are based on the belief that one can accurately reflect on their own designs and
step outside of their own biases to provide an unbiased evaluation. The results above
illustrated that this is a difficult task. While some of these techniques were observed in
this study, such as Counter-Planning, the desired behaviour of mitigating fixation was
not observed i.e. coping strategies.
While the value of such techniques as Why?Why?Why? is called into question
by the results of this study it is important to reiterate the benefit of mitigating
analogical persistence. Analogical reasoning is an important and central component of
the act of design (Lawson, 2006); because analogies provide a heuristic which allows
designers to scope a potentially vast solution space down to a workable number of
solutions (Klein, 1987b). While there are clear benefits to using analogies to structure
the solution space, this can lead to framework in which designers rely on the analogy
to the point of incorporating inappropriate elements of that analogy into their final
solutions or to even cause reluctance to remove a clearly problematic characteristic
from their solutions. While techniques such as the ones described by Cross (1994)
may not be as valuable as originally thought, other techniques are available which may
be more suitable to reducing fixation in Interaction Designers such as Design
Rationale (Lee, 1997).
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8. Mitigating Analogical Persistence
8.1. Introduction
The previous study highlighted some of the ways that different types of analogies can
foster analogical persistence. Self-Generated Analogies were prone to analogical
persistence, because participants believed they were only using the particular strengths
of that analogy to structure their decision action-path despite experimental evidence to
indicate otherwise. Previous examples were also problematic, because participants saw
them as the optimal solution to the design brief. This belief that the provided Priming
Analogy being the best solution even influenced the perception that the best solution
they created was the one most similar to the flawed pictorial example. This raises some
concerns to the viability of various design techniques aimed at reducing fixation (e.g.
Cross, 1994). Despite the difficulty in mitigating fixation (e.g. Purcell & Gero, 1991;
Smith et al., 1993) it is an important issue that needs to be addressed. Chrysikou and
Weisberg (2005) were able to successfully mitigate fixation within the Design Fixation
paradigm, by providing participants with a listing of all the flawed characteristics of the
provided pictorial example. However, this manipulation, lacks ecological validity. This
study aims to build upon the work of Chrysikou and Weisberg (2005) by taking a
qualitative approach to mitigating analogical persistence. More specifically, by adopting
a more ecological valid approach to encouraging designers to generate their own lists of
problematic features. This quantitative study produced some surprising results.
Attempting to mitigate analogical persistence actually increased the influence of the
initial analogy. To address this surprising result the second portion of this study was a
follow-up qualitative analysis to examine the behaviours exhibited by the participants
that may have contributed to this observed increase in analogical persistence.
8.1.1. Mitigating Fixation
To date, most work aimed at lessening the impact of primed examples has been
unsuccessful (e.g. Purcell & Gero, 1991; Smith et al., 1993). Purcell and Gero (1991)
attempted to retain the benefits of using examples to frame the solution space, but
reduce the influence of problematic elements by using verbal descriptions of the
solution, as opposed to a pictorial example. While there did seem to be some reduction
in several of the measurements taken, the presence of fixation was still detected. Most
studies have aimed to reduce fixation by instructing participants to ignore the examples
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that they have been provided with (Marsh et al., 1996; S. M. Smith et al., 1993; Ward &
Sifonis, 1997). In each of these studies participants were instructed that the included
example was problematic, and that it should be explicitly avoided in relation to the
types of solutions they should propose. Despite these explicit instructions, fixation was
still exhibited with participants incorporating inappropriate elements of that initial
primed examples into their solutions. The only study which has achieved any level of
success in terms of lessening the influence of the provided examples was the
aforementioned Chrysikou and Weisberg (2005). In addition to the two conditions
traditionally associated with the Design Fixation paradigm, a control group with just a
verbal design brief and a fixation condition which is the design brief plus a flawed
example solution, Chrysikou and Weisberg (2005) also introduced a third condition
called the ‘defixation’ condition. In the defixation condition participants received the
design brief, the flawed pictorial example, and a set of instructions detailing each of the
problematic features of the included example. Results indicated that the types of
solutions generated in the defixation condition were significantly closer to the sketches
from the control group than the fixation condition. This technique, while effective,
would not replicate in a ‘real-world’ setting.
An ecologically valid approach to reducing the influence of the negative aspects
of the initial analogy must fit within the design process. The design process is difficult
to characterize (Lawson, 2006) However, Wolf et al. (2006) discussed a fairly
abstracted design process used in Interaction Design that will be adopted to frame our
discussion. The design process discussed by Wolf et al. (2006) is composed of four
stages.
1. The exploration of the design space with a focus on possible
solutions to the particular design problem.
2. Design judgements – which are self-generated heuristics, based on
their experience, knowledge, and existing design guidelines, which
help designers make fully informed design decisions.
3. The construction of the artefact
4. Design ‘crit’ - which focuses on the future of use/development of
the artefact and how it could be improved in light of this.
To lessen the effect of analogies on the decision-making process, a methodology which
highlights the inherent problems of the primed analogy must naturally fit somewhere
within these four stages of the design praxis.
Considering these four stages of the design process, which interval would be the
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most useful and least intrusive in highlighting the fundamental issues with the
problematic analogy, in a more ecologically appropriate manner? The focus of our study
is to highlight the possible issues with the analogies that are used in the design decision-
making process; therefore it is natural to look at a way to leverage the Design ‘crit’
portion of the design process. The chief focus of the ‘crit’ is to critically evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of the design solution. The issue with this approach is that the
critique focuses on the artefact, as it stands, as opposed to the initial analogy. While
this may highlight particular issues with the current state of the artefact, it does not
probe the issues with the underlying analogy which, as discussed in the first study,
influences the decision-making process very early on in the design process. As
analogical reasoning allows designers to narrow and frame the solution space (Klein,
1999) we would need to probe the potential problems with the initial analogy as early as
possible in the design process. Even the first stage of the design process, as outlined by
Wolf et al. (2006), is in some sense too late for this type of intervention since
exploration of the solution space, as framed by the analogy, has begun. This study
proposes a structured intervention before the design process commences. By
encouraging Interaction Designers to reflect on the types of analogies they use, as well
as the inherent strengths and weaknesses of those analogies, at the outset of the design
process we hope to decrease the impact of the negative characteristics of the analogy.
8.1.2. Reflection as a Tool to Mitigate Fixation
To obtain a more ecologically valid approach to reaching a list of the problematic
features of the analogies used in the design decision-making process we have provided
an intervention at the outset of the study that would encourage participants to reflect on
the types of analogies they use. Before we discuss the use of reflection to aid in the
decision-making process of Interaction Designers, it is important to define what is
meant by the term reflection. While the term reflection is used fairly broadly there are in
fact two types of reflection that are commonly used interchangeably: reflection-in-
action and reflection-on-action (Schon, 1983). Reflection-in-action is a process that
involves continually reshaping the problem as we are engaged with it. Reflection-in-
action is composed of four discrete stages. The first stage is to define and understand
the design problem. The second stage is to frame the solution space. The third stage is
then testing this frame against the design problem and the last stage is to then revaluate
the design problem based on the results of stage three. These four stages are cyclically
repeated until a solution is reached. Each cycle of the four stages allows the designer to
reflect (a conscious activity) on what is working and what is not working of the
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proposed solution. Reflection-on-action is not a continual reflection while engaged in
the design process, but rather a post-hoc examination on the design process as a whole.
Reflection-on-action deals with examining what we did in order to solve the problem
and aims to understand how our reflection-in-action contributed to the proposed
solution.
The use of reflection in the area of decision-making among Interaction
Designers is not new. Cockton et al. (2004) used reflection to increase the validity of
Heuristic Evaluation (Nielsen & Molich, 1990). By asking participants to use a
structured report to reflect on the discovery and analysis phases of the Heuristic
Evaluation. This reflection-on-action (as the reports were used to facilitate post-hoc
reflections on the process) allowed participants to make better quality design decisions
in terms of identifying valid usability problems. While Cockton et al. (2004)
demonstrated the usefulness of reflection-on-action in relation to design decisions, can
we utilise reflection-in-action as a structured method with the same level of success?
By encouraging participants to engage in reflection in action near the outset of the
study, we hypothesise that participants will be able to identify the problematic
characteristics of their chosen analogy when the level of commitment is still low. To
encourage this behaviour, we have chosen to use principles from Design Rationale to
best facilitate the desired behaviour.
8.1.3. Design Rationale
While it is important to look at how our study fits within the context of the design
process; it is also important to choose a methodology that highlights the strengths and
weaknesses of the initial analogy grounded in existing design practices. Design
Rationale is an established methodology used to structure the design decision-making
process to promote higher quality and better-informed decisions (Lee & Lai, 1991).
Adopting this approach would allow our participants the ability to make higher quality
decisions by using the organization afforded by Design Rationale to deconstruct and
understand how and why analogies are used. This deconstruction will hopefully yield
the same results, but in a more ecologically appropriate fashion, as those of Chrysikou
and Weisberg (2005).
The end goal of Design Rationale is to promote higher quality decision-making in
the design process, and this can be achieved in a multitude of ways which all fall under
the Design Rationale banner. We require a way in which to achieve better decisions
through understanding and highlighting the analogies that are used in design decision-
making. Traditionally, Design Rationale has been used to create a historical record of
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the information and the analyses that went into the choice of a particular feature or the
way an artefact was constructed (Klein, 1993). In addition to the historical aspect of
Design Rationale, the term is also used in relation to two other aspects of the design
decision-making process: a tool to detail the psychological benefits of a particular
artefact, and as a description of the design space (Lee & Lai, 1991). As a repository of
decisions, Design Rationale can also be used to postulate the benefits of the artefact,
and to describe the design space as it currently stands in the design process. This
description of the design space allows designers to come to higher quality design
decisions, by helping them to categorise the strengths and weaknesses in the design
space and to form possible alternatives that may build upon the identified strengths or
address the highlighted weaknesses. We chose to leverage this use of Design Rationale
as a way to understand the design space as a more ecologically appropriate tool to
identify the faulty characteristics of the initial analogy.
Within the different goals of Design Rationale there are also different levels to
which Design Rationale principles can be employed. Tang (2007) describes a
continuum of ways in which Design Rationale principles can be operationalised ranging
from the least informal to the most formal methods.
- No Explicit Rationale: Where designers rely mostly on intuition as
opposed to employing any systematic methods. As designers are
relying mostly on intuition no information is captured at all during
the design process. Any design decisions that are justified are either
reconstructed or deduced based on the state of the artefact and the
overall goals of the design problem.
- Informal Rationale: The rationale for the design decisions is
captured in a largely unstructured fashion relying mostly on notes
written during the design process.
- Template Based Rationale: The rationale is captured during the
design process using pre-defined templates as a way to chronicle the
required information with a minimum amount of additional cognitive
effort on the part of the designer.
- Argumentation-Based Rationale: Each design decision is captured
in the context of how that particular design decision relates to other
alternative options. This relationship is captured using a syntax that
focuses on how ideas and relationships between those entities are
represented.
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- Quantitative Rationale: Collects not only the decisions in terms of
how they relate to alternatives but also quantifies those choices in
such measures as cost and benefits.
Considering the range of ways that Design Rationale can be operationalised in the
design process, we wanted a technique which would allow designers to understand the
design space, while critiquing the analogy, with a minimum amount of interruption to
the design process. The informal portion (i.e. no Explicit Rationale or Informal
Rationale) of the Design Rationale continuum would be unsuccessful, as it would not
allow the designer a deep enough understanding of the design space. The more
structured portion of the continuum (i.e. Argumentation Based Rationale or
Quantitative Rationale) would be too onerous at such an early phase in the design
process. The Template Based rationale was chosen because it allowed the greatest
amount of descriptive information to be collected with a minimum interruption to the
design process. The Template Based approach to Design Rationale will allow
participants to formally demarcate the design space by examining not only the types of
analogies they are using, but also, the inherent strengths and weaknesses of those
analogies.
It was expected using the Template Based approach would allow Interaction
Designers to be able to recognise the faulty elements of the analogies they use, and
address those potential problems in their design decisions.
8.2. Method
8.2.1. Participants
Participants were forty students studying for an MSc in Human-Computer Interaction
(19 males and 21 females). Participants had on average 8 months of experience as
Interaction Designers.
8.2.2. Design
This study employed a two-by-two between-subjects design with two independent
variables: Presentation (Brief Only vs. Brief & Flawed Example) and Reflection
(Reflection vs. No Reflection). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four
experimental groupings (see Figure 8-1 for graphical representation of the experimental
design).
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Figure 8-1 Graphical representation of the experimental design.
As in all Design Fixation experiments the presence or absence of a flawed
Priming Analogy was manipulated. In the Brief & Flawed Example condition,
participants were given a picture of a possible solution to the design brief in addition to
the verbal design brief. This flawed example is meant to prime the participants to
engage with the flawed analogy as opposed to generating a different analogy based on
their personal experiences. The provided solution contained several features that were
not only counter-intuitive, but are also, in direct contradiction to the information
contained within the design brief. Those in the Brief Only condition received solely the
verbal design brief.
To test our hypothesis that reflection on the initial primed analogy will mitigate
the fixation effect, participants were randomly assigned to either the Reflection
condition or the No Reflection condition. In the Reflection condition, participants were
asked to spend ten minutes actively critiquing the analogies that they were using, be it
the provided flawed analogy in the fixation condition or their own Self-Generated
Analogies in the Brief Only condition, by using the provided template to structure their
reflection. In the no reflection condition participants were simply given ten additional
minutes in the idea generation portion of the study.
8.2.3. Materials
All participants were asked to design a calendar system that would take advantage of
the powerful computing abilities of modern computers. In response to this design brief
participants were asked to generate as many solutions as possible within the allotted
time frame. The design problem contained a brief verbal description outlining the goal
of the design brief and the requirements necessary for an acceptable solution. Contained
below in Figure 8-2 is the design brief given to participants.
As is traditional in the Design Fixation paradigm, participants were given
variations of this design brief depending on which of the presentation conditions they
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were assigned to. Participants in the control condition were given only the verbal
portion of the design brief. Participants assigned to the Fixation condition were, in
addition to the design brief, given a possible solution to the design brief, as illustrated
by the two sketches in figure 8.2.
Figure 8-2 The design brief, with accompanying flawed example, given to
participants.
To facilitate reflecting on the design analogies that were being used in the design
decision-making process, some participants were provided with a template to fill-out at
the outset of the study. Participants in the No Reflection condition were only given the
design problem as per the instructions detailed above. Depicted in Figure 8-3 are the
instructions and template given to participants who were asked to reflect on the flawed
example that accompanied the design brief. Since the participants were given a primed
analogy, they were also asked to judge the inherent strengths and weaknesses of that
particular analogy. For participants that were only given the design brief there was an
extra component of the reflection template that asked them to list what analogies the
design brief elicited (Figure 8-4). Once participants identified the analogies that they
would be using in their decision-making, they were instructed to judge the inherent
strengths and weaknesses of their Self-Generated Analogy.
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Figure 8-3 Reflection instructions for the brief & picture condition.
Figure 8-4 Critiquing instructions for the brief only condition.
8.2.4. Procedure
Participants were tested in two separate groups split along the two Reflection
conditions. All participants were given a booklet that contained the design brief and the
appropriate accompaniments depending on which of the four experimental conditions
they had been randomly assigned. Participants were instructed to generate as many
solutions as possible, within the time limits. To delineate multiple sketches for one idea
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from separate ideas, participants were asked to number each idea before they moved on
to the next idea. Each session lasted a total of 35 minutes. In the Reflection condition,
the first ten minutes of the session was composed of critiquing of the primed analogies
with the remainder of the session devoted to the idea generation task. In the No
Reflection condition the entire 35 minutes was devoted to the idea generation task.
8.2.5. Analysis
As in the previous studies, the scoring procedure created by Chrysikou and Weisberg
(2005) was employed. Each design that participants generated was analysed along three
measures of fixation: Reproductive Similarities (RS), Analogical Similarities (AS) and
Reproduced Flaws (RF). These three measures of fixation analyse the different ways in
which fixation can be exhibited. RS accounts for specific features of the provided
pictorial example being present in the generated designs. From the example in Figure
8-2 an example of a Reproductive Similarity would be if a proposed solution contained
the same four-week grid-like system used in the flawed pictorial example. AS are
similar to RS in that a feature of the provided example is inappropriately incorporated
into the final design, but rather than focus on the physical aspects of the feature the
fixation in AS is on the principles behind that feature. Again in reference to the included
example in Figure 8-2, an Analogical Similarity would be the use of multiple floating
calendar sections to denote different sections of the calendar. RF are characterised by
incorporating specific flaws from the pictorial example that were either placed there by
the experimenter or were inherent to the pictorial example. An example of a
Reproduced Flaw from the flawed example given to participants was that there was no
way to display the current date despite it being a requirement of all successful solutions.
The specific scoring criteria used are located in Appendix B.
Each design that was generated was given a percentage score, on the three above
measures of fixation, which indicated the level of fixation that the design in question
exhibited. A percentage score of zero was indicative of a complete absence of fixation
while a score of 1 was indicative of maximum fixation. The score for each measure was
obtained by dividing the design score for each individual measure by the maximum total
that could be obtained for that measure.
8.3. Results & Discussion
8.3.1. Quantitative results
Results were analysed using two-factorial multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA). The three dependent variables were: the level of fixation for Reproductive
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Similarities, the fixation levels of Analogical Similarities, and the levels of fixation on
Reproduced Flaws. As discussed earlier, our hypothesis was that encouraging
Interaction Designers to understand the design space through reflection on the analogies
that they use to make decisions, would lessen the persistence of these analogies. It was
expected that fixation levels across all three dependent variable (Reproductive
Similarities, Analogical Similarities, and Reproduced Flaws) would be lower in the
Brief Only condition when compared to the Brief & Flawed Example group which was
not given the Design Rationale template.
8.3.1.1. Reproductive Similarities
The Reproductive Similarities measure of fixation gauges how many of the superficial
elements of the primed analogy are incorporated into any of the solutions proposed by
the participants. For example, using the same format and details from the primed
example would be considered Reproductive Similarities. The more similar the proposed
solution is to the example the higher the level of fixation. The Brief Only condition is
included as a control to account for the number of features included in the scoring
criteria (see Appendix B) that would occur simply by chance. There was a main effect
of Reproductive Similarities, F(3,36) = 4.064, p < 0.05. While this overall difference
indicates that 4 participant groups are significantly different in terms of how many
surface features were incorporated into their solutions, this overall result does not
indicate how the two independent variables accounted for this variance.
Figure 8-5 Fixation levels for Reproduced Similarities across experimental conditions.
Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
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Figure 8-5 illustrates the levels of fixation across the four experimental groupings. We
can see that the significant difference that was observed in the overall multivariate test
can mostly be attributed to the Presentation condition (Brief Only M = 0.130, SD =
0.1445 vs. Brief & Flawed Example M = 0.339, SD = 0.265; F(1,36) = 11.392, p <
0.01) since the scores for the Reflection manipulation are approximately the same
(Reflection M = 0.252, SD = 0.246 vs. No Reflection M = 0.231, SD = 0.232; F(1,36) =
0.635, p > 0.05). In terms of our hypothesis we can see from these results that
encouraging participants to understand the design space through reflection had no
impact on the levels of fixation exhibited. From these results we can conclude that 1)
designers are more likely to propose solutions that are similar to the primed analogy;
and 2) that encouraging designers to understand the design space through structured
critiquing does not mitigate this fixation.
8.3.1.2. Analogical Similarities
Reproductive similarities focus on the influence of surface level features on the
produced solutions, while analogical similarities ascertain the influence of the
underlying structure of the initial analogy on the solution space. Our original hypothesis
was that the act of reflecting on the initial analogy would lead to lower levels of
fixation, i.e. analogical persistence would be mitigated. Figure 8-6 illustrates how
encouraging participants to understand the design space through reflection affects the
influence of the analogies that were used. Unfortunately, encouraging participants to
reflect on the initial analogy had the inverse of the expected effect and there was
actually an increase in the reliance on the initial analogy.
Figure 8-6 Fixation levels for Analogical Similarities across all experimental groups.
Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
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As illustrated by Figure 8-6 presentation did have a profound effect on the types of
solutions that were generated. Participants who were given a primed analogy produced
solutions that were far closer to that analogy when compared to the participants who
generated their own analogies (Brief Only M = 0.081, SD = 0.102 vs. Brief & Flawed
Example M = 0.409, SD = 0.264; F(1,36) = 32.234, p < 0.01).
Encouraging participants to understand the design space through reflection
actually caused participants to incorporate more elements of the primed analogy into
their proposed solutions (Reflection M = 0.322, SD = 0.308 vs. No Reflection M =
0.167, SD = 0.172; F(1,36) = 7.143, p < 0.05). The significant effect of Reflection
indicates that there were differences in the levels of fixation exhibited by the different
experimental groups. This main effect though does not provide us with detailed
information in how the act of reflection affects each of the experimental groups.
The first follow-up independent sample t-test examined the difference between the
Reflection vs. No Reflection groupings within the Brief Only condition. There was no
observable difference between the two Reflection conditions (Reflection M = 0.113, SD
= 0.124 vs. No Reflection M = 0.048, SD = 0.064; t = -1.466, p > 0.05). This result is
expected, as stated earlier, becuase when measuring fixation we are measuring the
presence/absence of specific defining features of the primed analogy. As both groups in
the Brief Only condition were not exposed to the flawed pictorial example we would
expect them to have comparable levels of fixation. The second follow-up t-test
examined the difference between the two Reflection conditions within the Brief &
Flawed Example manipulation. The independent sample t-test indicated that there was a
significant difference between the two groups with the highest level of fixation being
exhibited by the participants instructed to reflect on the Provided Primed Analogy
(Reflection M = 0.531, SD = 0.296 vs. No Reflection M = 0.286, SD = 0.164; t = -
2.286, p < 0.05). It is clear from this result that the overall multivariate effect for
Analogical Similarities is primarily accounted for by the large difference in fixation
exhibited between the Reflection and No Reflection groups in the Brief & Flawed
Example condition.
8.3.1.3. Reproduced Flaws
The Reproduced Flaws measure of fixation gauges the number of faulty elements from
the initial analogy that are present in the solutions proposed by the participants. While
the previous two measures of fixation are neither inherently positive nor negative, the
Reproduced Flaws measure deals solely with problematic elements of analogies on the
design decision-making process. There was a main effect of Presentation (Brief Only
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M = 0.171, SD = 0.125 vs. Brief & Flawed Example M = 0.459, SD = 0.258; F(1,36) =
11.392, p < 0.01), but no main effect of Reflection (Reflection M = 0.374, SD = 0.271
vs. No Reflection M = 0.256, SD = 0.211; F(1,36) = 3.554, p > 0.05). While providing
participants with a primed analogy caused them to incorporate problematic elements of
the analogy into their solutions, critiquing that analogy had no impact on mitigating
fixation as we had hoped.
Figure 8-7 Fixation levels for Reproduced Flaws across all experimental groups.
Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
8.3.2. Quantitative analysis – Discussion
Based on the results from Chryiskou and Weisberg (2005) we had hypothesised that
asking participants to reflect on the types of analogies they were using, as well as the
strengths and weaknesses inherent to that analogy, would reduce the influence of the
faulty primed analogy. What we found was that the independent variable of Reflection
only seemed to influence the number of structural elements (i.e. Analogical Similarities)
of the flawed analogy that appeared in the produced sketches. By encouraging
participants to reflect on the analogies that they were using we actually increased the
influence of the initial analogy.
We hoped that encouraging designers to understand the design space through
reflecting on the analogies that they use, we would help designers make higher quality
decisions (i.e. avoid the problematic elements of the analogies that they use and not
incorporate them into their proposed solutions). However, this structured reflection had
no effect on the incorporation of surface features into the solution sketches or the
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inclusion of problematic features of the flawed example. In the case of the Analogical
Similarities measure of fixation, encouraging reflection actually led to more reliance on
the Provided Primed Analogy.
8.3.3. Follow up Qualitative Analysis
The goal of this study was to enable Interaction Designers to make better quality design
decisions by mitigating the influence of the analogies that they use. By encouraging
participants to reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of the analogies they were using
we hoped to retain the benefits of using analogies in design decision-making while
eliminating the pitfalls of analogical persistence. Results indicated that not only was our
manipulation unsuccessful, but that it also increased the influence of the initial analogy.
To identify possible behaviours that may have contributed to observed increase in
analogical persistence a follow up qualitative analysis of the rationale templates was
performed.
To provide structure to this analysis the Theoretical Thematic Analysis
framework (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was employed. Theoretical Thematic Analysis is a
coding framework which focuses on an explorative open-coding approach to data
segmentation within the context of a focused research question. As we were interested
in patterns of behaviour across all participants, i.e. how participants constructed their
understanding of the design space and which behaviours may have led to an increase in
fixation, the Theoretical Thematic Analysis approach to data analysis was appropriate.
We were primarily interested in a description of how participants had mentally
constructed, and consequently explored the design space, so the data were analysed at a
semantic level, i.e. themes were identified from the explicit meaning of the data not
from an interpretive stance in which meaning to the statements may be inferred. Each
statement that was made, regardless of strength or weakness, was broken down into
discrete descriptive units. This open-coding approach emphasises taking each statement
and breaking it down into several codes. Each code aims to encapsulate a relevant idea
or theme which describes the meaning of each statement from the critiquing template.
The theoretical thematic analysis of the rationale templates identified certain behaviours
that were consistent across participants. To provide an idea of consistency within the
codes generated, Table 8-1 illustrates the code distribution across all of the participants.
The behaviours that were identified are discussed across two sections: the
behaviours were used to understand the design space and the behaviours may have
contributed to increased analogical persistence. The first section examines the
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behaviours that were used to elicit the strengths and weaknesses from the problematic
analogy. The second portion of the results section specifically looks at behaviours that
may have led to the increased levels of fixation exhibited in the study presented in the






















6 X X X X
25 X X X
26 X X X X
27 X X X
28 X X X X
29 X X X X X X
30 X X X X
31 X X X X
32 X X X X X
Table 8-1 Distribution of observed behaviours across all participants.
8.3.4. Identifying Strengths and Weaknesses
Participants constructed their own understanding of the solution space by eliciting the
strengths and weaknesses of the Provided Priming Analogy. Participants were able to
identify the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the provided analogy through several
different contrasting behaviours:
 the provided analogy against their Self-Generated Analogies
 the provided solution against the requirements from the design brief
 the flawed example against their self-generated requirements of what features
they believed were important to that particular product
 the flawed pictorial solution against established usability guidelines.
8.3.4.1. Contrast against Self-Generated Analogies
As was discussed in chapter seven, participants used their Self-Generated Analogies as
a source to contrast against the Provided Primed Analogy. This behaviour allowed the
participants to highlight certain features of the flawed solution that worked well, and
other features which were problematic based on how well one analogy achieved that
task when compared to the other. The excerpt below, from Participant Six’s rationale
template, illustrates how they used their Self-Generated Analogy of iCal to understand
and highlight some of the problematic features of the provided example.
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“The Button for the detailed day overview is missing – like the day view
in iCal” Participant 6
One of the requirements of the design brief given to all participants was that any
proposed solution needed to display the appointments for the current day. The provided
flawed solution accomplishes this through the use of a floating window to the side of
the calendar. Participant 6 believed that, rather than having isolated sections, that
different views would be a better method of addressing the issue of how information
was displayed to the user.
8.3.4.2. Contrast against Requirements from the Design Brief
A second method that participants adopted to elicit strengths and weaknesses of the
provided primed analogy was contrasting the example against the requirements of the
design brief. The design brief that participants were given contained several
requirements that all solutions must adhere to. This behaviour was mostly used in the
identification of strengths as opposed to the elicitation of weaknesses of the pictorial
example.
“Main view - easy to understand the system & how to use it (i.e.
add/remove appointments)” Participant 30
The above quotation illustrates how Participant 30 used the requirements from the
design brief (a successful solution must be able to add/remove appointments) as a way
to gauge how well the provided example accomplished this feature. In this specific case,
the provided Priming Analogy was successful because the method used to add/remove
appointments (two buttons marked + and -) was simple, to implement to accomplish this
requirement of the design brief.
8.3.4.3. Contrast against Usability Guidelines
The third method that participants used in the elicitation process was to contrast the
primed analogy with established usability guidelines and techniques. The quotation
below illustrates how Participant 31 was able to identify one of the fundamental flaws
of the proposed solution, namely the ambiguity of navigating between the twelve
months of the calendar using the 3D cube interface.
“Can’t test design eg. Cubed month navigation. Bizarre navigation” Participant
31
The issue of ambiguous navigation in the flawed pictorial example was highlighted, in
the case of Participant 31, by the problem of testing the 3D cube navigation with this
level of fidelity. This issue of user-testing highlighted the fact that the 3D cube interface
was ambiguous and potentially problematic to a successful design.
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8.3.5. Awareness of Weaknesses
The three behaviours we have just discussed have illustrated that participants were
aware of some of the problematic characteristics inherent to the flawed pictorial
example. Participants displayed different strategies of how to begin to analyse the
inherent strengths and weaknesses of the provided primed analogy. The identification of
these behaviours does raise a question: if participants are aware of the weaknesses and
are able to identify them then why was there evidence of increased fixation? Why were
more problematic elements incorporated into their proposed solutions when they were
able to identify the problem? The following section discusses some of the behaviours
exhibited by participants in their rationale templates that may have led to an increase in
analogical persistence.
8.3.5.1. Misattributing weaknesses as strengths
Participants were able to identify weaknesses in the flawed pictorial example that were
included with the design brief. Despite being able to identify problematic characteristics
of the flawed pictorial example this awareness was not sufficient to decrease fixation.
One of the behaviours exhibited by participants, which in part explains the observed
increased levels of fixation, was identifying design features as strengths when in fact
they were weaknesses. In these instances, the participants were able to identify the
problematic features as important but these features were mislabelled as strong points of
that design.
“Navigation view is attractive for users to use, and clearly shows
appointments on different months.” P27
The above quotation illustrates how this behaviour manifested in the rationale
templates. Participant 27 identifies one of the flaws of the primed example, i.e. the cube
like navigation, but rather than it being seen as a problem or a potential oversight of the
design it is seen as a strength. The cube like navigation is an issue as it only has six
sides and consequently is incapable of adequately navigating across twelve months as is
a stated requirement in the design brief. In the case of Participant 27 this problematic
feature was actually seen as a strength in that it would appeal to a technologically savvy
audience.
Keane (1988) discusses the idea that people use analogies as a way to generate
hypotheses where each element of an analogy is a testable hypothesis to see if it is
beneficial to the problem at hand. When engaging in analogical reasoning, according to
Keane (1988), individuals will try to map individual properties of their chosen analogy
on the problem they are engaged with. At the outset of the comparison, all of the
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features of the analogy start as neutral characteristics. These neutral characteristics are
tested against the problem to see if they are helpful in solving the problem or bear no
relevance to the problem. If the neutral characteristic is deemed to be helpful it is
considered a positive characteristic, but if it is completely unrelated to that particular
problem it is categorised as a negative characteristic. The example that Keane (1998)
used is of using billiard balls as an analogy to help understand molecules. A positive
element of the source analogy (the billiard balls) is the movement, which directly maps
on to how molecules move. A negative element though would be the colour of the
billiard balls, as this bears no relation to our understanding of molecules.
Considering this use of analogies to generate hypotheses and label them as either
helpful or a hindrance, we can see that it is possible that characteristics of the initial
analogy could be mislabelled as positive when in fact they would be negative. Rather
than reject an inappropriate element of the initial analogy (i.e. designated as negative)
participants inadvertently labelled it as a positive characteristic and accepted it into the
final generated solution. While this type of analogical error seems to foster the inclusion
of problematic design features into design solutions this was not the only observed
behaviour that may have contributed to the higher levels of fixation.
8.3.5.2. Reluctance to classify weaknesses
Participants were also reluctant to label features as weaknesses. While participants were
able to identify problematic features most of the time, these features were actually
identified as potential problems to be investigated as opposed to weaknesses that
should, be avoided in their own solutions. The quotation below illustrates participants’
reluctance to classify problematic features of the design as a weakness.
“Unsure how you would know what month you are looking at - where is it
labelled?” Participant 30
Participant 30 highlights that the included design has no display for current day or
month, which is in direct contradiction to the requirements of the design brief, but yet
the participant did not classify this element as a problem. Rather the weakness was
framed as a question, which implies that this is an issue to investigate, rather than as a
problem to be avoided in his own designs.
“Where is Saturday & Sunday? Is it not there because it's a work
calendar? What if I work weekends?” Participant 26
Another example of this reluctance is taken from Participant 26. One of the problematic
characteristics placed in the flawed pictorial example was the lack of Saturday and
Sunday on the calendar. Despite this being a significant flaw in the solution, Participant
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26 phrased all of their statements as questions as opposed to simply labelling them as
problems. This reluctance to identify a problematic design feature as a weakness may
promote higher levels of fixation by encouraging participants to spend greater amounts
of time sketching out the problematic features in hopes of understanding these
problematic features.
8.4. General Discussion
The aim of this study was to eliminate analogical persistence using ecologically
appropriate methods like Design Rationale and Reflection-in-action. Results from our
study indicate that not only was our hypothesis incorrect, but the methods we proposed
actually increased analogical persistence. Participants who were asked to use the
provided reflection templates, to gain a better understanding of the design space,
actually incorporated more problematic elements of the initial analogy as compared to
the No Reflection condition. When we performed a secondary qualitative analysis on
the reflection templates used, we found that the structured reflection encouraged by the
experimenters did aid participants in identifying problematic elements of the analogy.
However, this awareness of weaknesses actually increased the likelihood the
problematic analogy would be incorporated into the decision-making action plan, rather
than be discarded as dictated by our hypothesis. These findings beg the question why
would bringing one’s attention to the possible weaknesses of the initial analogy increase
analogical persistence?
As discussed in the previous chapter, participants referred to the provided
Priming Analogy as the ‘best’ solution to the design brief. This behaviour provided
evidence to indicate that the fixation observed was due to pre-emptive exhaustion of the
solution space. Perttula & Liikanen (2006) hypothesised that the fixation effects that are
observed under the Design Fixation paradigm are a function of one of two phenomena:
a pre-emptive exhaustion of the solution space or that designers unconsciously conform
to the provided example. While Perttula & Liikanen was inconclusive as to which
phenomenon was responsible for the effects observed in the Design Fixation paradigm,
the study presented in this chapter provides evidence to support the pre-emptive
exhaustion of the solution space understanding of Design Fixation. Participants were
actively engaging in understanding the strengths and limitations of the initial analogy.
Therefore an observed increase in fixation cannot be accounted for by participants’
unconscious desire to conform, since they were consciously disseminating the artefact.
If the unconscious conformity argument was valid, conscious reflection on the artefact
should have no effect. However, in this study reflection actually increased the observed
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level of fixation. This in conjunction with the findings from previous study, that
although participants are aware of the problems that an example can pose they view the
provided solution as the ‘best’ solution to the problem, indicates that participants are
consciously aware of the problems of the initial analogy but as the solution space has
been pre-emptively exhausted there is not a better option than the one provided to them.
This exhaustion of the solution space also leads the designer to view the provided
example as the best solution, because it is the least flawed solution available from the
limited solution space.
The primary aim of this study was to use principles from Design Rationale, in
conjunction with reflecting on the analogies that form the basis of the decision-making
process, to help participants gain a better understanding of the solution space and
consequently overcome the narrowing influence of their initial analogy. By encouraging
participants to reflect on the analogies that they use, it is possible that we inadvertently
caused participants to narrow the solution space even further. The observed increase in
fixation may be a function of the solution space narrowing to such a degree that
participants had few sources of material to draw upon, which caused them to rely more
heavily upon the initial analogy since it was the only option available.
8.5. Conclusion
To investigate how the act of gaining a better understanding of the design space through
reflection actually increases the influence of the analogy, we need to gain a better
understanding of how participants were constructing their understanding of the solution
space. A follow-up qualitative study was conducted examining the content of the
templates that participants completed at the outset of the study. The hypothesis of this
study was that by encouraging participants to generate their own lists of problematic
features of the analogies, this manipulation would mitigate fixation in an ecologically
valid manner. Contrary to our hypothesis, it was found that encouraging participants to
reflect on the useful characteristics of their initial analogy, actually caused participants
to incorporate more of those problematic elements into their final solutions. By
examining the reflection templates of those participants, we were able to identify such
behaviours as 'reluctance to classify problematic characteristics as weaknesses' and
'misattributing weaknesses as strengths'.
While these behaviours highlight some of the problematic ways in which
participants use analogies, there is a lot of information that is missing by employing this
type of analysis. By examining these behaviours from a post-hoc perspective we are
only engaging with a limited portion of the behaviours that actually contribute to
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increased analogical persistence. To overcome this limitation of a post-hoc analysis we
need to replicate the study presented in this chapter with the addition of a think-aloud
protocol. Employing a think-aloud protocol overcomes the limitations of a post-hoc
analysis by providing us with concurrent verbalisations of the decision-making process
utilised by Interaction Designers. By pairing a think-aloud protocol with the
experimental design detailed in the next chapter we not only gain a more detailed
understanding of the behaviours and cognitive processes that led to increased fixation;
but also provide validation to the behaviours identified in this study through
methodological triangulation.
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9. A Validation of the Behaviours
Contributing to Increased Fixation
9.1. Introduction
The study presented in chapter eight illustrated the effect of using Design Rationale
techniques to encourage reflection in Interaction Designers and consequently how this
affected the influence of analogies on the decision-making of Interaction Designers. The
increased levels of fixation observed indicated that encouraging participants to actively
reflect on the analogies that form the foundation of their decision-making actually
increased the influence of that analogy. A follow-up qualitative study highlighted
particular behaviours that may have been responsible for the increased influence of the
initial analogy. The goal of this final study was to validate the behaviours identified in
the previous chapter by pairing a think-aloud requirement with the reflection
manipulation from the studies represented in chapter 8.
In the previous study, we were able to identify certain behaviours that may have
fostered the increased influence of the initial analogy from an analysis of the Design
Rationale templates. Behaviours such as ‘misattributing weaknesses as strengths’, and
‘a reluctance to classify problems as weaknesses’ provided some insight into what was
causing participants to incorporate more problematic elements of the priming example
into their final solutions. The issue with this type of examination is that the data that
were analysed post-hoc, which provides us with a limited view of the types of
behaviours that increase analogical persistence. In this final study, we have
supplemented the data from the previous study with a think-aloud protocol so as to
provide a richer picture of the types of behaviours and cognitive processes involved in
increased analogical persistence. Pairing a think-aloud requirement with the reflection
manipulation in this chapter allowed us to investigate the validity of the relationship
between behaviours identified in the previous chapter and the observed increase in
analogical persistence. Verbal data generated from the think-aloud requirement allowed
us to supplement the data from the previous study by looking at which cognitive
processes were involved in increasing fixation that would otherwise remain undetected
if only the reflection templates were analysed.
9.2. Method
By employing a think-aloud protocol (Ericsson & Simon, 1993) in conjunction with the
reflection manipulation from the previous chapter we were able to provide validation to
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our findings through a different methodological approach. As per the studies in the
previous chapter, this final study focused on the experimental intersection of the
presence of a problematic Priming Analogy and the instructions to reflect on said
analogy. The results from this study investigated the validity of the behaviours fostering
fixation that were identified in the previous chapter.
9.2.1. Design
In this study, we were primarily interested in the observed increase in fixation observed
in participants who were instructed to reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of the
flawed Priming Analogy so we replicated this condition (Reflection and Brief & Flawed
Example) with the addition of a think-aloud protocol. A think-aloud protocol allowed us
to examine the cognitive processes involved in the decision-making task at hand. These
verbalisations were recorded and also transcribed. As participants’ verbalisations were
recorded each participant was interviewed and tested individually in a lab with minimal
distractions. To supplement the data generated by participants’ verbalisations, notes
were also taken during the interviews. These two sources of information were collated
and analysed for behaviours that may have led to increased analogical persistence. The
presence or absence of the identified behaviours from chapter eight provided us with a
measure of validity.
9.2.2. Participants
The study was conducted with six participants who were experienced in Human-
Computer Interaction methods. Table 9-1 contains descriptive profiles of the six
participants. All participants were recruited through personal channels from both
University College London and the University of Manitoba. All participants, with the
exception of Participants 1 and 3, were recruited through the Masters course in Human
Computer-Interaction in the above mentioned institutions. Participant 1 was recruited






PhD from the University of Sussex–
Experience in the design of Air Traffic
Control interfaces 5
2
MSc from the University College London
Interaction Centre. Currently working in
industry as a information architect. 2
3
PhD from City University– Experience in
designing commercial websites 6
4
MSc from the University of Manitoba.
First year student. 1
5
MSc from the University of Manitoba. In
the final year of a MSc in HCI with a
focus on 3D interactions on an Interactive
Table 3
6
MSc from the University of Manitoba. In
the final year of a MSc in HCI with a
focus on collaborative musical displays. 3
Table 9-1 Participant Profiles.
9.2.3. Materials
Participants were given the design brief for the calendar problem used in the previous
chapters. This design brief was a short problem statement which outlined the goals and
requirements of the design exercise. In addition to the design brief, all participants were
provided with the same additional materials as were used in the previous chapter: a
flawed example solution as well as a template to encourage reflection. The flawed
example given to participants contained several problematic elements, which either
directly contradicted the requirements stated in the design brief, or were generally
counter-intuitive to the purpose of the design brief. This flawed example primed a faulty
analogy in the mind of the designer which can then be quantitatively analysed to
ascertain its influence on the overall design decision-making process. In addition to the
flawed Priming Analogy, all participants were also provided with a template that
encouraged them to reflect on the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the provided
problematic analogy.
9.2.4. Procedure
Participants were provided with instructions at the outset of the study that they would be
given a design brief and that the purpose of this study was to generate as many solutions
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as possible in response. Participants were instructed to read over the provided material,
to acquaint themselves with the requirements of the study, and were given an
opportunity to clarify any problems before the commencement of the study. In addition,
participants were instructed to verbalise their thoughts throughout the entirety of the
study. To avoid issues regarding extended periods of silence, probing instructions were
employed if needed. If participants spent longer than one minute in silence they were
asked “what are you working on now?” This particular probing statement was used so
as to avoid causing participants to reflect on their own thoughts, rather than verbalise
their thoughts (Ericsson & Simon, 1993).
This study, like the experiment presented in chapter eight, was composed of two
sections. The first portion, which was ten minutes in duration, was concerned with
allowing the participants to reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of the provided
flawed example and to complete the Design Rationale template given to them at the
outset of the study. At the end of ten minutes, participants were instructed to move on to
the sketching portion of the study. Participants were given twenty minutes to sketch as
many solutions as possible in response to the design brief.
9.2.5. Analysis
All audio files that were generated by the study were transcribed verbatim. To ensure
that a realistic reflection of the subject matter was obtained such verbal idiosyncrasies
such as pauses, 'umms', and 'ahhs' were transcribed. In addition to the verbalisations
generated by the participants, supplementary information was generated in the form of
notes taken during the study by the experimenter as well as notes taken during the
transcription of the verbalisations.
The analysis was conducted over multiple stages. The first portion of the analysis
was to segment the transcript into discrete concepts. Each concept was a self-contained
unit of information (H. H. Tang & Gero, 2000). Each of the discrete segments identified
in the first portion of the analysis was labelled with a code that aimed to encapsulate the
idea of that particular segment. Multiple codes could be assigned to the same segment.
These codes were then clustered based on inter-code relationships. The clustering of
these codes led to the creation of meta-codes i.e., codes which captured the relationship
between several related segment codes. These meta-codes provided us with an overview
of the dominant themes and behaviours inherent to the data set. These meta-codes
themes also allowed us to examine the behaviours responsible for increased analogical
persistence within the verbal protocols. These identified behaviours were then
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contrasted against the findings from the previous study to provide us with an indication
to the validity of the behaviours from chapter eight.
9.3. Results & Discussion
From the verbal data generated from the think-alouds, several of the same behaviours
from the previous study were identified. The think-aloud data not only provided
methodological triangulation, but also provided more information as to the cognitive
processes involved in the manifestation of the behaviours identified. The results and
discussion section is composed of two sub-sections. The first sub-section discusses the
results from this chapter in the context of the behaviours identified in the previous
chapter. Specifically, the replicability of those identified behaviours as well as how the
verbalisations extend our understanding of those behaviours. The second sub-section
discusses several cognitive processes that were identified through the collected
verbalisations that would not have been identifiable if not for the think-alouds.
Table 9-2 illustrates the behaviours discussed in the previous study that were
exhibited in the think-aloud protocols. All of the observed behaviours in this study
showed a similar distribution to the previous study, in terms of frequency, across all
participants. By pairing a think-aloud with the experimental paradigm employed in the
previous study we were able to gain additional insight into not only how those
previously identified behaviours manifested; but also, how several cognitive processes

































1 3 X X X X X X X
2 3 X X X X X X X
3 5 X X X X X X
4 10 X X X X X
5 2 X X X X X X X X
6 1 X X X X X X X
Table 9-2 Distribution of codes all participants.
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9.3.1. Validation of Behaviours from Study 9.1
Table 9-2 illustrates the behaviours that were identified in the previous study and their
presence, or absence, across the participating designers in this study. All of the
behaviours identified in the previous study were replicated, with the majority of all
participants exhibiting the fixation fostering behaviours. All behaviours were exhibited
by at least 67% of the participants. The only exception to these results was the ‘contrast
against usability guidelines’ behaviour, which was exhibited by only 50% of the
participants.
While the think-aloud verbalisations validated the presence of many of the
behaviours, it also provided further insight into how these behaviours manifested. The
following two sections discuss several aspects of the ‘reluctance to clarify weakness’
behaviour. The gathered verbalisations provided us with more details into how this
behaviour manifests that we were not able to assess using the limited post-hoc analysis
of the rationale templates.
9.3.1.1. Reluctance to classify weaknesses - Narratives
In the previous study, reluctance to classify weakness was identified in all but one of the
participants. This behaviour was characterised by a participant’s reluctance to classify
any potential problems with the flawed analogy as an outright weaknesses. Participants
were more likely to discuss the problems with the proposed solution as potential issues
that should be further explored. The data generated from the think-alouds added a
further dimension to this behaviour which was the construction of a narrative to explain
away that problematic feature.
“Ummm... so where is Saturday & Sunday? It must not be [there] because
it's a work schedule. That's a good idea to simplify the design.”
Participant 4
The above quotation illustrates how Participant 4 was able to identify a main weakness
of the provided primed solution, namely that it doesn't have any weekends. This is a
major flaw, since it compromises the basic functionality of the calendar. Rather than
this being labelled as a weakness, Participant 4 composed a narrative to explain away
the problem, i.e. that the exclusion of the weekend is a conscious choice to streamline
the design.
The use of narratives is not foreign to the decision-making literature. Many of
the Naturalistic Decision-Making models discuss the use of narratives (e.g. Penning &
Hastie. 1986). Traditionally, narratives have been used to test out the potential strengths
and weaknesses of the proposed course of action. While the nomenclature differs across
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different models of Naturalistic Decision-Making the idea of narratives as an important
component of the decision-making process remains consistent (Lipshitz, 1995). In the
Recognition Primed Decision-Making model (Klein, 1998), the term used to denote this
behaviour is mental simulation. Under the Explanation-Based model of decision-
making this type of behaviour is referred to as ‘constructing the narrative’ (Pennington
& Hastie, 1986). While the use of narratives is discussed in many different models of
decision-making, it is worth noting that narratives have never been discussed in the case
of rationalising away existing flaws as seemed to be the case in this study but rather as a
tool to structure and understand the problem space. This focus on using a narrative to
explain away the flaws of the original example, rather than testing it, could in part
explain the increased levels of fixation observed in the previous chapter.
9.3.1.2. Reluctance to classify weaknesses – Dissonance between intentions and actions
In addition to the use of narratives, participants were observed discussing particular
characteristics as weaknesses, but failed to commit those weaknesses to paper. While
the problematic characteristics were verbally identified as a weakness, this
categorisation was not reflected in the rationale template. Rather, those identified
weaknesses were committed to paper as potential problems requiring further
exploration.
Participant 6 Verbalisation – Thinking about a calendar there are
typically Saturdays and Sundays. It doesn’t have those and I don’t see a
way to turn those on or off, nor an easy way to access some of the more
complicated functionalities. So I think it might fail on virtue of its
calendar’ness.
Entry on template – Where is Sat and Sun? Not particularly obvious
This discrepancy between identifying the issue verbally and failing to commit that
judgement to paper does indicate that the act of committing a judgement to paper may
increase this reluctance (Pennington & Hastie, 1986). By encouraging participants to
reflect on the inherent strengths and weaknesses, perhaps we are placing too much
emphasis on de-constructing the characteristics of the flawed solution as either positive
or negative. From the verbal data it is clear that participants can identify problematic
elements of the design, but the act of committing those opinions to paper seems to cause
participants to waver in their opinions. While the study presented is somewhat artificial
in design, i.e. more elements of defining and exploring the design space are under the
designers’ direct control and not as strictly detailed by the design brief and flawed
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solution. This study highlights some important issues that may have some important
implications for the field of Design Rationale. The central claim to Design Rationale is
that by cataloguing the decisions inherent to the construction of an artefact, as well as
the process behind them, future designers can use that information to aid them in
making better design decisions. The worrying fact is that the information that is
recorded may not be an accurate reflection of what the designer is thinking. This
disconnect between what the designer is thinking, and the record of that thought process
questions some of the basic benefits of using Design Rationale.
9.3.2. Cognitive Processes Contributing to Fixation
The first section discussed some of the behaviours identified in the previous chapter that
were replicated from the verbalisation generated by participants. This section discusses
some of the cognitive processes that emerged from the think-aloud data which may, in
addition to the aforementioned behaviours, contribute to the increase in analogical
persistence observed earlier. The concurrent verbalisations were able to shed light onto
the thought process and timing of the observed behaviours from the first study. In
addition to the behaviours identified in the previous study the verbal data indicated
several cognitive strategies that in and of themselves may have led to increased
analogical persistence.
9.3.2.1. Depth versus Breadth Approach to Understanding the Solution Space
One of the primary goals of using Design Rationale principles is to foster higher quality
design decisions by widening the solution space through understanding the limits of the
existing solution space using careful and focused analyses (A. Tang et al., 2008).
Participants in this study tackled the task of defining and understanding the solution
space in very different ways. Most participants adopted a depth approach, in which they
focused on exploring as many facets as possible of one or two designs, where some
others adopted a breadth approach, in which participants generated as many different
ideas as possible to explore the various different types of solutions available to them.
A significant portion of the participants (see Table 9-2 for a distribution of this
behaviour across participants), after completing the reflection portion of the study, spent
the remainder of the study working on one or two design ideas in detail. Participants
who adopted this 'depth' strategy spent the majority of the sketching portion of the study
working on one drawing. This one proposed solution was continually refined to ensure
that each necessary feature outlined in the design brief was present and devoid of any
problems. Two brief case studies are presented below which contrast the depth strategy,
observed in most of the participants, against the breadth strategy used by two
131
participants. This breadth/depth approach has been noted by various researchers as a
way to demarcate the solution space by transforming a wicked problem into a structured
problem (Akin, 2001; Ball & Ormerod, 1995; Ball, Onarheim, & Christensen, 2010). It
is worth noting that the two examples in Figures 9-1 and 9-2 represent either extreme of
this behaviour. From the small sample, these approaches to understanding the solution
space did not seem to be bimodal but rather on a continuum (Ball & Ormerod, 1995;
Ball et al., 2010). Although the examples presented in Figures 9-1 and 9-2 are not quite
typical of the other participants they do illustrate the differences in behaviours between
these two approaches. The presence of these behaviours as a way to engage with
understanding the solution space, among our participants is not surprising, considering
the goal of our structured reflection templates was to encourage participants to
understand in greater detail the design space. What is not as well understood is the
influence these behaviours have on the Design Fixation paradigm.
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P6 – Depth strategy
Participant six, throughout the entire sketching portion of the study
produced one possible solution to the design brief. While only one
solution was proposed each function of the calendar was described in
detail. In addition to a detailed description of what the proposed calendar
would, and would not do, the participant also discussed several different
views (day, week, month) and what the benefits and weaknesses of each of
those views would be. The features that were in the proposed solution
were far more rigorous in relation to the solutions produced by other
participants in that each feature was tested against the requirements of the
design brief. In total the one solution spanned three pages, which was
composed of three different views, and eight different features that were
all discussed in detail.
Figure 9-1 Sketch produced by participant 6 using the depth strategy.
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P4 – Breadth approach
Participant four proposed a total of ten different solutions in response to
the provided design brief. Each of the ten proposed solutions contained
enough detail to communicate the basic premise of the idea but contained
little to no detail of the actual functionality. Each solution contained
minimal detail in terms of how it satisfied the requirements listed in the
design brief. Of the ten solutions, the most detailed solution was a ‘time-
tunnel’ idea which described how one would navigate through a circular
tunnel interface with the more recent appointments closer to the user while
the farther away the appointment was chronologically the farther it would
be on the interface. In contrast, the least detailed solution used solely icons
to provide the details that a traditional calendar would. The solution
contained nothing more than few icons and area pointing towards an
empty box which represented a traditional grid like interface to a calendar.
Both of these solutions are contained in the figure below.
Figure 9-2 Two sketches produced by participant 4 using the breadth strategy.
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From the two examples described above, the differences are quite apparent. The depth
approach was characterised by one or two drawings, on average, which contained far
more detail. The breadth approach is concerned with generating a multitude of ideas at a
superficial level with little to no functionality, and/or incorporation of the basic
requirements as outlined by the design brief.
Figure 9-3 Fixation scores across all participants with standard error bars indicative
of the standard error of the mean.
Of the six participating Interaction Designers all but two demonstrated the depth
strategy (average number of designs: Depth = 2.4; Breadth = 8). The two participants
who did not use this approach adopted a breadth approach, in which more design ideas
were proposed at the cost of the level of detail. Participants using this strategy did not
engage with each solution past the sketching of the general concept. Little detail was
provided in terms of what functions their solution would accomplish and how it would
accomplish those functions. The two participants who adopted a breadth approach
produced markedly more design ideas in comparison to the depth grouping at the cost of
any level of engagement with the design problem. Figure 9.3 illustrates the average
fixation scores across all six participants. These fixation scores were calculated using
the same scoring criteria used in the previous study. Appendix D contains the scoring
criteria used to measure the level of fixation exhibited in the solutions generated by the
participants Interaction Designers. Due to the small samples size in both conditions,
any quantitative analyses would be low power, however from examining the raw data
does show a trend for lower fixation scores on the Reproduced Similarities and
Analogical Similarities measures of fixation in participants who adopted the depth
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approach. A larger sample size would be required to examine the implications that these
two strategies have on analogical persistence.
9.3.2.2. Explicitly improve flawed solution.
Many of the codes generated by the verbal protocols were from direct references to the
flawed solution, specifically how the solution could be improved. By encouraging
participants to try and identify the strengths and the weaknesses of the provided
analogy, they became markedly more inclined to spend the sketching portion of the
experiment focusing on improving the flawed example. While it would be reasonable to
assume that participants would want to incorporate the identified strengths and remove
the weaknesses from their proposed solutions, this was not how the introduction of the
Design Rationale templates manifested. As opposed to generating new ideas based on
the results of the first portion of the study, several participants explicitly referred to
improving some of the identified problems.
“So with this redesign we are going to look at the strengths that I listed
before, and the weaknesses and we are going to try and redesign it so we
keep the strengths but try to minimise the weaknesses. With any design
there are always tradeoffs. “ Participant 2
By focusing on ‘improving’ the provided flawed example it seems that participants
were inadvertently incorporating more problematic characteristics of the Priming
Analogy then addressing the identified weaknesses. This behaviour illustrates how
focusing on the rationale of a design decision can narrow the solution space even
further, and enforce a ‘patch-up’ mentality through relying more heavily on the Priming
Analogy. By encouraging participants to understand the design space, in hopes of
making better quality design decisions, the reflection actually reinforces the problematic
analogy.
9.4. Conclusion
The goal of this study was to investigate the validity of the behaviours identified in the
previous chapter that may have increased analogical persistence. By pairing a think-
aloud protocol with the existing experimental design we were able to use
methodological triangulation to address the validity of the results from chapter eight. In
addition to providing methodological triangulation, the think-alouds allowed us to gain
additional information about the cognitive processes involved in fixation that were not
apparent from previous analyses. These behaviours, in conjunction with some of the
identified cognitive processes, provide insight into why encouraging participants to
understand the design space through reflection increases the problematic behaviour it is
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trying to eliminate. Cross (1994) discusses how a narrow view of the design space can
lead to problematic solutions, and the different design methodologies that can be used to
broaden designers’ understanding of the design space and to prevent problems like
analogical persistence. Methodologies such as Reflection (Cockton, 2004) and Design
Rationale (Tang et al., 2008) have been used in the past as tools to improve the quality
of design decisions. Behaviours such as ‘the depth strategy’ as well as ‘misattributing
weaknesses as strengths’ identified in both this study and the previous chapter highlight
some of problems surrounding the intersection of these two methodologies.
The biggest issue raised by this study is the disconnect between the thoughts that
were verbalised by participants and the resulting behaviours. Participants would discuss
their thoughts in one fashion but when it came to acting upon those thoughts and beliefs
a dissonance occurred. Behaviours such as ‘the use of narratives’ and ‘reluctance to
classify weaknesses’ highlight the struggle that participants had with this disconnect.
These findings reinforce how difficult it is to accurately reflect on one’s own thought
process (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). This finding is of particular importance since
understanding one’s own cognition to make better-informed decisions is a fundamental
cornerstone of the Design Rationale process. This inconsistency between one’s thoughts
and their resulting actions calls into the question the value of such design principles as
Design Rationale.
Both Design Rationale (Lee & Lai, 1991) and Reflection (Schon, 1983) are
important pillars of leveraging our understanding of design cognition to help designers
make better quality design decisions. However, the intersection of the two seems to
foster problematic behaviours in Interaction Designers. The next chapter concludes this
thesis with a discussion of these issues.
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10. Conclusions
The purpose of this research is to understand the cause of analogical persistence, the
factors that affect its expression, and how we can mitigate its potential pitfalls while
retaining its benefits. It was observed early in this thesis that while analogies formed the
basis from which all solutions were derived, Interaction Designers could rely on these
analogies to such a degree that the overall quality of their decisions was influenced.
This final chapter will summarise the contributions to knowledge, provide a brief
discussion of the limitations of this research, and close with potential avenues of
research that may build upon this work.
10.1. Contributions Towards Knowledge
10.1.1. Analogies Persist Across all Stages of Decision-Making
As stated by many researchers, analogical reasoning is a cornerstone of the design
process (Bonnardel, 2000; Eckert et al., 2005; Klein & Brezovic, 1986; Schraefel,
Hughes, Mills, G. Smith, & Frey, 2004). Researchers, such as Klein, take this statement
one step further and state that analogical reasoning forms the foundations from which
we make decisions (e.g. Klein, 1999). Analogical reasoning is an important component
of design decision-making as it allows designers to quickly scope the solution space to a
pre-formulated template solution based on a similar situation that the designer has
encountered previously. Discussion of how analogies form the foundations of our
decision-making usually define these analogies as first stages that set up a possible
solution which is refined over several iterative stages (Klein, 1987; Klein &
Calderwood, 1988). As illustrated in every study discussed in this dissertation, these
seed analogies can persist across all stages of the decision-making process. However,
problematic characteristics of the initial analogy are still present in the final proposed
solutions, despite a participant’s engagement in the later stages of decision-making
(such as mental simulation), which is primarily concerned with eliminating these
problematic elements from the proposed solution.
The initial study, presented in chapter three was an explorative examination of
how Interaction Designers engage in the decision-making process in a ‘real-world’
setting. To frame our discussion of how Interaction Designers come to their decisions,
we analysed our results in terms of three variations of the Recognition-Primed
Decision-Making (RPD) model (Klein, 1999). It became evident that the analogies
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participants used at the outset were not an initial stage from which later stages were
built upon, but rather these ‘seed’ analogies persisted across all stages of decision-
making.
The primary goal of employing analogical reasoning in the initial stage of
decision-making is to quickly and effectively generate a possible course of action
despite the heavy cognitive load that designers can be under (Buchanan, 1992; Lawson,
2006). The stages of decision-making that follow from the initial point of analogical
reasoning are in place to ensure that any problematic elements of the decision-making
process are removed or mediated (Klein, 1999l Klein & Calderwood, 1991; Lipshitz,
1995). Chapter three presented evidence of the initial analogy actually undermining
these goals by promoting problematic behaviours, such as designers’ reluctance to
search for a more appropriate analogy when faced with evidence to indicate the
inappropriateness of their initial analogy. Such problematic behaviours prolong the
decision-making process, with the end-product being a lower quality design solution.
While our findings supported the idea of analogical persistence, other equally
viable hypotheses may explain the results from this first study. While only one analogy
was reported which in turn led us to believe, it is possible that if we were to examine the
decision-making employed during the design process there may be many other
influences that play a part in problematic decision-making. To address this issue, a
quantitative study using the Design Fixation paradigm was included as a way to validate
analogical persistence using methodological triangulation. The Design Fixation
paradigm examines how many problematic characteristics of an initial flawed example
are present in the produced sketches, which allows us to observe the degree to which an
initial analogy influences all stages of decision-making from idea generation until the
proposed final solution. Over several studies (chapters 4-6) we were able to
demonstrate how issues with an initial Priming Analogy are not removed from the
proposed action plan through the later stages of decision-making, as postulated by Klein
(Klein, 1987a, 1989; Klein et al., 1988; Klein, Whitaker, & King, 1988), but rather can
be observed even in the final proposed action plan (i.e. the artifact).
These findings highlight how an initial analogy, which forms the basis of the
solution path proposed by designers, can impact the entire decision-making process.
The idea of an initial idea disrupting the creative process is not new to the domain of
design with prominent researchers such as Darke (1979), Cross (1994), and Buxton
(2008) commenting on this issue, specifically with a focus on practical applications to
addressing this disruption to idea generation. While the aforementioned work has
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focused on addressing the issue of why previous experiences can limit the solution
space it has been taken for granted and assumed to be an incontrovertible fact. What
separates the work in this thesis from this previous research is our focus on the
theoretical underpinnings of the limiting nature of a seed idea, in this case an initial
analogy, and how it influences all stages of the design process. By examining the role of
the initial analogy, we hope to understand why analogical persistence occurs in the first
place. By understanding the context of this sort of fixation and how it manifests, we can
begin to build specific hypotheses to target different approaches to eliminating the issue
of analogical persistence.
In contrast to the practical focus of the above-mentioned researchers, the work
of Smith et al. (1993) serves as a theoretical counterpoint. Smith et al. (1993) presented
three experiments that examined how previous experience constrains the solution space,
with all generated solutions being a variation of an initial exemplar. Participants were
presented with sketches of aliens and were asked to generate as many solutions as
possible in response to the design brief (create an alien that would live on a far away
planet). It was found that the presence of these initial examples constrained the solution
space, and that the solutions generated were heavily based on these initial examples.
The work presented in chapters three and four of this thesis extends Smith at al. (1993)
theoretical approach to understanding the constraining effects of experience on the
design process by providing a bridge with the practical emphasis put forth by Darke
(1979), Cross (1994) and Buxton (2008). The work presented takes a real-world
application and develops a theoretical understanding of the decision-making process
used by Interaction Designers in-situ.
10.1.2. Addressing Threats to the Validity of the Design Fixation Paradigm
Our first study highlighted how analogical persistence can lead to lower quality
decisions, which in turn led to problematic designs. By taking a qualitative approach,
we were able to gain insight into how Interaction Designers come to the decisions that
they do in-situ. An alternative explanation to our conclusion that one initial analogy
chosen at the outset influences the decision-making process, is that several analogies
were considered, but only one analogy was taken to completion and that analogy was
the only one remembered. An axiom of the scientific method is ruling out alternative
hypotheses. A secondary study was conducted to test the validity of the issue of
analogical persistence. Since the study presented in chapter 3 adopted a qualitative
approach to examining design decision-making in Interaction Designers, the Design
Fixation paradigm (Jansson & Smith, 1991) was employed as a quantitative
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methodology in the subsequent study to allow us to manipulate the initial analogy and
observe how that problematic analogy impacted the types of solutions generated. By
using a different methodological approach we can employ methodological triangulation
to replicate and validate analogical persistence (Morse, 1991). While the Design
Fixation paradigm allowed us a level of control over the influence of the initial analogy,
there were several threats to the external and internal validity of the paradigm that
needed to be addressed before we could be confident that we were eliciting analogical
persistence using Design Fixation.
10.1.2.1. External Validity
The largest issue with the Design Fixation paradigm has been its generalisability.
In the past, using the Design Fixation paradigm with different design disciplines has led
to inconsistent results when using a sample of Mechanical Engineering students results
from the Design Fixation paradigm remain consistent. However, issues arise when
attempting to apply the Design Fixation paradigm to a non-engineering based design
discipline. Researchers such as Purcell and Gero (Purcell & Gero, 1991; Gero &
Purcell, 1993; Purcell & Gero, 1996) have demonstrated that when using the Design
Fixation paradigm with a non-engineering sample, in their case Architects & Interior
Designers, there was a failure to replicate. These studies attributed their failure to
replicate to a mismatch between the domain of the presented problem and the domain of
the designer. Our work illustrated that their failure to replicate exhibited was not due to
a domain mismatch, but rather the measure that they were employing was not sensitive
enough to detect the influence of the flawed priming example. By using a more holistic
approach to measuring fixation, such as the measures used by Chrysikou and Weisberg
(2005), we were able to measure how much the Priming Analogy influenced the
solutions that they generated.
10.1.2.2. Internal Validity
By employing the Design Fixation (Jansson & Smith, 1991) paradigm, we were able to
manipulate the type of analogies that would serve as the foundation of the design
decision-making process. This quantitative approach, while not as rich in data as the
initial qualitative study, did allow us to tease apart the influence that various
confounding variables have on the observed analogical persistence. In addition to the
concerns regarding the generelisability of the Design Fixation paradigm there were also
several threats to the internal validity. Chapter five addressed the issue of materials
employed in the Design Fixation paradigm while chapter six addresses the confounding
variable of familiarity.
The study presented in chapter five addressed the confounding issue of the
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stimuli used in Design Fixation paradigm. Work by Purcell and Gero (Purcell & Gero,
1991; Purcell et al., 1993) highlighted that some of the results derived from the Design
Fixation paradigm were specific to the stimuli presented.
To address this issue we generated new stimuli to present in our studies. Two
sets of problems were generated because one set of new stimuli had been successfully
used among Mechanical Engineers and differing design domains were the issue. One
problem was based on the principles emphasised in Mechanical Engineering, while the
other set of stimuli were based on Interaction Design principles. This allowed
comparability between our study and previous studies on the topic of stimuli and the
Design Fixation paradigm. By presenting participants with newly generated problems
and accompanying flawed pictorial examples, we were able to illustrate that the results
originally presented in chapter four were not a function of the stimuli used but rather
were a function of analogical persistence. Chapter five illustrates, in the context of
Interaction Designers, that the results using the Design Fixation paradigm validating our
earlier qualitative findings were not a function of the stimuli used in chapter four.
While chapter five addressed the issue of materials as a confounding variable to
the expression of analogical persistence, the stimuli were not the only threat to the
internal validity of the Design Fixation paradigm. Another issue raised by researchers
was the confounding variable of familiarity. Researchers such as Purcell & Gero (1993)
have argued that the effect of the initial analogy measures by the Design Fixation
paradigm is heavily influenced by one’s familiarity with that particular problem. More
specifcally, the fixation measurements that are gathered can not be solely attributed to
the presence of the provided Priming Analogy, but rather the fixation measures are an
expression of both the problematic example and one’s familiarity with the type of
problem encountered. To be confident that the results generated in the Design Fixation
paradigm were reflective of our manipulation we needed to address the confounding
issue of familiarity.
To reject the hypothesis that the analogical persistence exhibited by the Design
Fixation paradigm is a function of one’s familiarity with the presented design problems,
we presented each participant with two design problems of differing levels of
familiarity. By presenting two differing problems we were able to compare the
application and uses of unfamiliar and highly familiar problems. When the two
problems were compared, it was found that familiarity was not a confounding variable
to the Design Fixation paradigm.
While the Design Fixation is a useful paradigm which allows us to observe and
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manipulate the analogies used in decision-making, it is not without its flaws. Issues with
generalisability, stimuli, and confounding variables have been raised to undermine the
validity of this paradigm. In chapters four through six we have taken each of these
concerns and addressed each one individually. By tackling each threat to the validity of
the DF paradigm we can confidently use this paradigm as tool for validation of
analogical persistence and to investigate different types of analogies.
10.1.3. How Different Analogies can Influence Analogical Persistence
By using the Design Fixation paradigm, we can manipulate and directly observe the
influence of the initial analogy on the overall decision-making process by examining the
types of solutions Interaction Designers generate under different conditions. The issue
though with the Design Fixation paradigm in its current state is that it can only account
for one particular type of Priming Analogy: examples of previous work. Researchers
such as Herring et al., (2009), Linsey (2008), and VanLehn (1998) discuss different
sources of inspiration that designers draw upon when engaging with the design process.
While drawing on previous examples is a valid method to engage with the design
process, Interaction Designers also draw upon their own experiences of previous design
problems (as discussed in chapter three). While participants in the fixation condition in
the Design Fixation paradigm are relying upon the provided Priming Analogy,
participants in the control condition are using Self-Generated Analogies to begin the
decision-making process. By comparing and contrasting the solutions generated
between these two different types of analogies, we were able to see that Interaction
Designers engage with each type of analogy using different behaviours.
The current state of the Design Fixation paradigm allows us to observe how a
provided Priming Analogy influences the decision-making process by comparing how
similar the final solutions, generated by participants, are to the initial provided analogy.
In the Brief Only condition, there is no provided Priming Analogy, so we have no idea
to what level the initial analogy participants have generated has influenced their
decision-making process. To address this issue, we paired a think-aloud protocol with
the Design Fixation paradigm. By capturing the verbalisatons of participants in both the
Brief & Flawed Example condition and the Brief Only condition, we were able to
compare and contrast the different ways in which participants used the different types of
analogies in their decision-making. Results indicated several behaviours that Interaction
Designers employed during the Design Fixation study. When using Self-Generated
Analogies, Interaction Designers perceived the analogies as useful and remembered
only the best characteristics of the analogy.
143
When examining how participants employed the provided primed example, it
was found that the participants perceived the flawed pictorial examples as the ‘best’
solution to the design brief. This problematic behaviour continued throughout the
evaluation phase of the decision-making process, where the ‘best’ solution from the
generated solutions was the sketch most similar to the provided Priming Analogy. Both
of these behaviours, among others discussed in chapter 7, are problematic because they
underline the disconnect between how analogical persistence occurs and current ways to
address those issues. Cross (1994) discussed several techniques that are commonly used
in design practice that address the constraining effect of a particular idea. Techniques
such as the ‘Why,Why,Why’ method, in which designers ask themselves a series of
probing questions aimed at uncovering problematic thought processes that led to
problematic designs, do not accomplish what they set out to do if the designer’s
metacognition is completely disconnected from the issues surrounding the design
problem at hand.
While Chrysikou and Weisberg (2005) conducted a similar study the work
presented in chapter 7, differentiates itself by the scope of the analysis undertaken.
Chrysikou and Weisberg (2005) only captured and analysed verbal protocols in the
fixation condition. We know from previous studies (e.g. chapter three, VanLehn, 1998)
that designers can draw upon other sources of inspiration to engage with the design
process. By extending the capturing of participants verbalisations to include the Self-
Generated Analogies that participants were using in the Brief Only condition, we gained
more understanding of how different analogies can impact the expression of analogical
persistence.
10.1.4. Particular Design Methods can Increase Analogical Persistence by Fostering
Maladaptive Behaviours
The goal of this thesis was to use our findings about analogical persistence to mitigate
the potential pitfalls and foster higher quality decision-making in Interaction Designers.
Principles from both the areas of Reflection (Schon, 1983) and Design Rationale (Lee &
Lai, 1991) were employed in the hopes of retaining the benefits of using analogies in
design decision-making without the limitations. Chapter 8 demonstrated that when
participants were encouraged to better understand the solution space by reflecting on the
analogies they were using, they produced solutions which were far more like the
Priming Analogy. Therefore, attempting to mitigate analogical persistence actually
made it worse.
Previous work has attempted to eliminate the effect of a primed example, using
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the Design Fixation paradigm, but few have been successful in these endeavors.
Chrysikou and Weisberg (2005) were able to mitigate the inclusion of problematic
elements of the priming example by providing participants with a list containing all of
the issues contained within the flawed pictorial example. While this manipulation was
successful in this setting, the applicability of this method outside of a laboratory is fairly
limited. By building on this idea, we hypothesised that using principles from the
literature on Reflection and Design Rationale would replicate Chyrsikou & Weiseberg
(2005) in a more ecologically valid fashion.
Results from this study illustrated that encouraging participants to reflect on the
strengths and weaknesses of their initial analogies increased analogical persistence.
Participants who were encouraged to reflect and dissect their initial analogies produced
solutions that included far more problematic elements when compared to participants
who were only allowed to sketch. Follow-up studies highlighted, and validated, several
behaviours, that the experimental paradigm encouraged which resulted in increased
analogical persistence.
Chapters 8 & 9 highlight an important assumption regarding the implied
usefulness of some of the methods used by Interaction Designers in-situ to overcome
the limiting nature of previous experiences. The area of Design Rationale has long be
seen as a way to provide a framework from which designers can make more informed
and higher quality design decisions (Karsenty, 1996; Zannier & Maurer, 2005). The use
of Reflection (both in-action & on-action) has also been seen as a way to understand the
solution space, and through that structured understanding identify and remove
problematic features from the construction of the artefact (Louridas & Loucopoulos,
2000). The studies presented over chapters 8 & 9 have brought some of these
assumptions into question by highlighting how the use of these methods can increase
fixation.
While both Reflection and Design Rationale are commonly used in the design
community as methods to make higher quality design decisions (Karsenty, 1996;
Zannier & Maurer, 2005), the intersection of Reflection and Design Rationale is not an
area that has garnered much attention from the design community. Both of these
methods are concerned with encouraging the designer to understand, in greater detail,
what are the strengths of weaknesses of their solution/design/artefact. Through these
methods, designers can identify the particular issues inherent to the artifact and
consequently address them. Where these two methods differ is in the continuation of the
process of refinement. In the case of Reflection, this is an immediate cycle of reflection,
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reworking, and reflection again. The locus of the Reflection approach to improving the
design solution is on an individual level (Louridas & Loucopoulos, 2000).
Alternatively, the Design Rationale approach is focused on the wider design system, not
just that of the individual designer. By understanding and documenting the design
space, the goal is for knowledge to be reused by other individuals to aid them in their
decision-making when confronted with a similar situation (Ramesh & Dhar, 1992).
While the locus of the two methods is different (individual refinement vs. systems
approach) the primary goal is the same: to produce a higher quality artefact by
improving understanding of the current state of the solution space. It is possible that
these two differing loci have kept the research investigating this intersection to a
minimum.
The intersection of these two design methods may be a cause of increased
analogical persistence. While the initial goal of the two methods is similar; their
application differs. Each of these design methods has been discussed with their own
unique end-user in mind. It is possible that while the primary goals are similar the
different approaches are too disparate to combine in an ecologically valid, meaningful
approach to mitigating analogical persistence. By using these two methods in
conjunction it is possible that we are undermining each methods ability to fully
understand the solution space, which primes the initial analogy to an even greater extent
than before. To understand how the overlapping goals and the disparate loci of these
methods interact, a more focused study investigating this particular research question
needs to be conducted.
While the two methods that were employed in these studies to help Interaction
Designers make higher quality design decisions are commonplace they are not the only
methods used in industry that may help to eliminate the effects of analogical
persistence. Tools such as Design Consequences (Reichelt, 2007) or Parallel Design
(Myles, 2010) are promising techniques that may be better suited at eliminating the
problematic elements of the initial analogy.
10.2. Limitations & Future Directions
The aim of this thesis was to investigate the issue of analogical persistence, its causes,
influences, and possible methods to mitigate it. Different methodologies, both
quantitative and qualitative, were used to investigate analogical persistence. While these
differing methods were used to provide methodological triangulation some limiting
factors regarding those methods need to be addressed.
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10.2.1. Limitations
To probe and manipulate analogical persistence we have employed the Design Fixation
paradigm. This paradigm provided us with a quantitative approach that allowed us to
directly measure the level of influence that the initial analogy had on the overall design
decision-making process. While this suited the needs of our study, there are limitations
inherent to this approach.
The largest issue with using the Design Fixation paradigm, as it currently stands,
is one of ecological validity. While the early portion of this dissertation addressed a
range of threats to the validity to the Design Fixation paradigm a fundamental drawback
is one of generalising our findings from the Design Fixation paradigm to how designers
approach decision-making in a ‘real-world setting’. Factors such as extreme time
constraints and the artificial nature of some of the design problems do raise some
questions as to how we can draw conclusions in terms of how designers use analogies in
a meaningful way. We have tried to address some of these issues by complementing this
research with a qualitative study, as described in chapter three, in which participants
described how they engaged in the decision-making process for a recent design problem
they had encountered in their work, be it academic or industry-based.
Many researchers have discussed how the design process is experimental and
exploratory in nature and that adopting the Design Fixation paradigm allows only a
snapshot of the design process (Buxton, 2008; Cross, 1994). This work does not assume
that there is a right or wrong solution; but rather, provides some insight into the
behaviours that participants engage with that may contribute to the observed analogical
persistence. The logic being that the time constraints imposed by the Design Fixation
paradigm do not provide a true representation of the design decision-making process
employed by Interaction Designers so if we extend the time that participants have to
engage with the problem, then issues of analogical persistence would be addressed as
designers explored the solution space and attempted different solutions. If we were to
look at our results only in the context of the Design Fixation paradigm, then this may be
a valid concern. However, when our quantitative results are taken in the context of
qualitative findings presented in chapter three, we see that the issue of analogical
persistence is not simply a function of the Design Fixation paradigm. It is an issue that
plagues designers with a more realistic time frame to engage with, and explore the total
solution space.
Another issue with the validity of generalising our results from the Design
Fixation studies is the number of designers involved. Under the Design Fixation
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paradigm participating designers work individually on the provided design brief. The
isolated nature of the design process is being emphasised by virtue of the construction
of the Design Fixation paradigm. It may be argued that many of the issues inherent to
analogical persistence would be addressed when examined in a group setting. While the
idea of the lone designer is seen as an unrealistic representation of what occurs in
industry, it is worth noting that the participants from the study presented in chapter
three were all design practitioners and that the aspects of the design that they worked on
were in isolation of the rest of the design system. While uncommon the practice of the
‘lone designer’ is still active in industry. Prominent researchers such as Donald Norman
have discussed the topic of ‘design by committee’ and championing the return to the
idea of ‘design dictator’ (Norman, 2005). Norman describes how sometimes when
design decisions are made by one individual, rather than by a consortium, the usability
can improve, and ‘design by committee’ can in some instances be harmful to the overall
design process. The isolated aspect of the participations in this research is a valid
concern, but the idea of design decision-making from an individual perspective is not
without precedent. The interaction between analogical persistence and groups of
designers is an important area that should be addressed in future research. While
Chapter 8 & 9 highlighted the problem with using individual focused design methods to
overcome analogical persistence, the use of group focused design methods such as
Design Consequences (Reichelt, 2007) or Parallel Design (Myles, 2010) why be a
promising next step in examining ecologically valid design methods to overcome
analogical persistence.
10.2.2. Future Directions
This dissertation closes with an examination of a possible way to mitigate some of the
problematic elements of analogical persistence. The primary goal of the last portion of
the thesis was to examine ecologically appropriate tools that Interaction Designers
could use in-situ to aid in reducing the problematic elements of analogical persistence.
By looking at tools such as Structured Reflection (encouraged reflection using
principles from Design Rationale) we were hoping to find a design method that suited
our needs. Instead, the intersection of Reflection and Design Rationale actually created
more problems than it solved by actually fostering analogical persistence. As briefly
discussed in the limitations section, by shifting our focus away from the individual
designer to design tools with a collaborative component, we may be more likely to
mitigate analogical persistence. Both Design Consequences (Reichelt, 2007) and
Parallel Design (Myles, 2010) share the same goal of eliminating problematic elements
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from the artefact by encouraging a greater understanding of the design space, but rather
than encourage reflection on a personal level, a secondary designer is used to prompt
and encourage the designer to engage with the problematic elements of the design. Both
of these tools could be modified so that the reflection on the artefact could be shifted to
the analogies that are being used in the decision-making process.
Design Consequences is a collaborative design tool devised by Reichelt (2007)
which focuses on an iterative design refinement process between several members of
the design team. The Design Consequences exercise begins with the team, of no more
than eight individuals, being briefed on the design problem as well as provided with
several examples of the type of output that the designers are expecting to get out of the
exercise. After this initial introduction and brief, each designer sketches for seven
minutes a possible solution to the provided design brief. Next each designer passes their
solution to the designer directly to their right. The next designer then further
refines/builds upon that design for another seven minutes, with the opportunity to ask
the previous designer for any clarification regarding their design. At the end of that
design interval, each designer must present the sketch they are currently working on to
the group of designers to receive group feedback. The strength of the Design
Consequences tool is that it hinges on the secondary designer continuing the design
process as a way to refine the proposed solution by building on the strengths of the idea
and eliminating the problematic characteristics. At first glance this particular design tool
seems to fall prey to some of the issues raised by this dissertation, i.e. the priming effect
of example solutions; however, this particular tool aims to address issues like that
through the different understanding of the solution space that your fellow designer has.
The locus of this technique is not grounded in understanding the design space in greater
detail, but rather using the secondary designer’s different understanding of the solution
space to highlight information that may have been suppressed by the original designers
understanding of the solution space.
Parallel Design (Meyles, 2010) is another design tool that leverages different
perspectives on the design space to eliminate problematic elements from the proposed
artefact and make better informed design decisions. Under the Parallel Design method
designers are assigned to one of several small design teams (the goal is to have groups
of roughly equivalent skill sets and levels). All of the design teams are then briefed on
the design problem as well as the goals of the design session. Each of the small design
teams will work on their ideas in parallel. No communication is allowed between the
different design teams. After a pre-determined time limit, each design team comes
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together and presents their team’s idea to the larger grouping of designers. Feedback is
given on each design with the goal of one particular idea being selected to be continued
to the next stage of development. This iterative design process combined with the
efficiency of parallel design groups provides a foundation from a method in which
problematic characteristics of the proposed solution are removed from the artefact.
Both Parallel Design and Design Consequences leverage the different
understandings of the same solution provided by different designers. It is hoped that this
feedback from fellow designers can be used as a source to make better design decisions,
which could mitigate the potential pitfalls of analogical persistence on the decision-
making process of Interaction Designers.
10.3. Final Conclusions
This thesis challenges two important views that are currently held about design
decision-making. Firstly, from a theoretical perspective the work presented over the
previous nine chapters has tested the current view that the analogies are simply used in
the first stage of decision-making to scope the problem space and quickly engage with
the problem. Researchers, such as Klein (1999), have postulated that the issues inherent
to these analogies are refined and removed over later stages of decision-making. Our
work highlights the fact that problematic characteristics can persist across the entire
decision-making process from idea generation through to solution selection. Secondly,
from a practical perspective, we have drawn attention to the fact that some of the design
methods currently employed to aid in improving design decisions can actually increase
analogical persistence.
This thesis provides a strong body of evidence to challenge some of the
theoretical and practical assumptions we have of the decision-making processes
employed by Interaction Designers and provide a basis for future design tools aimed at
helping Interaction Designers come to higher quality decisions.
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12. Appendix A: Materials for Chapter 4
The Bicycle Rack Problem
Brief: Design a car-mounted bicycle rack. Your proposed solution must satisfy the
following issues: 1) easy mounting of at least three bicycles; 2) easy mounting of the
rack; 3) the proposed bicycle rack cannot harm the bike or the car; 4) the rack must be
versatile for all makes of both bikes and cars.
Proposed solutions need not be detailed or complete. A simple sketch complete with
annotations is all that is required. You have twenty-five minutes to complete this
exercise. You are not limited to one solution. You may propose as many solutions as
you would like.
Example: Below is an example of a present day bike rack. The bicycle is set in the rails
and the vinyl coated hook is attached to the seat tube of the bike, and then the hook is
tightened down by hand with a wing nut. One should note the difficult in mounting the
middle bikes on the rack.
159
The Spill Proof Coffee Cup
Brief: The goal of this problem is to design an inexpensive, disposable, spill-proof
coffee cup. The proposed solutions must satisfy the following issues: 1) The propose
solution must be operable by one hand; 2) must be durable; 3) there must be no straws
or mouthpieces included in the proposed solution.
Proposed solutions need not be detailed or complete. A simple sketch complete with
annotations is all that is required. You have twenty-five minutes to complete this
exercise. You are not limited to one solution. You may propose as many solutions as
you would like
Example: Below is an example solution to show how each design should be presented.
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Medicine Dispenser/ Reminder for Elderly Individuals
Brief: Design an apparatus that will dispense as well as remind a patient when to take
their medications. The following issues must be addressed in the proposed solutions: 1)
Remind the individual which medication to take, 2) Keep track of medication taken, 3)
Device must be able to alert elderly individuals who suffer from a range of sensory
impairments such as Hearing difficulties and being short-sighted, 4) Must be able to
handle medication at least two different time periods in one day.
Proposed solutions need not be detailed or complete. A simple sketch complete with
annotations is all that is required. You have twenty-five minutes to complete this
exercise. You are not limited to one solution. You may propose as many solutions as
you would like
Example: Below is an example solution to show how each design should be presented.
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Digital music library manager
Brief: Design a programme, which will organize and play digital music on an old
computer which has limited resources. This programme is targeted at older computers
so a minimal interface is necessary. The following issues must be addressed in the
proposed solutions: 1) Unnecessary graphics should be avoided 2) Buttons be kept to
minimum 3) Be able to add and delete tracks 4) Display the current playing song 5)
Manage the volume 6) Be able to navigate to other tracks in the collection 7) Be able to
Stop, Pause, and Play tracks.
Proposed solutions need not be detailed or complete. A simple sketch complete with
annotations is all that is required. You have twenty-five minutes to complete this
exercise. You are not limited to one solution. You may propose as many solutions as
you would like
Example: Below is an example solution to show how each design should be presented.
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Current Degree: _____________
Year of Study: _______________
Educational Background (undergrad degree, etc):______________________
_____________________________________________________________
Please rate you familiarity with the following items:
Music Management Programs
1 2 3 4 5




1 2 3 4 5








Same shapes, patterns, type of car, tire railings, suction cups,




1) Use of top of the car, 2) use of suction cups, 3) use of tire
railings, 4) use of the same type of sketch angle, 5) use of




1) Alternative ways to attach car, instead of suction cups, 2)
Alternative ways to secure bike on the rack
0-2
Intentional flaws The generation of a top-mount design 0-1
Unintentional
flaws
1) The use of suction cups to hold rack on car, 2) placing






Same shapes, patterns, and angle as example design, as well




1) Use of straw, 2) use of mouthpiece (extension of cup lid),
3) use of overflow device inside of cup (bent straw), 4) use
of the same type of sketch angle, 5) use of same type of




1) Alternative ways to prevent overflowing instead of bent
straw 2) alternative ways to insulate cup
0-2
Intentional flaws 1) use of straw that would leak, 2) styrofoam, squeezable




1) base of the cup is narrower then the top 2) a straw that is













1) Top mounted compartments, 2) same sketch angle, 3) one





1) Alternative ways to provide reminder in single unit (eg.
vibration), 2) alternative ways to dispense medicine (isolated
compartments)
0-2





1) ambiguous controls (simply copy set time and set pill
buttons) 2) no notification for people with visual











1) use of album 2) vertical volume bar 3) use of excessive
controls, 4) use of cover flow 5) use of arrows to navigate





1) Alternative ways to display playing music (different
method but still with controls under track information), 2)
alternative ways to navigate music collection (tracks separate
and grouped by album)
0-2





1) not able to search, 2) no display for current track 0-2
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13. Appendix B: Materials used in
Chapter 5
Calendar
Brief: Simple home based computers are able to handle complex graphics but yet not all
applications take advantage of this fact. Design a new calendar system that keeps track
of appointments as well as display the current date. Proposed designs must meet several
requirements: 1) able to add/remove appointments, 2) be able to navigate between all
twelve months 3) display current date as well as appointments for that day.
Proposed solutions need not be detailed or complete. A simple sketch complete with
annotations is all that is required. You have fifteen minutes to complete this exercise.
You are not limited to one solution. You may propose as many solutions as you would
like
Example: Below is an example solution to show how each design should be presented.
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Nail Clipper
Cutting and cleaning our nails is a necessary and common activity, but despite of it's
commonality people can still use upwards of three different devices to cut their
fingernails, cut their toenails, and clean their nails.. Design a single device which is able
to accomplish these three activities. Each proposed design must conforms to the
following requirements: 1) the use of minimal components, 2) is able to finger as well
as toe nails, 3) is able to clean underneath the nails.
Proposed solutions need not be detailed or complete. A simple sketch complete with
annotations is all that is required. You have fifteen minutes to complete this exercise.
You are not limited to one solution. You may propose as many solutions as you would
like
Example: Below is an example solution to show how each design should be presented.
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1) Cube like rotation 2) Simple grid system 3) Drop down





1) Use of 3D view 2) Floating calendar sections 3) Non-




1) Static weeks will not work, 2) Ambiguous navigation
between months, 3) No current display for month/year, 4)
Secondary information to display detailed information
0-4














1) Use of single lever system 2) Separation of pressure and





1) Single Cantilever, 2) No cleaning 0-2
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14. Appendix C: Materials From the
Pilot Study in Chapter 6
Ergonomic Laptop – Based on US patent (US5278779)
Brief: The occurrence of Repetitive Strain Injury (RSI) is on the increase as the use of
poorly designed input devices are used, with laptops being particularly bad. Redesign a
laptop that is more in keeping with ergonomic considerations. The primary goal of this
redesign is to reduce the strain on users and reduce ergonomic related injuries. Each
proposed redesign must take into account the following criteria: 1) Reduce strain on the
user, 2) durable build, 3) easily portable.
Proposed solutions need not be detailed or complete. A simple sketch complete with
annotations is all that is required. You have fifteen minutes to complete this exercise.
You are not limited to one solution. You may propose as many solutions as you would
like
Example: Below is an example solution to show how each design should be presented.
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Calendar
Brief: Simple home-based computers are able to handle complex graphics but yet not all
applications take advantage of this fact. Design a new calendar system that keeps track
of appointments as well as display the current date. Proposed designs must meet several
requirements: 1) able to add/remove appointments, 2) be able to navigate between all
twelve months 3) display current date as well as appointments for that day.
Proposed solutions need not be detailed or complete. A simple sketch complete with
annotations is all that is required. You have fifteen minutes to complete this exercise.
You are not limited to one solution. You may propose as many solutions as you would
like.
Example: Below is an example solution to show how each design should be presented.
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Music Player
Brief: Design a programme, which will organize and play digital music on an old
computer which has limited resources. This programme is targeted at older computers
so a minimal interface is necessary. The following issues must be addressed in the
proposed solutions: 1) Unnecessary graphics should be avoided 2) Buttons be kept to
minimum 3) Be able to add and delete tracks 4) Display the current playing song 5)
Manage the volume 6) Be able to navigate to other tracks in the collection 7) Be able to
Stop, Pause, and Play tracks.
Proposed solutions need not be detailed or complete. A simple sketch complete with
annotations is all that is required. You have fifteen minutes to complete this exercise.
You are not limited to one solution. You may propose as many solutions as you would
like
Example: Below is an example solution to show how each design should be presented.
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Marine Mammal communication system (based on US patent US5392735)
Brief: Although the surface of the earth is mostly covered by oceans little is known of
what happens beneath the waves. Marine Biologists are interested in developing a
system to communicate with intelligent marine mammals in hope of learning more
about the ecology of the oceans. The following issues must be taken in to considerations
in any and all proposed solutions: 1) be able to send and receive messages, 2) Be able to
deal with a range of questions ranging form simple yes/no questions to more complex
questions such as 'how many are in your pod?', 3) Be able to communicate at various
depths
Proposed solutions need not be detailed or complete. A simple sketch complete with
annotations is all that is required. You have fifteen minutes to complete this exercise.
You are not limited to one solution. You may propose as many solutions as you would
like.
Example: Below is an example solution to show how each design should be presented.
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Medicine Dispenser
Brief: Design an apparatus that will dispense as well as remind a patient when totake their medications. The following issues must be addressed in the proposedsolutions: 1) Remind the individual which medication to take, 2) Keep track ofmedication taken, 3) Device must be able to alert elderly individuals who sufferfrom a range of sensory impairments such as Hearing difficulties and being short-sighted, 4) Must be able to handle medication at least two different time periods inone day.Proposed solutions need not be detailed or complete. A simple sketch completewith annotations is all that is required. You have twenty-five minutes to completethis exercise. You are not limited to one solution. You may propose as manysolutions as you would like
Example: Below is an example solution to show how each design should bepresented.
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Lost Key Locater
With an ever growing number of items that people can carry on their person at one time
it is no surprise that many of these items are misplaced and can be difficult at times to
locate. Design a system that organizes and can help locate items when they are
misplaced in the household. Proposed designs must conform to the following criteria: 1)
Must be able to help organise common items that people carry on their person such as
mobile phones, MP3 player, glasses and keys. 2) Be able to locate any of those items if
misplace.
Proposed solutions need not be detailed or complete. A simple sketch complete with
annotations is all that is required. You have twenty-five minutes to complete this
exercise. You are not limited to one solution. You may propose as many solutions as
you would like.
Example: Below is an example solution to show how each design should be presented.
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15. Appendix D: Materials used in
Chapter 6 & 7
Calendar
Brief: Simple home-based computers are able to handle complex graphics but yet not all
applications take advantage of this fact. Design a new calendar system that keeps track
of appointments as well as display the current date. Proposed designs must meet several
requirements: 1) able to add/remove appointments, 2) be able to navigate between all
twelve months 3) display current date as well as appointments for that day.
Proposed solutions need not be detailed or complete. A simple sketch complete with
annotations is all that is required. You have fifteen minutes to complete this exercise.
You are not limited to one solution. You may propose as many solutions as you would
like.
Example: Below is an example solution to show how each design should be presented.









1) Cube like rotation 2) Simple grid system 3) Drop down





1) Use of 3D view 2) Floating calendar sections 3) Non-




1) Static weeks will not work, 2) Ambiguous navigation
between months, 3) No current display for month/year, 4)
Secondary information to display detailed information
0-4
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Marine Mammal communication system (based on US patent US5392735)
Brief: Although the surface of the earth is mostly covered by oceans little is known of
what happens beneath the waves. Marine Biologists are interested in developing a
system to communicate with intelligent marine mammals in hope of learning more
about the ecology of the oceans. The following issues must be taken in to considerations
in any and all proposed solutions: 1) be able to send and receive messages, 2) Be able to
deal with a range of questions ranging form simple yes/no questions to more complex
questions such as 'how many are in your pod?', 3) Be able to communicate at various
depths
Proposed solutions need not be detailed or complete. A simple sketch complete with
annotations is all that is required. You have fifteen minutes to complete this exercise.
You are not limited to one solution. You may propose as many solutions as you would
like.
Example: Below is an example solution to show how each design should be presented.









1) Same sketch angle, 2) Use of board and boat, 3)




1) Use of touch sensitive buttons to communicate, 2) Two




1) Lack of proper communication buttons, 2) Inappropriate
feedback for mammals (sound would be more appropriate)
0-2
